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Abstract
Emerging network scenarios are characterized by intensive access to a wide range of services
and applications that have increased the demands of communication networks. The
traditional network management models have been characterized by a high dependence on
the human factor to carry out network configuration and maintenance tasks. This situation
has become less sustainable in mobile networks not only due to the associated operational
(COPEX) and capital investment costs (CAPEX), but also due to the complexity they
have acquired when facing the exponential immersion of mobile devices. These aspects
have led to the emergence of the fifth generation of mobile networks, characterized by
ambitious performance indicators that must be fulfilled to meet the agreed service levels.
5G networks are grounded on the integration of technological advances promoted by
Software Defined Networks (SDN), Network Functions Virtualization (NFV), artificial
intelligence, among others, that have shifted the traditional network management
paradigms towards a self-organized and software-driven approach. It is therefore essential
to develop analytical methods based on artificial intelligence techniques to obtain
knowledge about the state of the network in order to infer possible situations that might
put the operativity of the network at risk. To this end, this research focuses on the study
of knowledge acquisition methods aimed to introduce self-organization capabilities in 5G
networks. It should be also noted that this thesis has been framed in the SELFNET
project (Framework for Self-organized Network Management in Virtualized and Software
Defined Networks) funded by the Horizon 2020 program of the European Commission,
whose purpose is the design and implementation of an autonomic management framework
for 5G networks. As a result, SELFNET has provided a reference architecture for the
development of the proposals conducted as part of this research.
This thesis also provides a review of the state of the art in 5G networks and their
supportive technologies. Likewise, diverse prediction and pattern recognition methods
have been studied in detail in order to conduct analytical processes focused on the
acquisition of knowledge about the monitored networks.
The performed research proposed also an analytical framework oriented to the
acquisition of knowledge in emerging network scenarios based on the architectural
principles described above. The evaluation of such proposal has shown its effectiveness
in view of the results obtained in the experimentation stage. This evaluation has been
conducted both at individual component level and at use case level.
On the other hand, detection methods for two major threats have been studied from
the perspective of emerging communication scenarios. The first of them focuses on
xxxiii
xxxiv LIST OF TABLES
the detection of Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attacks in cloud computing
environments. This approach has been based on the study of anomalous behaviors of the
entropy degree measured on application-level metrics. The effectiveness of the proposal has
led to its study in self-organized network scenarios, where it has been also demonstrated
acceptable levels of precision in the light of the results. The second detection method
has focused on inferring the participation of a network device in a Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack. The proposed model has been based on the knowledge acquisition
principles established as part of this research, demonstrating also acceptable levels of
accuracy in the evaluated experimental scenarios.
Finally, the conducted research has opened interesting lines of future work described
at the end of this thesis.
Keywords: 5G, cloud computing, DDoS, EDoS, prediction, pattern recognition,
reasoning, Self-Organizing Networks, Software Defined Networking.
Resumen
Los escenarios de red emergentes esta´n caracterizados por el acceso intensivo a una amplia
gama de servicios y aplicaciones que han incrementado las exigencias de las redes de
comunicacio´n. Los modelos de gestio´n de red tradicionales se han caracterizado a su vez
por una alta dependencia del factor humano para llevar a cabo tareas de configuracio´n y
mantenimiento de la red. Esta situacio´n se ha hecho menos sostenible en las redes mo´viles
no so´lo por los costes operacionales y de inversio´n de capital asociados, sino tambie´n
por la complejidad que estas han adquirido ante la inmersio´n exponencial de dispositivos
mo´viles. Tales aspectos han motivado el surgimiento de la quinta generacio´n de redes
mo´viles, caracterizadas por indicadores de desempen˜o ambiciosos que deben cumplirse
para satisfacer los niveles de servicio acordados.
Las redes 5G se sustentan en la integracio´n de los avances tecnolo´gicos promovidos
por las redes definidas por software (SDN), la virtualizacio´n de funciones de red (NFV),
la inteligencia artificial, entre otras, que han supuesto un cambio en los paradigmas
tradicionales de gestio´n hacia un enfoque autoorganizado y dirigido por software. Es
imprescindible por lo tanto el desarrollo de me´todos de ana´lisis basados en inteligencia
artificial para la obtencio´n de conocimiento acerca del estado de la red con el fin de
inferir posibles situaciones que puedan poner en riesgo la operatividad de la red. Con
este propo´sito, la presente investigacio´n se enfoca en el estudio de me´todos de adquisicio´n
de conocimiento orientados a introducir capacidades de auto organizacio´n en redes 5G.
Debe tenerse en cuenta tambie´n que esta tesis se ha enmarcado en el proyecto SELFNET
(Framework for Self-organized Network Management in Virtualized and Software Defined
Networks) perteneciente al programa Horizonte 2020 de la Comisio´n Europea, cuyo
propo´sito es el disen˜o e implementacio´n de un marco de gestio´n auto´noma para redes
5G. Como resultado, SELFNET ha proporcionado una arquitectura de referencia para el
desarrollo de las propuestas que conforman esta investigacio´n.
Esta tesis ofrece adema´s una revisio´n del estado del arte en redes 5G y las tecnolog´ıas en
las que se apoya. Asimismo, diversos me´todos de prediccio´n y reconocimiento de patrones
han sido estudiados en detalle con el fin de conducir procesos anal´ıticos enfocados en la
adquisicio´n de conocimiento sobre las redes monitorizadas.
La investigacio´n realizada propone tambie´n un marco de ana´lisis orientado a la
adquisicio´n de conocimiento en escenarios de red emergentes sustentado en los principios
arquitecto´nicos descritos anteriormente. La evaluacio´n de esta propuesta ha demostrado
su efectividad a la vista de los resultados obtenidos en la etapa de experimentacio´n. Esta
evaluacio´n se ha realizado tanto a nivel de componentes individuales como a nivel de casos
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de uso.
Por otra parte, me´todos de deteccio´n para dos tipos principales de amenazas han sido
estudiados desde la perspectiva de los escenarios de comunicacio´n emergentes. El primero
de ellos se enfoca en la deteccio´n de ataques de denegacio´n de la sostenibilidad econo´mica
(EDoS) en entornos de computacio´n en la nube. Dicha aproximacio´n se ha sustentado
en el estudio de comportamientos ano´malos del grado de entrop´ıa observado en me´tricas
a nivel de aplicacio´n. La efectividad de esta propuesta ha dado lugar a su estudio en
escenarios de red auto organizados, demostrando tambie´n un alto nivel de precisio´n sobre
la base de los resultados obtenidos. El segundo me´todo de deteccio´n, se ha enfocado en
inferir la participacio´n de un dispositivo de red en un ataque de denegacio´n de servicio
distribuido (DDoS). El modelo propuesto se ha sustentado en los principios de adquisicio´n
de conocimiento establecidos como parte de esta investigacio´n, y ha demostrado niveles
aceptables de precisio´n en los escenarios evaluados.
Finalmente, la investigacio´n realizada ha abierto interesantes l´ıneas de trabajo futuro
descritas al final de esta tesis.
Palabras clave: 5G, computacio´n en la nube, DDoS, EDoS, prediccio´n, razonamiento,
reconocimiento de patrones, redes autoorganizadas, redes definidas por software.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Information technology has brought an unlimited number of opportunities to overcome
a broad range of societal challenges with innovative solutions characterized by higher
productivity and lower response times. This fact was clearly evidenced throughout the last
decades by the emergence of communication networks, which have involved significative
changes motivated by a steady immersion of the Internet in almost every aspect of our lives.
With the rapid proliferation of mobile devices, this immersion has been strengthened since
the higher demand of ubiquitous network services opened new challenges for all technology
providers, but particularly for telecommunication operators.
Network architectures have strained to evolve as the operational context has gained
complexity. Traditional networks have been limited by the rigidity of both physical devices
and telecommunication infrastructures on which standardization processes (e.g. signaling
or protocols) were slow, hence the agile delivery of network solutions has been constrained.
This situation has been worsened by the tight integration of control and data planes in the
network devices, where the limitation of computing and networking resources has raised
restrictiveness when dealing with agility. For instance, throughput or memory capacity
have been critical in the manufacturing of a network device in order to be compliant
with a specific protocol family. Likewise, configuration tasks have also been manually
performed, so that tehy have caused higher network downtimes with less operational
costs efficiency. However, and despite the intrinsic network limitations, significative
technology enhancements have been achieved as network generations have evolved. For
instance, in the overall perceived Quality of Experience (QoE) in 2G mobile networks
compared with 4G. Such enhancements have been fostered by novel trends such as Software
Defined Networking (SDN), Network Function Virtualization (NFV), and other technology
enablers; thus laying the foundations for the fifth generation of mobile networks.
5G networks should provide a sustainable and scalable network infrastructure to
meet the exponentially-increasing demands on mobile broadband access [5G-18], while
leveraging competitiveness, standardization and faster innovation. 5G networks were
designed to meet prominent requirements [NGM15] in system performance, enhanced
services provision, deployment times, as well as operational, energy and management
efficiency. 5G networks should guarantee several outstanding attributes such as faster
recovery times, higher traffic demands, higher Quality of Service (QoS) and Quality of
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
Experience (QoE), lower operational (OPEX) and capital (CAPEX) expenditures, among
others. This generational change is driven by economic, societal and operational trends
to conform the global network of the 21st century [Eur09].
Network management poses in turn new challenges for 5G networks to be faced not
only with automation efficiency but also with the development of smart self-organizing
schemas. The inclusion of artificial intelligence is thereby mandatory to shift from
a policy-based configuration and incident response model towards a self-management
approach grounded on reasoning and machine learning capabilities. This paradigm shift
entails the acquisition of knowledge from the managed network in order to timely decide
the most suited actions to be enforced when an incident arises. It should be also noted
that conducting advanced analytical processes requires computational capacity as well as
specialized software elements seamlessly orchestrated to produce real-time responses to
a range of network problems. For this reason, the separation of the data, control and
management planes plays an essential role since the logic for handling network traffic (e.g.
by deploying security measures, adjusting bandwidth consumption, etc.) can be leveraged
to high-level software applications. Even though a software-driven management model
can open an unlimited number of alternatives, network management in 5G is challenging
enough to cope with the requirements of next generation networks. Hence, it also raises
new opportunities for the research community.
Given the complexity of emerging 5G network architectures, incident management
becomes more critical to fulfill the agreed service levels. Timely responses to restore the
normal operational conditions of the network are not straightforward and require a proper
understanding of the monitored context for conducting effective decision-making processes.
Information technology standards (such as ISO or NIST) and best-practices frameworks
(such as COBIT or ITIL) suggest performing incident management processes by means of:
the framing of the observed context, the assessment of its potential risks, the monitoring of
the identified threats and the deployment of timely response actions. This process stresses
the importance of conducting a complex analysis of the monitored data in order to detect
or anticipate the occurrence of situations that might disrupt the agreed service levels.
Because of the heterogeneity of the monitored scenarios, which will be considerably higher
in 5G networks, the enforcement of appropriate countermeasures or preventive responses
should rely on effective knowledge acquisition processes adapted to different use cases.
Thereby, important research lines are posed towards the accomplishment of this goal.
To contribute with the development of advanced self-organizing capabilities adapted to
the autonomic management approach foreseen in 5G networks, the present thesis tackles
the study of knowledge-based analysis methods targeted on inferring potential network
incidents in emmerging communication scenarios. The conducted research takes advantage
of the innovations posed by the supportive technologies of 5G networks when laying out
architectural considerations aligned with the design principles of 5G. Hence, granting
self-organizing capabilities to accomplish their performance indicators. The conducted
research proposed new approaches to tackle with the challenges of network incident
management, and their outcomes have suggested promising results while rasising interest
research lines for future work.
1.1. Research Problem 3
1.1 Research Problem
This section outlines the main areas taken as the baseline for conducting the present
thesis. They pose the research problem and objectives which rule the development of this
research.
Current technological trends arise complex requirements to be addressed, and the
solutions to cope with them involve a seamless integration of novel concepts applied to
emerging scenarios. In the area of modern communication networks, research efforts have
been committed to deliver innovative solutions for both common and novel problems
related with network management. In particular, the application of data analytics in
network management for achieving self-organizing features has drawn the attention of the
research community, being the main research topic of this thesis as well .
With the emergence of the fifth generation of mobile networks, some research projects
have been undertaken towards the creation of autonomic management models aimed to
fulfill the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) posed by 5G. They share the common
concern of dealing with massive amounts of data originated at different architectural
levels of the network infrastructure, on which the application of suitable analysis
techniques demands a proper comprehension of the operational context. Therefore, the
enforcement of preventive or reactive countermeasures to mitigate network incidents and
likely service degradation situations depends on the correct modeling of the analyzed
domain driven by cognitive approaches. Since 5G technology is currently under
development, the implementation of such complex networks intended to support millions
of connected devices lay a major challenge in the design of analytical components suited
for such architectures. Likewise, those components should play an essential role in the
accomplishment of self-organizing capabilities through their seamless interaction with
other 5G architectural entities. Both the role of the autonomic management entities
and the architectural design considerations pose important fields of study throughout this
research.
Furthermore, this thesis has been framed into the SELFNET project. SELFNET
(Self-Organized Network Management in Virtualized and Software Defined Networks) is
a research project funded by the European Commission under the H2020 programme,
which is aimed to develop a management framework for achieving self-organizing
capabilities in 5G networks. For this purpose, SELFNET combines leading technologies
such as Software Defined Networking (SDN), cloud computing, Network Function
Virtualization (NFV), Artificial Intelligence (AI), among others, for the designing and
implementation of a multi-tenant aware management framework targeted to address
three use cases: self-optimization, self-healing and self-protection. SELFNET considers
the vast heterogeneity of the operational domains as well, and defines in turn a
multi-layered architecture entailing to distinguish data, control and management planes
for the automatic provision of responses to network incidents. This project has provided
a reference architecture on which the present research has been grounded. There, the
core self-organizing functionalities of SELFNET are conducted by the Autonomic Layer,
where analytical approaches should be explored for the accomplishment of efficient network
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management. Consequently, the Autonomic Layer has been the component of interest of
the present thesis.
The literature review disclosed also that data analysis methods in 5G networks
have been barely addressed by the research community, being this the reason why the
contributions of this thesis have been oriented towards their study. In this landscape,
it has been hypothesized that knowledge-based methods can be suited to conduct data
analysis processes aimed on the inference of situations that might disrupt the normal
operation of the monitored network. It has led to the distinction of two major research
stages: the study of a general-purpose knowledge acquisition approach framed into the 5G
architecture, and an in-depth study of well-defined use cases where the effectiveness of the
proposed approach is validated.
It has been outlined the importance of having a deep understanding about the network
in order to enable effective decision-making processes on the basis of the comprehension of
the current network status and the projected scenarios. In that direction, the Situational
Awareness (SA) model proposed by Endsley has recently drawn the attention of the
research community due to its suitability for understanding the monitored environment.
The SA model also facilitates an effective decision-making oriented towards the mitigation
of common network problems. Hence, the present research has studied existing incident
management approaches grounded in the Endsley’s model, from which the three SA stages
(perception, comprehension and projection) have been analyzed, with special attention on
the comprehension and projection stages.
The aforementioned context has led to pose the research problem of this thesis on the
adaptation of well-known feature extraction techniques, forecasting algorithms, pattern
recognition methods and rule-based reasoning for designing an analysis framework targeted
on granting autonomic management capabilities on self-organizing architectures. This
approach is driven by use cases foreseen in emerging communication networks, which
requirements must be addressed. Such use cases deal with the inference of situations that
represent a likely degradation or disruption of the agreed service levels in the network.
The proper assessment of the proposed knowledge acquisition process poses an
important challenge as well. This situation gains relevance due to the fact that, at the
time of this writing, there are no well-known evaluation methodologies suited for 5G
analytics. Furthermore, the accuracy on inferring network problems should be assessed
on well-defined use cases adapted to 5G networks. For experimental purposes, special
attention has been put on self-protecting capabilities, taking into account the SELFNET
approach. To this end, the accuracy on detecting network incidents has been validated
on two reference use cases related to Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) and
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) threats. Nevertheless, it is important to remark
that the knowledge acquisition approach developed throughout this research is not limited
to the self-protection domain, but to any other use case. For instance, and aside from
self-protection, self-optimization, self-healing and self-configuration are the cornerstone
use cases of self-organizing networks. Those could be properly embraced under the same
analytical approach presented in this work, as it was showcased in the SELFNET project.
Novel network threats have also emerged through the last years, which will take another
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nuance from the perspective of 5G networks. This is the case of Economic Denial of
Sustainability (EDoS) attacks originated in cloud computing infrastructures, which has
motivated the definition of the first use case. EDoS attacks are targeted on exploiting
common vulnerabilities of the auto-scaling mechanisms with the aim to deplete the hired
computational resources, thus giving rise to the economic unsustainability of the offered
services. EDoS threats have drawn the attention of the research community, which led
to the definition of detection and mitigation proposals. Since 5G networks are strongly
dependent on virtualization platforms for provisioning services on-demand, the study of
EDoS threats pose a novel research problem. Notwithstanding the importance of these
attacks, the literature review disclosed two open challenges scarcely addressed. Firstly,
their detection approaches are mostly grounded on network traffic metrics, hence missing
the study of behavioral patterns of the auto-scaling policies in the cloud platform itself.
Secondly, and to the best of the author’s knowledge, EDoS detection has not been studied
in the context of self-organizing networks framed in 5G architectures. Because of this, the
present research explores the adaptation of novel EDoS detection methods supported by
self-organizing capabilities. To this end, a formal definition of this threat and a proper
validation of the use case is mandatory. These subjects have been addressed throughout
this research.
Similarly, the detection and mitigation of DDoS attacks remains as an open research
problem, which has lay the grounds of the second use case. DDoS has been largely studied
and several detection and mitigation techniques have been proposed in the literature.
However, they exhibit two aspects that should addressed for enhancing their effectiveness.
On the one hand, the dynamicity of DDoS attacks in 5G networks will be characterized by
the heterogeneity of the connected devices and their ability to conduct more sophisticated
attacks, so raising a new concern for IT administrators. On the other hand, the possibilities
to mitigate such threats are expected to be considerable higher within 5G networks, being
its adaptation to non-stationary environments a distinctive trait. Aside from that, many
users nowadays ask themselves if their devices could be taking part of DDoS attacks, for
which detection methods based on source-side analysis of DDoS traffic plays an essential
role. However, this trait has been scarcely studied by the research community and remains
a research open topic. To this end, the present research explores a source-side DDoS
detection approach based on knowledge acquisition by taking advantage of self-organizing
capabilities. In addition, its adaptability to 5G architectures must be gounded on data
heterogeneity, source traffic-flow analysis and non-stationary forecasting. Those aspects
have been accounted for accomplishing the goals of this use case.
1.2 Motivation
At the time of this writing, the fifth generation of mobile networks is under development
and it is expected to have its first commercial releases by the year 2020. Moreover, most
of the 5G supportive technologies, such as SON, NFV and SDN, rather than reaching
high maturity, are also still under development. A situation that has motivated the
interest of the researchers in the last years. Such technological landscape has led to the
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development of innovative and challenging projects whilst fostering high competitiveness
in the academia and the industry. A fact that has been recently evidenced by the research
literature.
Therefore, the research efforts committed towards the fulfillment of the first
implementation of 5G have specially motivated the development of this thesis. The
immersion of 5G networks is foreseen to drive outstanding changes for the society and the
economy in the forthcoming years, hence relying on their capabilities to provide ubiquitous
access to ultra-dense networks operating at high data rates. It is then expected by the
current society to take part of such technological shift from its roots to their achievement.
From a scientific perspective, conducting research within emerging trends entails a
challenging task since most of them have not reached the maturity achieved by well-known
technologies. It poses a strong incentive to look for open issues where traditional
formulas must be rethought or designed from scratch, which in the meantime brings higher
uncertainty.
On the land of SDN and NFV, the separation of control and data planes has opened
innumerable alternatives for managing complex network architectures from high-level
applications. This fact has facilitated the design of novel solutions based entirely on
software, disregarding low-level network aspects delegated to the data plane. In the
meantime, the ability to provide self-organizing capabilities in 5G scenarios poses an
additional motivation since cognitive approaches must be considerable enhanced. Those
must be capable to conduct advanced analysis methods taking into account that existing
computational limitations will be significantly reduced in 5G networks.
In addition, the study of well-known and novel network incidents contextualized into
the 5G ecosystem embraces the definition of use cases for validation purposes, as is the case
of the detection of EDoS and DDoS threats. Given the lack of existing 5G infrastructures,
the development of experimental testbeds in the management side entails new challenges.
Thereupon, novel 5G management frameworks, like the one provided by the SELFNET
project, brought reference architectures which have inspired the proposal of self-protective
capabilities for the aforementioned threats.
1.3 Objectives
The fifth generation of mobile networks has raised many challenging objectives that
should be addressed in a near future, a situation that is clearly evidenced in the research
landscape. This situation has led to contextualize the scope of this thesis into the area
of autonomic management in 5G networks, with interest on self-organizing approaches.
Therefore, this research lays out a main objective: the study of analytical methods for
providing knowledge acquisition capabilities in self-organizing networks. Bearing this
in mind, this work comprises three fundamental aspects. Firstly, the design of a 5G
reasoning-based framework enabled for the detection of situations that are potential
symptoms of degradation or disruption of the agreed service levels of the network.
Secondly, the instantiation of the proposed framework into a self-organizing architecture.
Thirdly, the evaluation of the detection capabilities on specific use cases framed into
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emerging network environments.
For the accomplishment of the proposed objectives, the following activities shall be
conducted as part of this research:
1. An in-depth study of the state of the art on 5G and supportive technologies.
2. Review of the most relevant prediction and pattern recognition methods.
3. Definition of a reasoning framework based on prediction and pattern recognition
methods for acquiring knowledge in 5G networks.
4. Definition of evaluation use cases based on the analysis of well-known and novel
network threats adapted to 5G self-organized scenarios.
5. Definition of high level metrics for inferring potential situations that might produce
the disruption or degradation of the agreed service levels.
6. Implementation of analytic detection methods suited to self-organizing networks to
address the requirements of each use case.
7. Assessment of the proposed methods when detecting network threats within the
context of the reference use cases.
1.4 Contributions of this Thesis
The contributions of this thesis are illustrated in Figure 1.1. They are arranged in a matrix
where the rows represent the areas of knowledge and the column identifiers stand for the
contribution. The intersections denote the level of degree achieved by each contribution
on the corresponding research area. Therefore, the following are identified as the key areas
of knowledge: Fifth generation mobile networks (5G), Self-Organizing Networks (SON),
Software Defined Networking (SDN), Cloud Computing, Prediction, Pattern Recognition
and Incident Management.
To lay the background on 5G and autonomic management capabilities, contributions
[SRA+16], [BWSMea17], [SMGV17] and [SMMVGV18a] have been considered.
In [SRA+16], the study of the reference SELFNET architecture for providing
self-management capabilities has grounded the design principles of a fully operational
control loop in 5G. This approach has been considered in [BWSMea17] to rise the
situational awareness adaptation for incident management in 5G networks. Bearing the
autonomic control loop management in mind, a theoretical defensive approach towards
crypto-ransomware mitigation has been exemplified in [SMMVGV18a]. In addition,
[SMGV17] addresses the SDN principles for driving a programmable network management.
The inclusion of data analytics for achieving autonomic management in 5G has been
initially studied in [SMMVGV17b] and [SMMVGV17c], leading to the integration of
well-known methods in prediction, pattern recognition and self-organizing capabilities
studied in [SMMVGV17d]. They have contributed for proposing a reasoning framework for
5G networks along with a detailed description of its workflows. A detailed assessment of
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Figure 1.1: Contributions of this thesis.
its capabilities in terms of prediction and pattern recognition accuracy has been provided
as well.
On the other hand, contributions in [SMMVGV17a] have led to the study of Economic
Denial of Sustainability threats, which has provided an updated state of the art on
EDoS attacks in cloud computing environments and the study of a novel Entropy-based
Economic Denial of Sustainability detection method based on predictive capabilities.
Hence, contributions in [SMMVGV18b] and [MVSMGV18] have led to the creation of
a 5G security architecture with intrusion detection capabilities targeted to mitigate EDoS
threats in self-organizing networks. Those contributions have grounded the proposal of
a similar approach for studying the detection of DDoS attacks at source-side, which has
been published in [HGLFMV+18].
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
Chapters 1 to 5 provide the theoretical background that contextualizes the research
problem and related knowledge areas. They are so intended to get the reader familiar
not only with the vast terminology regarding emerging networks, but also with updated
research advances on 5G and their supportive technologies. On the other hand, forecasting
and pattern recognition methods play a key role in the proposals introduced latter on this
thesis. This fact has motivated their inclusion in the state of the art chapters.
Chapters 6 to 10 introduce research proposals aimed to accomplish the objectives
stated in Chapter 1. Chapter 6 starts with the definition of a general-purpose knowledge
acquisition framework contextualized in 5G networks, which constitutes the reference
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architecture for addressing the use cases’ objectives. They, although different in nature,
share the same self-organizing approach when dealing with knowledge generation. Because
of that, an in-depth study of those use cases takes place in the next three chapters. In
them, the emerging network architectures and analytical methods previously introduced
are referenced for sketching out the proposals and experimental validation.
In order to facilitate the reader’s comprehension, this thesis has been structured as
follows:
Chapter 1 introduces the research context of this thesis by examining the general
landscape related with emerging network architectures, innovation fields and challenges.
They allow the definition of the research problem, objectives and knowledge areas where
the publications related to this thesis have contributed.
Chapter 2 reviews the state of the art of the fifth generation of mobile networks.
It remarks the challenging requirements, performance indicators and generational shift
fostered by their supportive technologies.
Chapter 3 introduces some research efforts towards the development of 5G networks,
where the SELFNET project is described in detail. This chapter raises also important
research areas that lay the grounds for the definition of novel use cases to be studied in
the forthcoming chapters.
Chapter 4 reviews the main families of prediction algorithms and the adaptive
thresholding methods widely referenced throughout this research. They are later studied
to generate factual knowledge for prediction-based analytics.
Chapter 5 describes a set of well-known pattern recognition methods for matching,
novelty detection and classification. Their ability to find discordances between samples
and reference data are later applied to enhance the knowledge acquisition process from
the network management perspective.
Chapter 6 focuses on the generation of knowledge about the network considering the
monitored environment. To this end, a reasoning framework is proposed. It combines
prediction, pattern recognition, adaptive thresholding and rule-based analysis capabilities,
thus accommodating an autonomous network management approach.
Chapter 7 addresses the Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) threat by delving
into its definition and characteristics for proposing a detection method suited for
virtualized environments.
Chapter 8 explores the implication of EDoS threats into the context of emerging
self-organizing networks, for which a novel detection strategy is proposed and assessed
in depth.
Chapter 9 delves into the source-side detection of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
threats in self-organizing networks. To this end, a novel detection method to infer the
participation of a device in a DDoS attack is studied.
Finally, Chapter 10 summarizes the contributions derived from this research and raises
some interesting lines of future work.

Chapter 2
5G: Fifth Generation Mobile
Network
This chapter presents a general overview of the fifth generation of mobile networks, their
challenges, requirements, Key Performance Indicators (KPI), and future trends. For a
better understanding of the reader, the chapter is organized in five sections. In Section
2.1, a broad picture of 5G network is presented. Section 2.2 describes requirements pushed
towards the development of 5G networks. Section 2.3 presents the main Key Performance
Indicators related with the accomplishment of 5G requirements. In Section 2.4, the main
5G supportive technologies are introduced. Finally, Section 2.5 provides the final remarks
of this chapter.
2.1 Overview to 5G
The growth of mobile devices connected to Internet has increased the number of user
necessities and, in consequence, the network requirements. Real challenges have raised in
terms of network performance indicators such as faster recovery times, lower latency, higher
transfer rates, less energy consumption, enhanced Quality of Service (QoS)an Quality of
Experience (QoE), among others.
It is expected that in the year 2020 the number of connected devices will exceed
20 billion [Gar17]. Hence, the main telecommunications operators are pushing novel
technologies in order to enhance the current network characteristics torward the fifth
mobile generation. 5G has thus emerged as the promising technology to deal with the
challenging requirements of future generation networks [NGM15]. It empowers a smart
integration of the most innovative advances on Network Function Virtualization (NFV),
cloud computing, Software-Defined Networking (SDN), Artificial Intelligence (AI) and
Self-Organizing Networks (SON). In particular, the synergies between SDN and SON
are addressed as a key research topic [Eur14] to enable the fulfillment of the disruptive
key performance indicators (KPIs) promoted by 5G [GRA16]. On this line, several
research initiatives in 5G have integrated cloud computing, SON and cognitive networks
to design modern and automated management architectures which are able to monitor
heterogeneous network infrastructures. That is achieved by the incorporation of analysis,
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decision-making and learning capabilities when inferring the status of complex network
scenarios, so the automatic enforcement of actions to mitigate risks or optimize operations
is possible [ABC+14].
5G will take advantage from the synergy of such technologies in order to provide
autonomic self-management. For this purpose, 5G should grant novel capabilities on
context modeling and network programmability to accomplish higher QoS/QoE levels,
more efficient operational (OPEX) and capital (CAPEX) costs, enhanced network trust
and privacy, and many other distinctive features [SYY+13][PZCG14]. In the mantime, this
mobile generation will be driven by economic, societal and operational trends on which
ensuring the network Service Level Agreements (SLAs) will be even more challenging.
Furthermore, 5G environments will have to face crucial issues related to scalability
[DMR16]. In this context, cloud computing can deal with these concerns by provisioning
unlimited resources (computing, storage and networking) when the service is needed.
On the other hand, Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) allows the deployment of Virtual
Application Functions (VAFs) such as critical applications, location services, data caching,
among others, closer to the edge location for granting the user higher bandwidth and lower
latency when the service is delivered. One of the main advantages of both cloud computing
and MEC is that virtual resources are deployed timely and with minimal effort. In this
way, the telecommunication providers can turn into a more profitable and efficient business
model benefited from a significative reduction on the operational costs.
A key aspect of 5G networks is the introduction of advanced data processing techniques.
In this regard, specialized analysis tasks and artificial intelligence methods should be
properly applied to generate knowledge based on the information gathered from the
network. Such advanced analysis relies on aggregation and correlation techniques applied
on low-level metrics acquired from both traditional monitoring tools and advanced network
sensors.
2.2 5G Requirements
In order to cover the main necessities of modern mobile networks, 5G requirements has
been divided in some application domains [NGM15][5G-16a], as is detailed in Table 2.1.
One of the main concerns is related to the number of devices/sensors connected to 5G
networks, a situation that becomes more complex considering the fact that the Internet
of Things (IoT) poses extra requirements that 5G must be able to cover. Such complexity
is raised by the user expectations on perceived quality, and even more by the business
model focused on agile service delivery. On this line, 5G demands additional efforts to be
undertaken by the research and industrial communities.
In general terms, 5G architectures must provide enhanced functions in order to cover
context life cycle [PZCG14], which can include the following phases:
Context acquisition. This phase gathers information from heterogeneous sources,
including physical and virtual elements. It considers not only the context data source
but also the frequency, interfaces, data processing, formats, and the acquisition
method.
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Table 2.1: Summary of 5G Requirements
Requirement Description
User experience This requirement is related with the enhancement of the quality of
service (QoS) and Quality of Experience (QoE) levels compared with
current networks [TPL+16]. On one hand, this requirement can be
achieved by the combination of MEC and SDN technologies. On the
other hand, the deployment of virtual functions over a virtualized
cloud environment closer to the service location will let a better user
experience.
Device This requirement improves the intrinsic device indicators such as
higher data rates, signal and energy efficiency, among others. An
increase of 1000x times of mobile traffic is expected by 2020 and
higher QoS levels must be reached on 5G infrastructures. Besides
that, it is important to promote advances in device to device
communication (D2D); monitoring, aggregation and processing
capabilities; extend battery lifetime and programmability at both
software and hardware elements [BTAS14].
System
Performance
This requirement aids to cover advanced capabilities to support
higher data transfer speed, more simultaneous connections and ”zero
perceived” latency. An estimated data rate is 10Gbps.
Enhanced
Service
The main idea behind this requirement is to enhance the user
experience by granting higher availability, reliability and accuracy of
the device location. Likewise, transparent connectivity and enhanced
security services will offer seamless connectivity and enhanced
privacy. It includes self-protection and self-healing capabilities in
order to improve network resilience.
Business Model This requirement is intended to introduce new business models in
order to customize the network behavior while reducing operational
and capital cost. 5G will be able to introduce new services (time
to market) in a faster and dynamic way, taking advantage of the
separation between of data and control plane, the deployment of
virtual functions and the possibility of sharing network resources.
Management &
Operation
Current networks require a high degree of manual management and
configuration of network devices, so that increasing the operational
costs. In this regard, the automatic management requirement
will allow the reduction of these expenditures by deploying new
services anytime and anywhere when demanded by the users. A
key characteristic of future 5G networks is the ability to perform
automatic system recovery and self-management in critical situations,
hence minimizing also the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO).
Context modeling. The collected network data is represented in a specific model
which must have a meaning taking into account the context of the situation. That
collected data needs to be characterized in terms of its attributes or characteristics,
using different approaches such as ontology methods, markup schemes, graphical
representations, object or logic oriented modelling.
Context reasoning. This phase obtains high level metrics from the collected data,
thus helping in the creation of new knowledge. For this purpose, the modelled
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data will be analyzed by reasoning methods and event management techniques. The
knowledge inference includes preprocessing, aggregation and analysis of the acquired
data.
Context Distribution. Finally, all information (raw data, aggregated and high-level
metrics) are delivered to stakeholders with the objective to enhance the provisioning
of their services.
2.3 Key Performance Indicators (KPI)
5G networks pose diverse Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in order to measure the
expected services in comparison with the current mobile technology. Those indicators can
thus be defined in terms of the following metrics [Eur14] [NGM15]:
Latency. 5G expects to provide lower latency compared to current networks. It
takes into account the latency between the source and destination, that is knowing
as end-to-end latency. This KPI expects to enhance the quality of experience of the
user. It is foreseen to reach 5ms.
Capacity. 5G will be able to support higher capacities (volume of information)
not only with normal traffic but also when many users are connected in the same
geographical area. The referential value is expected to reach 10 Tbps/Km2.
Service creation time. One of the main concerns in current networks is the
operational costs when a new service is required. In this regard, 5G expects to
reduce the service creation time from 90 days to 90 minutes.
Number of connected devices. In order to achieve a future network landscape with
any connected devices, this KPI aims on increasing the number of devices in 1000x.
An estimated value is about one million per square kilometer (1M/Km2).
Energy efficiency. 5G will decrease the energy consumed by network infrastructures
in 90% compared with current technologies.
Location accuracy. 5G expects to provide a location accuracy of about one meter
(1m). This value takes importance for industrial infrastructures mostly related with
transportation and positioning systems.
Mobility. This KPI will allow to enhance a continuous access to the services even
in high mobility conditions. To this end, 5G expects to provide mobility speeds of
about 300 to 500Km/h.
Peak Data Rate. This KPI is related to data transfer rate reached by network devices,
with an expected value of 10Gbps.
In Figure 2.1 the expected value or reduction of each KPI is presented. It is important
to note that some of these values are represented taking into account the capacities of
current mobile networks.
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# Connected devices 
(≥ 1M devices/ Km2)
Peak Data Rate 
(100x)
Energy efficiency
(reduction 1/10x)
Latency 
(≤ 5 ms)
Location accuracy 
(≤ 1m)
Mobility 
(≥ 500 Km/h)
Capacity
(≥ 10 Tbps/Km2)
OPEX 
(reduction 1/5x)
Figure 2.1: 5G Key Performance Indicators.
2.4 5G Supportive Technologies
In this section, the most outstanding 5G supportive technologies are revised. SDN,
Self-Organizing networks, Network Function Virtualization and Cloud Computing are
introduced since the thesis contributions are mainly grounded on them.
2.4.1 Software Defined Networking (SDN)
In 2011, a group of network operators, service providers and industry representatives
created the Open Networking Foundation (ONF) [ONF], an organization that promotes
the adoption of SDN in the industry. ONF defines Software Defined Networking (SDN)
as a network architecture where the control is programmable and is separated from the
packet forwarding functions, inherent to lower levels of the OSI model. In a more extended
context, SDN is an architecture that optimizes and simplifies network operations, linking
the applications with network services and devices. For this purpose, a centralized logical
control entity, called the SDN controller, is used to coordinate the communication between
the applications and network elements. The controller exposes network functions and
operations through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), leading to a suitable
interaction with the SDN applications [NG13].
OpenFlow [MAB+08] is the main protocol that has facilitated the development of SDN,
and has been adopted for the industry and research community. OpenFlow is the first
standard communication interface defined to communicate the control and infrastructure
layers of the SDN architecture. The most widely adopted version is 1.0.0.
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2.4.1.1 SDN base architecture
Figure 2.2 depicts a logical view of the SDN architecture [ONS12], composed by three
layers: infrastructure, control, and application. In the infrastructure layer, network devices
(switches and routers) forward packets according their configured flow tables. The control
plane contains the SDN controllers responsible to configure forwarding rules in the flow
tables of each network device existing in the infrastructure layer. In the upper layer the
different SDN applications are located. The architecture layers are communicated trough
programming interfaces that allow their interaction and information exchange. Network
intelligence is logically centralized in the SDN controller, which is able to maintain a global
view of the network. The separation of network functions, in control and data planes, is a
distinctive characteristic of SDN. The role of each plane is described in the following two
sections.
CONTROL LAYER
INFRASTRUCTURE LAYER
APPLICATION LAYER
API
Network device Network device Network device
Business Applications
SDN
Control 
Software  Network Services
Network device Network device
API API
Control-Data Plane Interface 
(e.g. OpenFlow)
Northbound API
Southbound API
Figure 2.2: SDN Architecture.
2.4.1.2 Control Plane
The control plane is responsible to set up the logic and corresponding data sets
necessary to control the SDN network behavior. Network protocols routing rules (as the
ones of OSPF) or filtering policies in a firewall are some examples of control plane logic in
IP networks [NG13]. The main objective of the control plane in SDN is the management
of flow tables to define forwarding rules. To accomplish this, a global abstraction of the
network is mandatory. This logical abstraction is programmable and is performed through
a Network Operating System (NOS), by the use of any protocol enabled to get information
from the data plane through a software interface [FRZ14] (also called Southbound API),
such as OpenFlow.
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2.4.1.3 Data Plane
The data plane is responsible to process incoming network packets in the network
devices. The packets get into the devices through physical media (cable, optical fiber, and
so on). After being assembled and error-checked, well-formed datagrams are processed
in the data plane through flow table lookups, previously configured by the control plane
[NG13]. The only exception to this procedure arises when a datagram does not match
with any flow table entry. In this case, the packet is sent to the controller, which
processes it according to the SDN applications logic. IP packet routing and layer two
switching functions are some examples of data plane functions in IP networks [FRZ14].
Infrastructure elements include not only network switches, but also terminal devices.
2.4.1.4 OpenFlow Protocol
This interface allows the SDN controller to directly configure the forwarding flow tables
in the network devices, such as routers or switches that support this protocol. ONF is
responsible to standardize this protocol. In OpenFlow, it is mandatory to set matching
rules in the flow table entries that will be examined for every incoming packet in an
OpenFlow switch, in order to decide the corresponding action to take over the packet (i.e.
forward, drop, etc.). Figure 2.3 shows the packet header fields used to define matching
rules, according to OpenFlow version 1.0.0 [OFv].
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Protocol
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Figure 2.3: Packet fields used to match against flow table entries.
2.4.1.5 Centralized vs Distributed approach
IP networks have been built under a distributed scheme in which every network node
has its own instances of the control and data planes. By contrast, SDN consolidates
the whole network control plane and provides a centralized scheme that determines its
behavior. Figure 2.4 depicts a comparisson between the two aforementioned schemes.
The separation of planes in SDN allows a continual evolution of each independently.
On the one hand, the hardware over which SDN is implemented, the embedded data plane
software and interfaces, and, on the other hand, the development of network operating
systems and high-level applications that implement the best software engineering practices.
These advantages give SDN the flexibility that traditional network architectures cannot
offer.
2.4.2 Self-Organizing Networks (SON)
From a functional perspective, a SON network includes three outstanding capabilities:
self-healing, self-optimization and self-configuration [Nom08]. Self-configuration involves
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Figure 2.4: From the distributed scheme in IP to the SDN centralized scheme.
the processes to automatically configure new network nodes deployed in the network
by downloading and parameterizing the required software [PLW+13]. Self-optimization
addresses optimal performance conditions by comparing the current network status with
the target parametrization, which might trigger corrective actions when required [AAA14].
In addition, self-healing entails the detection of network failures, the diagnosis of the
situation, and the enforcement of recovery actions to restore the affected network function
[AIIE13]. The original SON architecture [Nom08] comprises an Operation, Administration
and Maintenance (OAM) subsystem deployed either as a centralized, distributed or
hybrid architectural approaches. The simplest closed-loop network OAM architecture
[HSS12a] entails the presence of sensors deployed along the network to monitor crucial
network elements for Performance Management (PM). The monitored information is
analyzed according with the network policies defined to automate the Configuration
Management (CM) processes. Such policies are planned and enforced through different
network actuators adapted to specific domain managements [SK09]. Figure 2.5 illustrates
a simplified view of a closed-loop architecture.
Furthermore, Glenn et. al. [AIIE13] outline the differences between adaptive,
autonomous and cognitive networks. Adaptive networks change their configuration in
response to environmental changes, whereas autonomous networks are also adaptive, but
with no human intervention. Thus, SON networks are adaptive and autonomous. On the
other hand, cognitive networks are autonomous networks that include learning capabilities
in the management lifecycle; ranging from monitoring, decision-making and action
enforcement processes in order to acquire knowledge about the context [JVDMB+07].
Thereby, SON-cognitive networks have represented an ongoing trend for the management
of modern networks [FM09], in this way adapting the processes related with sensing the
network, planning, decision-making and actuation according to the operational context.
Even though the original SON definition remains suitable, it has adopted new
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characteristics adapted to the evolving mobile network technologies such as LTE, 4G and
5G. In this context, emerging SON networks that include cognitive capabilities cope more
efficiently with the management challenges pushed by the operators. Modern sel-organized
scenarios grant the ability to perform complex network analysis targeted on deploying
smart proactive and reactive actions when mitigating, correcting or optimizing network
services. SON networks are key enablers of 5G, taking advantage of the application of
advanced machine learning techniques to adapt the network for complex self-healing,
self-optimization, self-configuration, self-protection and other use case scenarios. 5G
provides suitable capabilities to evolve more powerful SON architectures relying on the
decoupling of network and data planes promoted by SDN, the advanced on-demand
provisioning fostered by cloud platforms, the immersion of NFV management and
orchestration architectures, and the evolution of self-managed approaches towards the
next generation networks.
2.4.3 Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
The provisioning of efficient network services with higher quality requirements and lower
operational costs has been traditionally a major concern for service providers in the
telecommunications landscape. The bundling of network functions within closed hardware
platforms have limited the ability to extend the capacity of the offered network services
not only by budget constraints, but also for the lack of agility in the deployment
process [NG13]. Moreover, when considering the factors involved in the provisioning of
network services towards an efficient relationship between revenue and CAPEX/OPEX (i.e
skilled network operators, vendors, time-to-market, users demands or hardware/software
updates), higher infrastructure investments are mandatory. However, some studies have
shown that their return rate of such investments is minimal [HSMA14], hence demanding
more innovative business models.
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On the other hand, the concept of virtualization has emerged to allow hardware
resource sharing between software entities that operate independently, as if they were
completely isolated from each other, thus managing the workload more efficiently [MAJ14].
This is why the advantages of virtualization have been adopted on the networking area
for allowing the coexistence of multiple logically separated networks running on the same
physical elements [CB10]. Thus, enabling the abstraction of the hardware infrastructure
by standard software interfaces for a proper network management.
Bearing in mind the restrictiveness of hardware-based solutions, Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) can be defined as the bundling of specialized network applications
such as firewalls, load balancers, DPI servers, among others, into software entities rather
than in hardware devices [HSMA14]. Provided by the flexibility in the management of
software-based solutions, a service provider can deploy customized services adapted to the
monitored network conditions by placing network function instances (VNFs) of the desired
services in different locations of the network. However, to accomplish an on-demand service
provisioning, advanced orchestration processes are mandatory for ensuring the lifecycle of
VNFs across the managed premises.
In 2012, a group of telecommunication operators of the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) proposed the NFV framework [ETS13]. It lays the
architectural vision and design considerations for virtualizing network functions on the
supporting infrastructure, and defines also the communication interfaces for the different
components, as illustrated in Figure 2.6. The framework relies on standard Commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware to set the architectural baseline for orchestrating the
allocation of network functions throughout a virtualized infrastructure.
Basically, the reference architecture defines three main working domains: The
Network Function Virtualization Infrastructure (NFVI), Virtualized Network Functions
(VNFs), and NFV Management and Orchestration. The framework might also
integrate operational/business support systems (OSS/BSS) used by network operators
for management purposes [ETS13].
NFVI comprises hardware and software elements that lay the virtual platform on which
VNFs are created. NFVI is composed of compute, storage and networking components
abstracted from their counterpart hardware [YZV16]. This level of abstraction is achieved
by the Virtualization Layer, since it can expose the virtual platform as a single entity with
disregard of the physical placement or topology of hardware elements in the managed
domain. Thereby, VNFs can be deployed in different locations of the network, provided
by the proper allocation of compute, network and storage resources [CB10]. On top of
the VNFs, the Element Systems (EMs) are intended to manage the functionality of one
or many controlled VNFs.
In addition, the NFV Management and Orchestration implements the coordination
between the architectural components of the framework in such way that the VNFs
provisioning lifecycle is guaranteed when delivering a network service. It poses a strong
dependence on Virtual Infrastructure Manager as the controller of the abstracted compute,
storage and network resources to meet the deployment requirements of each VNF in the
provisioning process. Even though the NFV framework allows the dynamic allocation
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of network functions, the placement for VNFs chaining in datacenters is a challenging
topic from the network operator point of view, which requires optimization strategies for
dealing with resource consumption, cost evaluation, quality of service levels, and so on,
when managing large infrastructures [XSZ+15].
It is also worth mentioning the tight integration achieved by NFV and SDN in
emerging network scenarios. Even when both technologies can coexist independently, their
synergies have opened a wide range of opportunities for network operators. SDN/NFV
have introduced programmable management approaches in the deployment of network
services suited for challenging use-cases including, for instance, video services or the
”cloudification” of telco infrastructures, which have been largely addressed by the research
community [CRSG+15] [BKH+14].
2.4.4 Cloud Computing
Among the different definitions of cloud computing, the one stated by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been widely referenced in the literature
[ZCB10]. It defines cloud computing as a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient and
on-demand access to a shared pool of computing resources that can be timely provisioned
with minimal management effort or service provider intervention [NIS11].
With the rapid evolution of information technology architectures and enterprise
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business models, traditional provisioning of resources (computing, storage and network)
has demanded significative advances to deal with the limitations of hardware computing
elements. In this respect, virtualization has played a major role as it allows sharing
infrastructures transparently from the customer point of view [MAJ14]. In cloud
computing, a particular resource can thus be leased to different users while ensuring a
complete isolation from each managed domain, a concept known as multi-tenancy. This
innovative service-oriented model provides an elastic resource provisioning model, while
decreasing the costs of hardware acquisition. Cloud computing offers in this way different
service models depending on the available resources to be leased [DLNW13]. Zhang et.
al [ZCB10] outlines also some related technologies that led to the emergence of cloud
computing.
Previously, grid computing was aimed to merge computational capacity for achieving
a specific goal. That model was further exploited by the cloud computing paradigm
which provides a general-purpose virtualized infrastructure for resource sharing. Such
enhancement is accomplished by the virtualization engine (hypervisor), capable of
abstracting the underlying hardware elements. On the other hand, concepts like utility
and autonomic computing have grounded the cloud approach. Utility computing aims
on billing customers according to their resource usage; whereas autonomic computing has
the objective to grant self-management capabilities to a system, being this a feature from
which cloud computing and modern technologies, such as 5G, have benefited from.
The NIST has also identified the following five essential characteristics in cloud
computing deployments [NIS11]:
On-demand self-service. The automatic provision of resources as needed by a
particular customer.
Broad network access. Cloud capabilities available over the network for being
accessed by standard mechanism.
Resource pooling. The ability to pool resources for serving multiple tenants for which
the sense of location is abstracted for simplicity (i.e. at country, state or datacenter
level).
Rapid elasticity. It is understood as the elastic provisioning capability achieved by
means of scaling mechanisms. From the customer perspective, resource scaling is
unlimited.
Measured service. The inclusion of a resource metering per service type that let a
cloud provider the abstraction of usage profiles (i.e. for billing purposes).
Aside from their definition and characteristics, the service model is driven by the cloud
multi-layered architecture [ZCB10][DLNW13] illustrated in Figure 2.7. Their architectural
components are explained as follows:
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provisions infrastructure resources on-demand,
which are typically categorized as compute, storage and networking. Datacenter physical
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entities such as servers, routers, power systems, etc. are pooled and abstracted by the
virtualization layer to grant the provider the ability of offering on-demand infrastructure
resources. Commercial IaaS platforms are Microsoft Azure and Amazon EC2.
Platform as a Service (PaaS) is the intermediate level of the architecture. It offers
an integrated environment built on operating systems and application frameworks for
creating, developing and deploying custom applications. PaaS platforms examples are
Google App Engine or Amazon S3.
In the top level, Software as a Service (SaaS) consists of software applications delivered
directly to the end users on the Internet. It allows them a “pay-as-you-go” model derived
from the use of the hired applications. Google Docs is an example of this.
Since most of the cloud providers are private, the research community, industry and
enterprises have also dedicated efforts towards the creation of open source projects aimed to
deploy customized cloud environments with no dependence neither on external parties nor
proprietary hardware/software elements. In particular, Openstack [Ope] has emerged as a
leading open source platform for managing cloud deployments. Openstack orchestrates a
set of services (Nova, Neutron, Keystone, Telemetry, etc.) which could be also integrated
with SDN and NFV deployments.
Hence, in the context of emerging network platforms, cloud computing facilitates the
on-demand network resource provisioning by means of the elastic capacities inherent to
their supportive platforms.
2.5 Final Remarks
In this chapter the principles of 5G networks have been explored. It has started from
a description of their challenging indicators to a later reviewing of their supportive
technologies. One of the most important concepts to remark is the idea behind
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programmable networks, on which the separation of the data and control planes has shifted
the network management paradigm towards a software-driven model with self-organizing
capabilities. Likewise, the scalability and flexibility achieved by the virtualization of
network functions has led to evolve the network infrastructures towards a software-based
service model. As it has been seen, the characteristics of all reviewd technology enablers
will be seamlessly integrated in the 5G ecosystem for fulfilling the emerging connectivity
demands. Hereinafter, and bearing in mind that 5G is currently under development, the
role of those technology enablers has been considered throughout the performed research.
Chapter 3
Research in 5G and Related Open
Challenges
This chapter describes the current state of the research landscape related to 5G
technologies. Challenging directions are also presented by reviewing current research
projects carried out to address a variety of use cases. This chapter focuses also on the study
of network incident management and its adaptation to emerging 5G scenarios. For this
purpose, two types of attacks are reviewed as potential use case scenarios to be addressed
by 5G networks, being them furtherly studied later in this document. The contents of
this chapter are structured in four parts. Section 3.1 presents some initiatives conducted
by the research community to promote the advances on 5G technologies. Section 3.2
introduces the SELFNET project in more detail due to its close relationship with the
research conducted on this thesis. Section 3.3 describes the traditional network incident
management concepts and its relationship with the 5G scenarios. Finally, Section 3.4
provides the concluding remarks of this chapter.
3.1 5G research projects
Research initiatives in 5G have been conducted to cope with the challenges of new
generation mobile networks. These initiatives are worldwide fostered and funded by
different organizations, such as the European Horizon 2020 programme [ECH] (preceded
by FP7), the IMT-2020 group in China [RPI], 5G Americas [R5A], among others.
In the European context, some FP7 projects such as METIS [OBB+14], T-NOVA
[PTn], UNIFY [RPU] and COWD [CrF] have contributed to lay important research
baselines for other initiatives. For instance, the Mobile and wireless communications
Enablers for the Twenty-twenty Information Society (METIS) generated and agreed
an European platform for the development and standardization of mobile and wireless
communication systems. Likewise, T-NOVA takes the advantages of SDN and NFV
thechnologies, being them focused on the automated deployment of Network Functions
as a Service (NFaaS) over virtualized infrastructures. To this end, the projects aims on
the design and implementation of a platform enabled for the provisioning, configuration,
monitorization and optimization of virtual functions.
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Complementary, a dynamic platform for automated end-to-end service delivery is
explored by the UNIFY [RPU] project, which targets the dynamic and orchestrated
provision of services in cloud environments with optimal placement of service components
across a novel infrastructure. Unlike T-NOVA and UNIFY, which rely on the potential
of SDN, NFV and cloud technologies, the CROWD project is intended to significantly
increase wireless mobile network density; ensuring user quality of experience, resource
optimization and a reduction on energy consumption.
Promoted under the 5G-PPP Phase 1 projects umbrella, some outstanding H2020
initiativesare METIS II, COGNET, CHARISMA, 5G-ENSURE and SELFNET. They
encompass several research fields and, at the same time, promote collaboration
partnerships to enhance current and future outcomes. The METIS II [RPM] project
aims to develop a seamless integration of 5G radio technologies by the insertion of
a protocol stack architecture addressing regulatory and standardization challenges. It
provides a collaboration framework for 5G as well. A smart management of the Cloud
Radio Access Network (C-RAN) is addressed by CHARISMA [PCM] project, leading
to the efficient deployment of network services through the intelligent management of
C-RAN deployments and the Radio Remote Head (RRH) platforms. CHARISMA targests
on achieving low latency, higher density, increased data rates and spectral efficient and
enhanced energy management. On the other hand, incident management challenges in
5G are targeted by the 5G-ENSURE [R5G] project, which covers a wide range of security
and resilience concerns like those dealing with standardization, privacy and architectural
aspects. 5G-ENSURE has the final goal to provide reliable security services with “zero
perceived” downtime.
Network Functions Virtualization and service chaining are a disruptive capability in
5G. In this regard, the SONATA [RS2] project addresses the challenges related to their
development and deployment. To this end, it enables a Software Development Kit (SDK)
and an orchestration framework to offer a platform for the rapid provisioning of services
and applications. A machine learning approach to allow autonomic network management
is proposed by the COGNET [P5C] project, which attains self-organizing capabilities
based on the monitored information. This approach is conducted by machine learning
algorithms applied to identify network errors, fault conditions, security or other related
issues that led both inferring the network context and predict the user demands. As
a result, the provisioning of services is dynamically adapted to the inferred network
context. A similar approach is conducted by the project SELFNET [P5S], which evolves
the concept of self-organizing networks in 5G by developing a framework for autonomic
network management. SELFNET is further explained in the next section.
Several other research efforts are described with more detail in [BLVCSMGV16] and
[Pir14]. All of them share the common vision to fulfill the proposed 5G KPIs, hence
enabling a feasible adoption of the fifth generation of mobile networks.
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3.2 The SELFNET project
SELFNET (Self-Organized Network Management in Virtualized and Software Defined
Networks) was proposed with the main goal to develop a smart and autonomic network
management framework to provide self-organization capabilities in mobile 5G networks.
This project has been funded by the Horizon 2020 programme.
SELFNET achieves an autonomic management paradigm by the integration of
enhanced monitoring features, prediction algorithms, pattern recognition strategies,
machine learning capabilities, orchestration of virtual functions and service function
chaining to conduct a self-organized approach. Such paradigm is focused on the
identification of the current network behavior, which leds to decide the best mitigation
responses against the inferred network problems. In consequence, the deployment of proper
actuators in the infrastructure takes place.
3.2.1 SELFNET Architecture
SELFNET reference architecture [NCC+16] relies on the principles of SDN and NFV
to allow an intelligent management of different network functions intended to detect and
automatically mitigate a range of common network problems such as network congestion,
transmission delays, link failures, among others. SELFNET defines three major use-cases:
self-protection [NCC+16], self-optimization [NWAC+16] and self-healing [SRA+16]. Each
of them distinguishes several scenarios in which network analysis, decision making and
action enforcement are required.
The architecture (Figure 3.1) is composed by functional layers, each of them described
as follows:
3.2.1.1 Infrastructure Layer
In the bottom part, the Infrastructure Layer holds the physical resources required to deploy
and instantiate virtualized functions. To this end, it is further divided into sublayers for
provisioning physical computing, networking and storage support over bare metal, and
a virtualization sublayer capable to instantiate the required virtual infrastructures for
supporting VNF deployments. Cloud computing platforms play an important role towards
the consecution of advanced network abstraction and elastic resource provisioning.
3.2.1.2 Virtualized Network Layer
The Virtualized Network Layer holds the instantiated network infrastructure that support
the execution of virtualized network functions (VNF) both individually and chained. In the
latter case, being composed as Network Services (NS) deployed along the virtual topology.
3.2.1.3 SON Control Layer
In the next level, the SON Control Layer contains the different SON sensors for data
collection to start the intelligence loop, and the SON actuators for the enforcement of
actions previously decided for closing the control loop in the managed network domain.
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Figure 3.1: The SELFNET Project Architecture.
3.2.1.4 SON Autonomic Layer
The upper level is for the SON Autonomic Layer, which is the core of SELFNET
intelligence and it is committed to monitor relevant data for acquiring knowledge about
the monitored network. The obtained knowledge leads to both diagnose the cause of
potential network failures and take decisions on the best actions to be enforced. Hence,
accomplishing the system goals and the compliance of the agreed service levels.
3.2.1.5 NFV Orchestration and Management Layer
A supportive architectural component is the NFVO Orchestration and Management Layer,
which allows automated and efficient orchestration mechanisms for deploying network
functions in the network infrastructure. The main goal of this supportive module is the
management of the VNFs lifecycle, accommodated to the service provisioning needs.
3.2.1.6 Access Layer
In the highest level, the Access Layer allows the interaction of SELFNET with
external users, network administrators or external systems through suitable Application
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Programming Interfaces (APIs) for an efficient management of the system.
3.2.2 Situational Awareness in SELFNET
To facilitate the operational context comprehension based on the Endsley situational
awareness model [End88], a three-step schema of Monitoring, Aggregation and Correlation,
and Analysis is proposed. This, in fact, maps the Monitor and Analysis component of the
SON Autonomic Layer:
Monitoring has the main objective of collecting a wide range of low level metrics and
events from the physical and virtual network infrastructure, and from the deployed
SELFNET sensors.
Aggregation and Correlation methods reduce the amount of the monitored
information, by obtaining aggregated metrics about a specific network domain.
Meanwhile, events are correlated and filtered to avoid redundant or non-sensitive
information.
Analysis is aimed to acquire knowledge about the operational network context
inferred from the analysis of aggregated monitored metrics. This process is carried
on by pattern recognition capabilities, prediction methods, and knowledge inference
procedures to deduce conclusions regarding potential network failure or degradation
scenarios projected from the observations.
3.3 Network Incident Management in 5G
In the last decades a great variety of contributions related with the management of
incidents have been published. Some of them are classified and reviewed in depth in
[SRA+16] [SSABC16], where a marked trend toward the adoption of classical information
security risk management schemes is emphasized. They pose different lines of research,
ranging from the mere definition of the risk management terminology [HA14], to the
proposal of practical guidelines for their mitigation [Dot15].
The first of these incident management groups of publications lies in the foundation
of conceptual security models, as is the case of the well-known CIA-Triad [Smi12], the
Parkerian Hexad [PP98] or the Cube of McCumber [McC91]. On the other hand, several
authors focused on the study of how mitigate potential threats, hence establishing the
basis for standards [Int13] [NSP], guidelines [ReC] or platforms [MMA]. As indicated
by Ben-Asher et al. [BAG15] a greater specialization in this area of research and its
applications representatively improves the effectiveness of defensive deployments, which is
a very important step towards bringing self-organizing capabilities on 5G environments.
But it is important to highlight that in the networking context, an incident does not only
report a risk. In fact, they occur in connection with something else, which may be the
result of a security threat, but also the outcome of the deployment of countermeasures,
or even the variation of certain network management policies, such as enabling additional
bandwidth, the discovery of new devices or the optimization of some resource usage, in
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this way also bringing feedback about the effectiveness of the self-management actions.
Therefore, understanding the nature of an incident and its impact usually requires
a comprehensive overview of the state of the network and the different cause-effects
monitored in them. Because of this, most of the recent proposals for network incident
management combine the conventional risk management schemes with the situational
awareness model proposed by Endsley [End88].
According with Endsley, situational awareness means “to have knowledge of the
current state of a system, understand its dynamics, and be able to predict changes in
its development”. Because of this, the model distinguishes three major steps: perception,
comprehension and projection; where the first of them is related with monitoring the
environment and the discovery of initial facts, comprehension aims on the inference
of knowledge and hence generating new facts from the observations, and projection
is related with the prediction of the environment status. Note that the conventional
model introduces feedback between data processing stages, in this way allowing learning
and improving decision-making. As discussed in [CSD15], the Endsley model proven
effectiveness in complex and dynamic scenarios where the diagnosis of incidents highly
depends on their context. Throughout the bibliography it has been successfully
combined with risk management models [FB14] and adapted to networking environments,
consequently coining the term NSSA (Network Security Situational Awareness) [LM15].
Its adaptation to 5G started with project like 5G-ENSURE [R5G] which were mainly
inspired in the risk assessment and management approaches.
More recently, SELFNET [P5S] adopted the situational awareness paradigm based in
the research of Barona et al. [BLVCMV+17], which described a framework for hybridize
the Endsley model, information security risk management and self-organizing networking.
The perception stage of SELFNET was described in depth in [CV17], and a first
approach toward orchestrating the activities related with comprehension and projection
was published in [LVV17]. Situational awareness is in fact a key research topic related with
information security in 5G networks as stated in the release of the first 5G PPP Phase 1
Security Landscape [BWSMea17], where the cognitive approximation to understand the
network environment is tackled by a cognitive approach driven by contextual analysis.
The research conducted in [BLVCMV+17] proposed an approximation towards the
implementation of the situational awareness stages for conducting autonomic incident
management strategies by taking the SELFNET model as a reference architecture (Figure
3.2). As explained in the previous section; perception, comprehension and projection
are attained by the monitoring, aggregation/correlation and analysis components of the
SELFNET architecture.
Forthcomings chapters of this thesis delve into the procedures, methods and technology
enablers for conducting reasoning processes oriented to achieve contextual analysis, thus
emphasizing the projection stage as the main topic of this research. Thereby, to put in
context the acquaintance of knowledge from the monitored network when dealing with
incident management, two kinds of threats are studied in the following sections. They will
ground the definition of the use cases to be studied.
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Figure 3.2: A Situational awareness approach for incident management in 5G.
3.3.1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
Nowadays there are different procedures that intentionally may lead to deplete the
resources of a network element, thereby denying its service. The performed research
focuses on those based on flooding the victim with malicious requests [ZJT13], which
typically have been categorized in high-rate and low-rate DDoS attacks [WCXJ13]. This
taxonomy considered as classification criterion their request frequency. According to
this classification, the first family of threats gathers the techniques grounded in timely
injecting a large volume of traffic/requests. On the other hand, low-rate DDoS intend to go
unnoticed over the security measures by adopting incremental or activation/deactivation
request injection patterns, that usually are less visible than conventional flooding-based
intrusion attempts [BBK15]. Furthermore, the attacker may take advantage of reflection
[XWY+17] and/or amplification [MSK17] to magnify the impact of the intrusion. A clear
example of this is observed in the Link Flooding Attacks (LFA) [WLJW16], where low rate
request flows from regions with high traffic density are reused aiming on overflowing the
computing capacity of intermediate network elements, thus resembling legitimate traffic
and making the threat difficult to be discovered. Flooding-based denial of service was
originally achieved from a single point of the network, which was commonly referred as
conventional Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. But the trend of the current devices towards
gaining computing capacity, as well as the advances in cloud computing, and the tendency
to implement self-scaling and load balancing mechanisms, entailed that nowadays the
attacker requires a large number of devices (end-points) with traffic injection capabilities
to reach their malicious purpose, this situation being typified as DDoS. Because of this,
intruders usually resort to botnets [MDML17] for acquiring offensive power. Botnets
are increasingly extensive and adapt to the emergent network scenarios [AAB+17]. In
32 Chapter 3. Research in 5G and Related Open Challenges
addition, they have evolved towards robustness and evasion of mitigation techniques
[VZF17], which make them a dangerous shuttle of denial of service attempts. However,
given the great bibliography related to the botnet problem, this thesis does not deeply
cover them, thus suggesting publications like [HBK15] for reviewing their most relevant
features.
Most of the efforts of the research community dedicated to the defense against DDoS
assumed the aforementioned circumstances. But given the complexity of the problem
to be solved, the proposals are often divided into four different challenges [VZF17]:
prevention, detection, mitigation and identification of sources. DDoS prevention focuses
on avoiding the attack from reaching the victim, hence covering measures that range
from applying filtering policies to traffic redistribution. Note that unlike mitigation,
the prior identification of the intrusion with this purpose is not required. According
to the bibliography, prevention approaches typically consider univocal features of the
legitimate traffic [LLZZ13], Turing tests [WMLW18], security protocols [KVF+12] or
reputation-based systems [WCC+17].
The research focused on DDoS detection requires studying features of the intrusion
itself, either through the analysis of the traffic involved and/or the study of network-level
behaviors [ZJT13]. To this end, different analytic techniques were adopted, among them
hidden Markov model [HVV17], artificial neural networks [SOR16], entropy-based analysis
[BBK15] support vector machines [AYON17] or decision trees, the latter discussing the
efficiency of different machine learning methods. As highlighted in [YYGL16], within this
group, the source-side DDoS detection played a minority role in the bibliography. It was
classically addressed by validating the destination hosts of the outgoing traffic [SF00], or
by recognizing discordant traffic patterns at flow-level [ZJT13]. For example, D-WARD
[MPR03] proposed the construction of models that represented the normal usage of the
traffic flowing through the protected system. It was based on classifying metrics extracted
from traffic flows, from which it was possible to distinguish discordant behaviors. Another
interesting contribution is illustrated in [GP01], where the proportionality between
outgoing and incoming traffic is studied. With the advent of the SDN technologies, this
detection paradigm [YYGL16] has been revised, leading to analyze the flow-tables inherent
to the OpenFlow protocol. In this way DDoS attacks originated in groups of compromised
end-points can be detected [MKK11], which usually are IoT or end-user devices [JW13].
But this requires conducting monitorization and feature extraction processes on data
gathered in at least small/medium network regions.
Once the intrusion is recognized, the mitigation measures act. They involve the reactive
and proactive deployment of some of the aforementioned prevention techniques, as well as
the reinforcement of the network perimeters that displayed a higher risk level, which would
lead to define quarantine regions [MVSOGV18]. They can also assume the instantiation
of alternative countermeasures usually related to the active security model, among them
deployment of honeypots and decoys [WDMS17], or the redirection of malicious traffic to
sinkhole servers [JCG+17]. Within this security paradigm are framed the main techniques
for identifying the source of the threats. Their principal objective is to discover the
intruder, for which the adoption of traceback measures, highlighting among them packet
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marking techniques, is frequent. In [Int13] some of the most popular source identification
approaches are reviewed in detail. Note that because they often directly depend on the
network topology [KBP14], and the fact that in real scenarios they suffer restrictions
imposed by the different data protection policies [Den14b], their goal frequently tends to
be simplified as to get as close as possible to the intruder, in this way allowing to extend
the range of action of the instantiated security actuators.
DDoS has been extensively studied in the research literature, hence remaining as
a hot security topic. It has benefited from the advances of modern technologies, thus
sophisticating intrusion and evasion techniques and also gaining complexity in emerging
scenarios. This is a critical aspect to be considered when defining defensive strategies
against them.
3.3.2 Economic Denial of Sustainability Attacks
At November 2008, Hoff [Hof08] [Hof09] firstly hypothesized about the presence of a novel
strain of the denial of service threat, which was termed Economic Denial of Sustainability,
abbreviated EDoS. It described a specific family of attacks against the different cloud
computing platforms, where the intruder aimed on increasing the economic costs derived
from both maintenance and provision of the services offered, hence making their support
less viable, even achieving denial. Interested in this publication, R. Cohen [Coh09]
extended the EDoS definition by highlighting the important role played by exploiting
the self-scaling mechanisms considered by each provider. That is, if the attacker succeeds
in forcing the users to hire additional computing resources by exploiting the self-escalation
policies of the provider, clients will have to pay more, which may lead them to change
to a more competitive service supplier. This implies that the service offered ceases to be
profitable, and that hence the EDoS attack achieved its main purpose.
Although it is a novel concept, inherent to the emergent technologies, EDoS rapidly
drawn the attention of the research community and organizations for information security,
according to them becoming a DDoS variant framed in the categories Reduction of Quality
(RoQ) [BBBS17] and Fraudulent Resource Consumption (FRC) threats [SGSC16]. They
stated that EDoS typically attempt to exploit the ”pay-as-you-go” service model offered by
most of the cloud computing providers [SMR14] [SGS+17], which leads to its adaptation
to different metrics, and self-scaling policies or mechanism [BBBS17]. The following
describes its main characteristics, impact and the defensive strategies raised by the research
community.
3.3.2.1 Characteristics and impact
In general terms, EDoS attacks pose similarities with conventional DDoS threats,
especially those based on flooding [ZJT13]. However, EDoS pose a significantly
different problem that requires a separate solution: assuming the original definition of
Hoff [Hof08][Hof09], EDoS focuses on forcing the increase of the economic cost of a
cloud computing service instead of directly preventing its provision, as occurs in their
predecessors. Therefore, for the sake of effectiveness the number of connections and
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requests involved in their execution may resemble the legitimate activities. Hence network
metrics traditionally studied when detecting flooding-based threats (e.g. number of
requests, number of sessions, total amount of payload, bandwidth consumption, etc.)
display distributions similar to those gathered at normal traffic. Therefore, the attacker
usually exploits vulnerabilities at application layer with the purpose of extend the
computational cost of resolving the received requests [SGSC16]. In this last characteristic
lies the greatest difference between EDoS attacks and massive accumulations of legitimate
requests, the second commonly referred as flash crowds [YZJ+12], in which the processing
cost is similar to those of the requests monitored before the agglomeration.
The computational cost of attending the received requests can be exploited to induce
EDoS in several ways, for example by requesting large files or costly queries [BS15],
HTTP-requests on XML files [VS12], or taking advantage of alternative Application
layer vulnerabilities related with web services [ZJW+14] [SSK17][SC17]. G. Sonami et al.
[SGSC16] studied in-depth the impact of these threats, concluding that it varies depending
on the affected party. In the case of the customers, EDoS directly involves economic losses,
which can lead them to the election of more economical suppliers. This indirectly causes
the providers to lose customers, and therefore their profit is reduced. As discussed in
[SC17], the increase in the computation requirements for addressing the malicious requests
also implies a decrease in the quality of service offered, which is a consequence of the need
for among others, more infrastructure, deployment of additional network virtualization
functions (NFV), multi-tenancy capabilities, etc. It was defined by Bremler-Barr et al.
[BBBS17] as collateral damage, publication in which they demonstrated that by launching
an easy low-rate EDoS attack, it was possible to prompt additional causalities directly
related with enforce auto-scaling and the waste of resources it involves.
3.3.2.2 Defense against EDoS
Despite relevance, the bibliography does not include a large collection of publications
focused on the defense against EDoS threats. The studies that address this problem
usually assume metrics at network-level, usually confusing features for EDoS identification
with those that typically detect flooding-based DDoS attacks. The nature of EDoS threats
poses instead resemblance with normal network traffic behaviors, hence requiring different
defensive approaches to find particular discordances both at network and application level.
In [BS15][BM15][BSB16] some of the most relevant proposals are collected and discussed.
With the purpose of facilitate their understanding, they are classified according to their
scope, as traditionally organized in the research related with the defense against DDoS
[IT11]: detection, prevention/mitigation, and identification of sources.
Detection. The approaches aimed on detection share the main goal of identify the
threats. Therefore, they are often the triggering situation prior to the deployment of
mitigation capabilities or the identification of the attack sources. In the bibliography
there are two types of proposals assuming as classification criteria the scope of
the metrics to be analyzed: those extracted at local, and network monitoring
environments. Publications focused on local metrics traditionally model the
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consumption of resources and study the self-scaling processes [IT11]. Network-based
approaches analyze information provided by the packet headers [AHSS12][JSTD16],
and the browsing habits of the normal clients [KNB13][ITJ12]. Although few
investigations have focused on local traits, they demonstrated greater efficacy,
since they directly assume the definition of EDoS attacks originally posted by Hoff
[Hof08][Hof09]. However, methods based on network traits analysis take advantage
of the state of the art about flooding-based DDoS detection, which in many cases
has led to confusion between both types of attacks.
Mitigation and Prevention. Once the threat has been succesfully identified, the
proposals for mitigation act. They mainly focus on increasing the protected system
restriction level through the deployment of more complex access control techniques,
usually Turing tests based on image recognition [KSK+12] [AAB13] and resolution of
cryptographic puzzles [MARH13][KN09][KSK+12]. It is important to highlight that
most of the publications gathered in the state of the art addressed the mitigation
problem by the aforementioned classical solution for cloud computing security
incidents. On the other hand, publications for preventing EDoS threats aimed
on modeling and optimizing costs related with processing the malicious requests
[YTGW14]. Unlike mitigation approaches, they do not require the prior detection
of the threat. Notwithstanding, most of the proposals categorized in mitigation
could be deployed as prevention measures.
Identification of sources.Finally, the research that aims on identifying the origin
of the attacks attempt to discover the attacker itself. Given the difficulty that
this entails, and the fact that it is often not possible due to the restrictions of
Internet providers, as well as intermediate elements of the backbone, privacy and
data protection policies, etc. from the practical point of view, identifying the origin
is often simplified at reach as close as possible to the attacker. Most of the classic
techniques in the state of the art of the defense against conventional DDoS serve
for this purpose [ITJ12], among them those based on the analysis of error messages
[AR14], deployment of honeypots [WDMS17] or packet marking [YBV15], in all of
them playing the network topology an essential role [JL14].
Unlike DDoS, EDoS has recently drawn the attention of the research community. Thus,
it opens the possibility to evaluate its impact in modern and complex network scenarios
where virtualization plays a critical role. The literature has mostly framed the study of
EDoS threats in cloud deployments, however, and as discussed in Sections 2.4 and 3.2, the
immersion of virtualization technologies in 5G infrastructures arises new security concerns
to be addressed. Therefore, later chapters of this thesis delve into the study of EDoS
threats not only in cloud environments, but also in the contexts of self-organizing network
scenarios.
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3.3.3 Towards Crypto-ransomware Mitigation in 5G: A Self-organizing
Approach
Throughout last decade, crypto-ransomware evolved from a family of malicious software
with scarce repercussion in the research community, to a sophisticated and highly
effective intrusion method positioned in the spotlight of the main organizations for
cyberdefense. Its modus operandi is characterized by fetching the assets to be blocked,
their encryption, and triggering an extortion process that leads the victim to pay
for the key that allows their recovery. In this section, a novel defensive approach
based on the Self-Organizing Network paradigm and the emergent communication
technologies proposed in [SMMVGV18a] is examined. The proposal exemplifies the
smart management of network-based countermeasures against crypto-ransomware without
human supervision, as well as the adaptation of the defensive deployment to the state of
the monitored environment in a context of new generation networks. This is possible
by instantiating/removing sensors and actuators according to their effectiveness and the
risk level of the region they operate; and by establishing regions of quarantine for stronger
monitoring and actuation. They enhance the orchestration of smart defensive deployments
that adapt to the status of the monitoring environment and facilitate the adoption of
previously defined risk management policies. In this way it is possible to efficiently
coordinate the efforts of sensors and actuators distributed throughout the protected
environment without supervision by human operators, resulting in greater protection with
increased viability. Recently, and in parallel with the development of local-level solutions,
the research community studied the impact of the crypto-ransomware on communication
processes. This prompted the publication of the first proposals based on analyzing network
features in emerging scenarios, as is the case of [Zah17] at Internet of Things (IoT) or
[Lee17] at Cloud Computing. Hence, such approaches raises awareness on the importance
of deploying more advanced defensive schememes adapted to emerging networks and, in
particular, to 5G architectures.
According to the standardized framework for SON 3GPP networks, a closed-loop
approach allows a reduction of the operational costs, hence streamlining decision-making
and counteracting. As highlighted in [HSS12b], even the simplest self-organized networks
govern their behavior based on information monitored by sensors. Therefore, the proposed
defense against crypto-ransomware has as starting point data collected by sensors scattered
throughout the protected environment. In order to generate high level metrics and identify
traits of suspicious behaviors, the monitored information is aggregated and analyzed at a
different data processing plane. Note that with the purpose of minimizing the impact of
the sensor at the end-points both aggregation and analysis tasks are launch on dedicated
servers. From the acquired situational knowledge it is decided when to deploy or remove
the additional security measures, which are executed by actuators defined as agents in
charge of closing the loop by enforcing security policies.
The algorithm that manages the situational awareness and dictates the immune
responses per network region is illustrated in Figure 3.3. There three intelligent loops
are described, each of them having a different purpose (see Table 3.1). The first closed
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Figure 3.3: Self-organization per defended region as flowchart
loop is termed Threat Discovery and focuses on recognizing discordant behaviors typical of
cryptomalware at the end-points. This process runs continuously and serves as triggering
for the most basic network-level actuations, which entail the deployment of additional
monitoring elements at regions suspected of having been compromised. During the second
closed loop, referred as Quarantine, they perform as sensors that aim to manage the
passive security countermeasures deployed at the affected regions (areas in quarantine),
hence deciding how long they should remain operational, their configuration, and if it is
required to increase their restriction level. Therefore, each iteration of the second loop
has three possible consequences: leaving the defensive deployment as it stands, recalling
actuators (i.e. dismantle quarantined regions), or incorporating active security measures
[Den14a] (which behave much more restrictive); in particular, the latter is accomplished
by adding decoys and sink servers [Kea16]. If it is decided, the third closed loop is
triggered, which is refereed as Active Shield. This loop is responsible for managing the
active security countermeasures, hence orchestrating a second quarantine layer limited by
their range of action. Its execution can lead to two possible consequences: maintaining
the active defensive deployment or dismantling the second quarantine layer, which occurs
when the level or risk significantly decreases.
The three closed-loops described so far introduced a novel self-organizing defensive
approach which allows the smart coordination and calibration of countermeasures
deployed as sensors and actuators. Such defensive scheme orchestrates their instantiation
considering the acquired situational awareness of the protected environment and risk
level. It has empowered by the adoption of emerging communication technologies inherent
to the progress towards the development of new generation networks (5G). Therefore,
this approximation discloses the applicability of knowledge-based autonomic management
towards the mitigation of crypto-ransomware threats, whilst it opens interesting lines for
future research.
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Table 3.1: Closed-loops for crypto-ransomware defense
Feature First loop Second loop Third loop
Name Threat Discovery Quarantine Active Shield
Quarantine region triggering First-level Second-level
Quarantine region management First-level Second-level
Sensors
HIDS DPI Decoys
Sandboxes Sinkholes
Actuations
Local process
interruption
Custom handshake
interruption
Traffic redirection
Notification Notification Sinkhole configuration
DPI and NFVs
instantiation
Decoy NFVs
instantiation
Data gathering
Sinkhole
configuration
Notification
3.4 Final remarks
Research initiatives are performed worldwide to reach the maturity level expected for 5G
networks bearing in mind the timeline towards the year 2020, when it is expected to find
the first release of this technology. The SELFNET project is aligned to that strategy
tackling with the autonomic network management on self-organized environments. The
accomplishment of this relies on the ability to acquire knowledge to understand the network
context in order to perform efficient decision-making processes. The Situational Awareness
model proposed by Endsley contributes to this purpose by providing a contextual-based
analysis model on which the stage of projection aims to infer the current and future
status of the monitored network. This approximation gains relevance in the incident
management lifecycle to attain cognitive-based defensive approaches. To accomplish the
research objectives of this thesis, the state of the art of two network threats were reviewed
for immersing into knowledge-based detection strategies later in Chapters 7 to 9, where
the proposed use case scenarios and countermeasures suited for self-organizing networks
are studied in detail.
Chapter 4
Prediction Algorithms and
Adaptive Thresholding
This chapter introduces the prediction algorithms and adaptive thresholding methods
applied throughout this research, which provide forecasting capabilities in the knowledge
acquisition process, as part of the autonomic network management. The contents of
this chapter are organized as follows: Section 4.1 describes the prediction landscape
on networking. Section 4.2 describes well-known forecasting algorithms for univariate
analysis. Section 4.3 introduces the adaptive thresholding approach considered to estimate
a prediction interval for analysis purposes. Finally, Section 4.4 remarks the conclusions of
this chapter.
4.1 Network prediction
Anticipating the occurrence of network incidents or events grants the network the
capability to react proactively when dealing with network threats that might produce
a degradation of the service quality or, in the worst case, the unavailability of the service.
Such approach can be conducted by predicting the evolution of monitored network metrics
over time. When sampled, measured or collected on periodic time intervals; those metrics
can be represented as time series, which leads to the application of prediction algorithms
for estimating their behaviour. Given the heterogeneity of the monitored metrics, not all
the algorithms might be suitable for performing prediction since they take into account
different time series attributes such as the trend, seasonality, variance, among others.
Hence, some prediction methods perform better when assessed on a given time series.
5G networks envision heterogeneous scenarios where context-based prediction plays an
essential role in several domains such as geographic, network link, traffic mesurements,
social-type, among other network contexts. The deployment of proactive actions enables
an autonomic approach where the network can take benefit of future conditions for
accomplishing the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) established by 5G [BCH+17].
Thereby, the prediction algorithms introduced in this chapter are intended to drive the
inference of knowledge related with forecasted data in the detection of network scenarios
that can led to the inference of discordant behaviours. Three main categories of algorithms
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are identified to this end: moving average, smoothing, and autorregresive models.
On the other hand; rather than being exact, predicted metrics need a confidence
interval on which its precision can be assessed. To this end, an approach for building
adaptive thresholds taken the forecasted estimation as a baseline is mandatory. As a
result, prediction interval should be estimated for assessing the behaviour of the monitored
metrics, which is introduced at the end of this chapter.
4.2 Prediction Algorithms
The most relevant prediction methods for univariate analysis on time series are described
in this section, which are summarized below.
4.2.1 Cumulative Moving Average
Let a sequence of serialized data x1, x2, . . . , xn, the purpose of the Cumulative Moving
Average (CMA) [Men15] is to calculate the average of the data stream CMAi, 0 < i ≤ n
from the first observation until the element xi. This matches with the following recursive
expression:
CMAn =
∑n
i=0 xi
n
(4.1)
where the CMA at n+ 1 is expressed as follows:
CMAn+1 =
xn+1 + n× CMAn
n+ 1
(4.2)
deduced by assuming x1 + . . .+ xn = n× CMAn.
This approach is also known as running average or long running average. Usually
considered as a smoothing method for time series that equally takes into account all the
registered observations, the CMA provides a good baseline to infer predictions. Figure 4.1
illustrates an example of prediction by CMA estimation on a randomly generated time
series.
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Figure 4.1: Example of prediction by CMA
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4.2.2 Simple Moving Average
The Simple Moving Average (SMA) is another smoothing strategy based on the mean of
the last n observation within a time series [JBMS99]. It can be expressed as a constrained
variation of the CMA, where m is the length of the subsequence to be taken into account.
The SMA is formulated as follows:
SMA =
Pm + Pm−1 + . . .+ Pm−(n−1)
n
=
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Pm−i (4.3)
and the next SMA is forecasted as expressed below:
SMAt+1 = SMAt +
Pm
n
− Pm−n
n
(4.4)
As is the case of CMA, throw the addition of the previous registered absolute errors
it is possible to infer the future values of the analyzed time series. The higher is m, the
greater is the similarity with the CMA. Hence the smoothing is more relevant, but also the
time consumption of the algorithm. An example of predictions form m = 4 on randomly
generated time series is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Example of prediction by SMA m = 4
4.2.3 Double Moving Average
The Double Moving Average (DMA), was introduced by Mullony
[KW08][Mul94a][JBMS99] with the purpose of mitigate the time consumption of
the traditional moving average compositions. In the previous bibliography, and especially
at financial domain, it was a common practice to repeat the SMA calculation in order to
highlight specific indicators related with the analysis of stocks and commodities. Given
the following SMA refereed as Mt for a time series of observations:
Mt =
Yt + Yt−1 + . . .+ Pt−(n+1)
n
(4.5)
and the following SMA M
′
t contructed from its smoothing:
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M
′
t =
Mt +Mt−1 + . . .+Mt−(n+1)
n
(4.6)
DEMA is formulated as follows:
DMAt = 2Mt −M ′t (4.7)
The prediction of future observations is based on the parameter bt expressed as:
bt =
2
n− 1
(
Mt −M ′t
)
(4.8)
which allows inferring the Yˆ observation in t+ p as follows:
Yˆ = DMAt + btp (4.9)
So as is the case of SMA, DMA inherits the adjustment parameter m for defining the
size of the considered observation window. Figure 4.3 illustrated the prediction calculated
for m = 4.
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Figure 4.3: Example of DMA prediction with m=4
4.2.4 Weighted Moving Average
In contrast with the previous moving averages, the Weighted Moving Average (WMA)
considers different multiplicatively weights to the observed data in different positions of
the time series [FL14]. This allows attaching more importance to recent events, hence
providing more quickly reactions to the recent changes. WMA is widely implemented for
calculate different indicators, such as the trend direction, support and resistance areas
at financial domain and accommodate forecasting. Let the x1, x2, . . . , xn sequence, it is
formulated as follows:
WMAt =
wtxt + wt−1xt−1 + . . .+ wt−(n+1)xt−(n+1)
n+ (n− 1) + . . .+ 2 + 1 =
∑n
t=1wtxt∑n
t=1wt
(4.10)
where wi, 1 ≥ i ≤ n is the weight for the observation at i. The current implementation
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of WMAt assumes the classical wi = i weighting definition. As is the case of SMA,
predictions are obtained through addition of the previous registered absolute error between
the WMA and its corresponding observation, to the last observation (see Figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4: Example of prediction with WMA
4.2.5 Simple Exponential Moving Average
The Simple Exponential Smoothing (EMA) method [ASMW15], also known as
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA), is another fast response strategy
that providers grater novelty discovery at the expense of being more prone to abrupt
fluctuations (i.e. false signals). Unlike WMA, the EMA weighting factors decrease
exponentially, so it can be considered a particular case of WMA which satisfied such
feature. It is usually formulated as the following recursive expression:
EMA1 = x1 (4.11)
EMAt = αxt + (1− α)EMAt−1 (4.12)
where α, 0 <= α <= 1 is the adjustment parameter of the degree of the weighted decrease.
The higher α the most relevant are the new observations.
As it is illustrated in Figure 4.5, α = 0.4 provides a smoothed base for infer the next
observations when performing prediction with EMA.
4.2.6 Double Exponential Moving Average
It is typical that the application of EMA in the financial domain results in the requirement
of calculating several variations of EMA for different time periods and degrees of the
weighted decrease, and they contrast. This used to be a very expensive approach in
terms of computational resources, hence motivating the publication of similar methods.
Among them it is important to highlight the Double Exponential Moving Average (DEMA)
proposed by Mulloy. Similarly to DMA, DEMA is calculated for a time series of
observations as follows:
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Figure 4.5: Example of prediction with EMA for α = 0.4
EMA1 = x1 (4.13)
EMAt = αxt + (1− α)EMAt−1 (4.14)
and the following EMA
′
t constructed from its smoothing:
EMA
′
1 = x1 (4.15)
EMA
′
t = αxt + (1− α)EMAt−1 (4.16)
DEMA is formulated as follows:
DEMAt = 2EMAt − EMA′t (4.17)
The prediction of future observations is based on the parameter bt expressed as:
bt =
2
n− 1
(
EMAt − EMA′t
)
(4.18)
which allows inferring the Yˆ observation in t+ p as follows:
Y = DEMAt + btp (4.19)
An illustrative example of prediction with DEMA for α = 0.4 is illustrated in Figure
4.6.
4.2.7 Triple Exponential Moving Average
As an alternative to DEMA P.G. Mulloy proposed the Triple Exponential Moving Average
(TEMA) [Mul94a]. It provides an additional smoothing level, which is calculated from
the EMA:
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Figure 4.6: Example of prediction with DEMA for α = 0.4
EMA1 = x1 (4.20)
EMAt = αxt + (1− α)EMAt−1 (4.21)
the following EMA
′
t contructed from its smoothing:
EMA
′
1 = x1 (4.22)
EMA
′
t = αxt + (1− α)EMAt−1 (4.23)
and the EMA
′′
t that considers the previous baselines:
EMA
′′
1 = x1 (4.24)
EMA
′′
t = αxt + (1− α)EMA
′
t−1 (4.25)
so TEMA is summarized as follows:
TEMAt = 3EMAt − 3EMA′t + EMA
′′
t (4.26)
Figure 4.7 illustrates an example of prediction with TEMA calculated when α = 0.2.
4.2.8 Simple Exponential Smoothing
The Simple Exponential Smoothing (SES) was introduced by R.G. Brown [Bro57] and
extended by C.C. Holt [Hol04] as an extension of an analytical approach attributed to
Poisson. It is a variation of EMA suitable for predict observations on time series with no
trend or seasonal pattern, represented by the following recursive expression:
St = αyt−1 + (1− α)St−1 (4.27)
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Figure 4.7: Example of prediction with TEMA
where 0 < α < 1, t >= 3, yi is the observation at i, and α is the smoothing constant.
There are several approaches to the problem of fix the base case of this expression. Hence,
the prediction approach assumes the classical S2 = y1, postponing the exploration of
alternative strategies for future work. On the other hand, as frequently observed in the
bibliography, the adjustment of the parameter α is obtained by calculating the values
minimizing the function Sum of the Squared Errors of prediction (SSE) at the initialization
observations, defined as:
SSE (α, ) =
N∑
t=1
(
Hα (X)t −Hα (X)t|t−1|
)2
(4.28)
On this basis, the forecasted values are calculated as follows:
St+1 = αyt + (1− α)St (4.29)
which is also expressed as:
St+p = St + αt (4.30)
where t is the prediction error observed at t. Figure 4.8 illustrates an example of prediction
with SES. Given that the adjustment parameter is auto-fitted, the forecast demonstrated
a very accurate behavior.
4.2.9 Double Exponential Smoothing
By definition, SES may not operate effectively when there is a trend in the analyzed time
series. In order to mitigate this drawback, the Double Exponential Smoothing (DES)
algorithm was proposed [GJ06]. It introduces an additional constant γ related with the
degree of trend, and a second equation taking it into account. The new recursive ecuations
are detailed below:
St = αyt−1 + (1− α) (St−1 + bt−1) (4.31)
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Figure 4.8: Example of prediction with SES
bt = γ (St − St−1) + (1− γ) bt−1 (4.32)
where 0 <= α >= 1, 0 <= γ <= 1. As is frequent in the bibliography, the case bases are
the initializations St = y1 and b1 may be:
b1 = y2 − y1 (4.33)
b1 =
1
3
[(y2 − y1) + (y3 − y2) + (y4 − y3)] (4.34)
b1 =
yn − y1
n− 1 (4.35)
Predictions based on these methods are then calculated as follows:
yt+1 = St + bt (4.36)
yt+m = St +mbt (4.37)
An example of their implementation is illustrated in Figure 4.9.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
2
4
6
8
10
Observation
Va
lu
e
 
 
Time Series
DES Ft
Figure 4.9: Example of prediction with DES
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4.2.10 Triple Exponential Smoothing
Unlike DES, the Triple Exponential Smoothing (TES) algorithm takes into account the
seasonal changes of time series [Win60]. Therefore, it incorporates a new adjustment value
β related with the seasonal degree and an addition recursive expression, so it is calculated
by:
bt = α (yt − St−N ) + (1− α) (bt−1 + Tt−1) (4.38)
Tt = β (bt − bt−1) + (1− β)Tt−1 (4.39)
St = γ (ytt − bt) + (1− γ) bt−N (4.40)
where bt is the base estimation at t, the estimation of the trend is Tt and the estimation
of the seasonal factor is St. The parameters α, β, γ fall in the range 0 < α, β, γ < 1,
and facilitate the adjustment of the smoothing. The prediction prediction yt+m is usually
calculated by additive or multiplicative operations, being additive:
yt+m = mbt + Tt−m + St (4.41)
and multiplicative:
yt+m = (St +mbt)Tt−m (4.42)
The first one is recommended for analyzing time series with significant trend and
additive seasonal component, and the second is best suited for data with multiplicative
seasonal component. Another important aspect to keep in mind is the initialization method
of b0, T0, S0 estimators. It is assumed that when no trend or seasonality is expected on the
time series, the initialization of estimators based on the latest observations is preferable
over the use of global measures. The implemented method is described in [MWH97], which
has proven to behave particularly well in similar use cases. Namely, the last twenty-four
observations are considered. The calculations performed are the following:
b0 = M1 (4.43)
T0 =
M2 −M1
12
(4.44)
St−12 =
pt
M1
(4.45)
where M1 summarizes the first twelve observations and M2 the last dozen. The adjustment
of parameters α, β, γ is obtained by calculating the values minimizing the sum of the
squared errors of the prediction.
Figure 4.10(a) and Figure 4.10(b) illustrated examples of the results of forecasting with
Holt-Winters.
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Figure 4.10: Example of prediction with TES.
4.2.11 Autoregressive Models
The Autoregressive Model family, unlike the exponential smoothing approaches, is not
based on decomposing the datum into factors. Instead its output variables depend linearly
on the previous observations and on a stochastic term.
4.2.11.1 Classical Autoregressive Model (AR)
The classical AutoRegressive AR(p) [Aka71] model is defined as:
Yt = µ+ φ1YT−1 + . . .+ φPYT−P + t = µ+
N∑
i=1
φiYT−i + t (4.46)
where epsilont is white noise (noise with mean cero), phi1 . . . φp are the parameters of the
model, µ is a constant value, and p is the order (number of time lags) of the autoregression.
The seasonal condition must be satisfied in the autoregressive part, and it is required for
the adjustment of ARMA models.
4.2.11.2 Moving Averages Model (MA)
The Moving-Average MA(q) [SD84] model is a different approach, where the output
variable depends linearly on the current and various past observations, so learn of the past
errors is possible. Note that q is the order of the moving-average model. MA instantiations
are defined by the following expression:
Yt = µφ1YT−1 + . . .+ φPYT−P + at − θ1aT−1 − . . .− θpaT−q (4.47)
equivalent to:
(1− φ1B − . . .− φpBp)Yt = µ+ (1− φ1B − . . .+ φpBp) at (4.48)
and summarized as:
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φp (B)Yt = µ+ Θ (B) at (4.49)
Unlike AR, they are always seasonal, but must satisfy the invertibility condition.
4.2.11.3 Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) Model
The combination of AR and MA lead to the definition of the Autoregressive Integrated
Moving Average ARIMA(p, d, q) [HT82] model, also known as Box-Jenkins models, which
is a generalization of ARMA that overcome its inoperability with non-seasonal data,
where d is the degree of differencing (the number of times the data have had past values
subtracted in order to became seasonal). A classical ARIMA model is expressed as follows:
YT−1 − a1YT−1 − . . .− ap′YT−p′ = t + θ1t−1 + . . .+ θqt−q (4.50)
where ai are the parameters of the autoregressive part, θi are the parameters of the
moving average part and t is the white noise. The adjustment of p, d, q may be the
ARIMA model equal to other forecasting models. For example ARIMA(1,1,0) is simply
random walk, ARIMA(1,0,0) is AR, ARIMA(0,0,1) is MA, ARIMA(0,0,0) is white noise,
ARIMA(0,1,1) is simple exponential smoothing, ARIMA(0,2,2) is double exponential
smoothing, etc. The calibration of the best suited algorithms can be performed by
several strategies, highlighting among them the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and
the Gaussian approximation Criterion.
Predictions on ARIMA models are generated by a generalization of the autoregressive
forecasting method where:
Yt = µ+ φ1YT−1 + . . .+ φPYT−P − θ1t−1 − . . .− θqt−q (4.51)
Figure 4.11(a) and Figure 4.11(b) illustrate examples of ARIMA based forecast.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
2
4
6
8
10
Observation
Va
lu
e
 
 
Time Series
ARIMA(1, 0.5, 0) Ft
(a) ARIMA(1,0.5,0)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
2
4
6
8
10
Observation
Va
lu
e
 
 
Time Series
ARIMA(0.7, 0.5, 0) Ft
(b) ARIMA(0.7,0.5,0)
Figure 4.11: Example of prediction with ARIMA.
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4.3 Adaptive Thresholding
For the evaluation of the prediction errors, two adaptive thresholds are constructed: an
upper threshold Athup and a lower threshold Athlow. They establish the Prediction
Interval (PI) of the observation, which is defined in the same way as is usually performed
in the bibliography [MWH97], hence assuming the following expressions:
Athup = xˆn+1 +K
√
σ2(Et) (4.52)
Athdown = xˆn+1 −K
√
σ2(Et) (4.53)
where xˆn+1 is the prediction of x at n+1, Et is the prediction error, and p0 is the prediction
of the last observation. The prediction error is given by the absolute value on the difference
between the forecast and the t observation. The variance σ2(Et) is calculated considering
the prediction error at the prediction period t (i.e. the horizon of the estimation).
In addition, the thresholds include a parameter K, from which use case operators are
able to adjust the sensitivity of the constraint. The default value of K is Zα/2 thus relating
the thresholds with the normal distribution of the series. Note that this is not a wrong
decision considering publications as [HKOS05], where it was shown that when the time
series does not approach the normal distribution, the error is unrepresentative; in the case
of the exponential smoothing algorithms, the margin rate of both intervals is in the order
100(1− α), where α, 0 < α < 1, is the smoothing constant.
Based on these equations it is possible to deduce that the higher the value of K, the
lower the level of restriction of the thresholds; therefore, the system will operate with
greater tolerance to prediction errors (see Figure 4.12(a), where K = 1.5). In the opposite
case, the system tends to infer a greater amount of facts related to the exceedance of
some of the prediction thresholds (see Figure 4.12(b), where K = 0.5). Its configuration
depends on the characteristics of the use case, and it is highly recommended its calibration
by machine learning approaches.
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Figure 4.12: Example of Prediction Intervals and K variations.
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4.4 Final Remarks
This chapter reviewed the prediction and adaptive threshold methods applied on univariate
time series for estimating forecasted observations. To this end, observations are modeled
according to the mathematical approximation conducted by the reference forecasting
method. Because of the importance of dealing with predictive capabilities when projecting
the status of the network, as indicated by the Endsley model, some of these methods are
conveniently applied in the forthcoming chapters of this research with the objective to
perform data forecasting analysis.
Chapter 5
Pattern Recognition
This chapter introduces well-known pattern recognition algorithms that are intended to
infer similarities between samples composed by grouped metrics, and datasets of reference
samples. Because three main pattern recognition actions are distinguished in the literature,
the chapter contents have been organized as follows: Section 5.1 outlines the pattern
recognition landscape in networking. Section 5.2 describes the classification algorithms.
Section 5.3 introduces common matching methods documented in the literature, whereas
novelty detection approaches are presented in Section 5.4. Finally, Section 5.5 provides
the concluding remarks of this chapter.
5.1 Pattern Recognition in Networking
The ability to analyze huge amounts of monitored data in emerging communication
environments is crucial for accomplishing an efficient autonomic management. It strongly
depends on the capability to disclose pattern and common behaviours on the sampled
data, which is achieved by automating the classification of sampled data taken as input
into a finite number of categories.
From the networking perspective, the need of searching patterns in data is fundamental
in emerging contexts, hence gaining relevance in 5G. The patterns to look for are already
available in the reference datasets used when supervised training mode is managed, which
reduces the need to perform costly testing to disclose a particular pattern. This trait poses
a major advantage for accomplishing autonomic management since the timely recognition
of a given pattern can lead to enhance the decision-making process, and the consequent
deployment of countermeasures in the monitored environment.
For instance, in the field of traffic classification, the research community has
investigated classification approaches for inferring application-level usage patterns without
the need to deploy Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) servers. It provides not only faster
response time against pre-defined network threats, but also significantly less processing
overhead in the network. Such approaches classify traffic patterns by identifying
statistical patterns in traffic attributes such as the packet length or inter-packet arrival
for categoryzing applications of interest for management purposes [NA08].
Complementary, matching and novelty detection methods have gained importance in
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the analysis of modern network environments. Novelty detection methods determine
wheter an observation belongs to the same distribution as the existing ones (inlier) or
not (outlier), whereas matching aims to evaluate if a sample of observations is equal to
any of the reference samples of a dataset. As is the case of classification, autonomic
network management can take advantage of both novelty detection and matching in the
inference of knowledge about the monitored environment. Thereby, the characteristics of
those pattern recognition actions are described in the forthcoming sections.
5.2 Classification
This section focuses on the Decision Stump, RepTree, Random Forest, Bootstrap
Aggregation, Adaptive Boosting, Bayesian Network and Na¨ıve Bayes classifiers.
5.2.1 Decision Stump
The decision stump is a simple tree classification model that unlike other tree proposals in
the bibliography, only performs one split, hence being commonly considered as a one-level
decision tree [JST+07]. The decision stump approaches regression based on a single
feature, which makes it not the most powerful classification tool but a simple an efficient
solution, usually being adopted as component in machine learning ensemble approaches,
such as bagging or boosting [FI92][SL91]. Figure 5.1 illustrates an example of classification
based on decision stump. The algorithm concludes that the pEntropy feature is the most
relevant, and built a one-level tree for deciding if the analyzed samples belong to the class
“legitimate” or “botnet”. In the example the hit rate was 84
pEntropy<= 0.695
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Figure 5.1: Example of classification by Decision Stump
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5.2.2 Reducing Error Pruning Tree
RepTree is a simple tree-based classification method that lies in the Reducing Error
Pruning for Tree construction (REPT) technique [SL91]. Note that REP is a simple
pruning approach that creates tree-based classifiers by the following procedure: starting
at the leaves, their nodes are replaced with the most relevant classes. If the accuracy of
the resultant classifier is not worsened, the changes prevail. This approach reduces the
size of decision trees by removing sections of the trees that provide little power to classify
instances. RepTree builds decision/regression trees based on the principle of computing
the information gain with entropy and minimizing the error arising from variance, and then
pruning them by applying reduced-error pruning with backfitting [BF85]. The resultant
classifier is a multi-level tree in which each level evaluates conditions of a particular
attribute. Figure 5.2 illustrates an example of RepTree automatically plotted by the
tool WEKA.
1: pEntropy
2: pCounter
4: pCorrelation3: Legitimate (7/0) [3/0]
5: Legitimate (4/0) [1/0] 6: Botnet (22/0) [12/0]
7: Legitimate (33/0) [18/0]
< 0.48 >=0.48
<22 >=22
<0.16 >=0.16
Figure 5.2: RepTree for Botnet detection
5.2.3 Random Forest
According with the random forest scheme proposed by Breiman [Bre01], a random forest
is a classifier consisting of a collection of tree-structured predictors such that each tree
depends on the values of a random vector sampled independently and with the same
distribution for all trees in the forest. In particular, the original approach implemented
the variation of Classification And Regression Trees (CART) [RJPD14a] that choose which
variable to split on using a greedy algorithm that minimizes error. The final classification
of a PRSample container comes from the correlation of the classifications emitted by all
the generate trees; in this way, the likelihood of a sample belonging to a class is the
probability of being emitted as a classification by some of the trees (see Figure 5.3).
Note that this process requires the specification of several adjustment parameters
such as the maximum amount of iterations to be performed, number of trees or their
maximum depth. However, as highlighted by Breiman, the number m of randomly
selected attributes is the only adjustable parameter to which random forests are somewhat
sensitive. This value determines the correlation between each pair of trees and the strength
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Figure 5.3: Random Forest
of each individual tree. By increasing the aforementioned parameter, both correlation and
strength increase. When the correlation grows, the forest error rate increases; in the
opposite, when strength grows the forest error rate decreases, so the level of both features
must be balanced.
5.2.4 Bootstrap Aggregation
Bootstrap Aggregation, also refereed as bagging, is an ensemble algorithm with
classification and regression capabilities. In the implementation of bagging, based in
the proposal of Breiman [Bre96], bootstrap is adopted as statistical estimation technique
where certain statistical indicators (i.e. mean, variance, etc.) are from multiple random
samples within the reference dataset with replacement. Breiman extended this approach
to machine learning models. In this way, different machine learning models are built from
multiple random samples of the training dataset (hence the term bagging) (see Figure 5.4).
When classifying samples, the results of the different classifiers are aggregated in order
to provide a unified solution. Therefore, this is a scheme very similar to Random Forest,
but with a major distinction: in Bootstrap Aggregation all features are considered for
splitting each node. On the opposite, in Random Forests only a subset of the attributes
is selected at random out of the total. Then the best split feature of the subset is applied
to split each node in a tree.
5.2.5 Adaptive Boosting
Adaptive Boosting [ROM01], also refereed as AdaBoost, is a machine learning algorithm
which inherits the idea of combining different classifiers observed in Random Forest or
Bagging, but with the nuance that the results obtained by a classifier are taken into account
when building the next one (boosting). Adaptive Boosting was originally designed to
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Figure 5.4: Training in Bootstrap Aggregation
consider simple decision tree classifiers, each with a single decision point (usually decision
stumps). At training stage, each sample in the training dataset is weighted and the
weights are updated based on the overall accuracy of the model and whether an instance
was classified correctly or not (see Figure 5.5). In particular, a weight wth is assigned
to each sample within a reference dataset equal to the current error E(FT−1(xi)) on that
sample, where FT−1 is the previous classifier and xi the input in position i. This process is
repeated until certain minimum error is achieved or when it is not possible to improve the
obtained results with new training steps. The classification consider the decision made by
every classifier, but weighted according to their weights, so the final output of the system
is obtained as a weighted linear combination of all base classifiers.
5.2.6 Bayesian Network
Bayesian Networks are the graphical representation of sets of random variables and their
relationships by means of acyclic directed graphs, in which the vertices are the observed
data and the edges their conditional probabilities. As indicated by Buczak and Guven
[BG16], these structures can be constructed by experts or algorithms based on inference,
which constitute the modelling stage of the system. An example of a Bayesian Network
is illustrated in Figure 5.6, where vertices are sample features (ex. communication delays,
bandwidth, number of sessions, etc.) and edges are the probability that one observation
involves a dependency with another according to the Bayes theorem:
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
(5.1)
where A and B are the monitored features. There are different approaches for building
Bayesian Networks with classification capabilities [WkB], distinguishing two major model
building steps: structure learning and probability estimation. The first stage aims on
defining the Beyesian Network structures, being supported the different sets of methods:
local and global score based algorithms, conditional independence tests, or even loading a
predefined structure.
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Figure 5.5: Adaptive Boosting
5.2.7 Na¨ıve Bayes
Na¨ıve Bayes [JL95], is not a simple method, but a family of algorithms based on the
Bayes theorem sharing a common principle: every feature being classified is independent
of the value of any other feature (hence the adjective na¨ıve). Because of this, Na¨ıve Bayes
classifiers are considered Bayesian Networks with a simple structure that has the class
node as the parent node of all the attribute nodes (see Figure 5.7). This characteristic
makes them much simpler and faster than the conventional Bayesian Networks. On the
other hand, if the conditional independence assumption actually holds, the classifier will
converge quicker than Bayesian Networks, hence requiring less training data.
5.3 Matching
Matching has the goal to test if a sample of observations is equal to any of the samples
contained in a reference dataset. Note that unlike classification actions, matching does not
take into account the degree of similarity between the monitored data and the reference
samples or the class they belong; only if the sample appears as it is in any of them. Hence
the class attribute of the ARFF dataset files is ignored.
5.3.1 Dictionaries and Bloom Filters
Bloom filters [RK15] are probabilistic data structures used to determine whether a data
belongs to an impractically large dataset or not. Their main features are enormous
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Figure 5.6: Bayesian Network
efficiency (θ(k)cost), low memory consumption and non-generation of false negatives,
which are achieved at the cost of storing only the information strictly necessary to
determine if an observation was previously observed. Note that when datasets are small,
they are easily managed by conventional data structures (lists, maps, etc.). But when
they are very large, Bloom filters are one of the few structures capable of handling all
the information they contain for their specific purpose. Because of this Bloom Filters are
frequently applied in networking with different purposes, among them pattern matching
and Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) [RL06] [GVSOMV17].
The most common representation of a Bloom filter is an array of m bits with k different
hash functions, each of which maps or hashes some set element to one of the m array
positions, hence generating a uniform random distribution (see Figure 5.8). Given the
probabilistic nature of this data structure, the use of a number of inappropriate hash
functions and operating over a too large sample space may lead the Bloom filter to generate
false positives. This occurs when collisions occur when consulting filter records, i.e. the
dispersion function redirects the search to two or more different positions which have
different values. The collision is due to the fact that the just identified element has not
been observed before, but when previously registering another observation, some of the
positions that represent the new one was modified.
The best Bloom filter setting is approached based on the following probability of issuing
false positives [GA13]:
TFP =
(
1−
(
1− 1
m
)kn)k ≈ (1− e−knm )k (5.2)
where n is the number of elements to classify, m is the number of bits that identify the
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Bloom filter slots, and k is the number of dispersion functions. Bearing this expression in
mind, it is possible to calculate the optimal amount of dispersion functions for a particular
sensor according to its specification. This is summarized as follows:
K =
m
n
× ln2 (5.3)
Alternatively, a simple way to enhance the Bloom filter hashing is considering universal
hash functions. But their implementation often involves the increase of m, in this way
penalizing the size of the representation in memory of the structure.
5.4 Novelty Detection
Novelty detection is usually defined as the task of recognizing that test data differ in some
respect from the data that are available during training, which also can be refereed as
one-class classification [PCCT14]. These methods are usually applied to solve problems
where the analytic system was provided by a long and complete collection of reference
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samples (commonly “normal” observations), and it is required to decide if the observed
data can be tagged as belonging to the population on the reference dataset, or it has
“discordant” nature. For example, let the dataset illustrated in Figure 5.9 which contains
instances characterized by basic IPFIX features (source, destination and nPackets) and
some aggregated metrics calculated from the packets they represent (pEntropy and
NLevenshtein).
% 1. Title: Network traffic flows 
   %  
   % 2. Source : 
   %      (a) Creator: J. Maestre Vidal 
   %      (b) Institution: UCM 
   %      (c) Date: March, 2017 
   %  
@relation habitualTraffic 
@attribute 'source' string 
@attribute 'destination' string 
@attribute 'nPackets' numeric 
@attribute 'pEntropy' numeric 
@attribute 'NLevenshtein' numeric 
@attribute 'class' {habitual} 
@data 
"192.16.25.13","162.65.30.04",50,0.45,0.48,habitual 
"192.16.25.18","162.65.30.06",115,0.65,0.26,habitual 
"192.16.25.19","162.65.30.20",65,0.71,0.84,habitual 
"192.16.25.20","162.65.30.06",47,0.53,0.89,habitual 
"192.16.25.13","162.65.30.06",260,0.63,0.83,habitual 
"192.16.25.19","162.65.30.04",179,0.65,0.54,habitual 
"192.16.25.13","162.65.30.20",135,0.48,0.61,habitual 
"192.16.25.18","162.65.30.04",78,0.73,0.97,habitual 
"192.16.25.20","162.65.30.31",56,0.71,0.34,habitual 
"192.16.25.13","162.65.30.06",93,0.59,0.61,habitual 
"192.16.25.13","162.65.30.32",165,0.51,0.31,habitual 
"192.16.25.18","162.65.30.04",219,0.53,0.47,habitual 
"192.16.25.19","162.65.30.04",194,0.64,0.44,habitual 
"192.16.25.20","162.65.30.06",188,0.52,0.42,habitual 
"192.16.25.13","162.65.30.20",73,0.71,0.51,habitual 
"192.16.25.19","162.65.30.37",56,0.35,0.53,habitual 
Figure 5.9: Example of one-class dataset
By novelty detection it is possible deduce if the following samples belong to the same
class than the reference data:
Flow1 : {192.16.25.13, 162.65.30.04, 70, 0.5, 0.83}
Flow2 : {192.16.13.13, 162.65.04.04, 48, 0.42, 0.46}
Flow3 : {192.16.19.13, 162.65.06.04, 72, 0.72, 0.71}
If they are tagged as “normal”, it is possible to state that monitored data is similar to
the normal traffic on the network. In the opposite, the flows are anomalous and probably
require in-depth study. The following describes two main methods for novelty detection:
Support Vector Machines and classification generating synthetic data.
5.4.1 Support Vector Machines
The Support Vector Machines (SVM) are a collection of supervised automatic learning
algorithms based on the transformation of the input space into another one of superior
and infinite dimension, where the problem to be dealt with is solved from the calculation
of the optimal hyperplane called support vector [BL02]. Hence, given a reference dataset
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(plane) represented as a p-dimensional sorted vector, Support Vector Machines calculate
the hyperplane that optimally separates the samples into classes, thus defining the sets of
membership (See Figure 5.10).
The ideal hyperplane for class delimitation is a 1-dimensional vector which maximizes
the distance between the members of each class, usually refereed as maximum-margin
hyperplane. However, it is not always possible to find, mainly due to the compensation
of errors registered at training steps or computational limitations. The latter usually
leads to the implementation of predefined kernel functions (ex. homogeneous polynomial
k(~xi, ~xj) = (~xi× ~xj)d, perceptron k(~xi, ~xj) =‖ ~xi− ~xj ‖, etc.), which project the information
to a space of greater dimensionality on which it is possible to operate more efficiently.
Class 1
Class 2
Hyperplane
Figure 5.10: Two class Support Vector Machine
5.4.2 Generation of synthetic data
The novelty detection method for one-class classification, proposed by Hempstalk
[HFW08], combines the application of a density estimator, used to form a reference
distribution, with the induction of a standard model for class probability estimation. As
is common in the bibliography, the reference distribution is used to generate artificial data
that is employed to form a second synthetic class where this artificial class is the basis for
a standard two-class learning problem. According with this publication, the combination
of both density and class probability estimation are merged into the following curve:
P (X|T ) = (1− P (T ))P (T |X)
P (T )(1− P (T |X))P (X|A) (5.4)
where T is the class of the sample in the reference dataset, A is the class of the artificial
data to be built, and P (X|A), P (X|T ) are their density distributions. For instance,
the tool WEKA implements 10 iterations of bagged unpruned RepTrees decision trees
with Laplace smoothing as the probability estimator P (X|T ), and a product of mixture
of Gaussian distributions with one mixture per attribute [SG99] as density estimator
where each mixture is fitted to the target data for its corresponding attribute using
the Expectation–Maximization (EM) algorithm [Moo96]. The number of the artificial
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sample matches the size of the reference dataset. Hence the data used to build the bagged
unpruned decision trees was exactly balanced. Once the artificial samples are created, a
two-class classifier is built assuming both sample collections.
5.5 Final Remarks
This chapter reviewed the pattern recognition methods to be applied on samples
of observations as part of the knowledge acquisition process conducted to grant
self-organizing capabilities on the monitored network. The inclusion of patter recognition
capabilities is aligned with the comprehension and projection stages of the Endsley model,
as it is the case of prediction methods. Consequently, the conducted research takes benefit
from both.

Chapter 6
Knowledge Acquisition Framework
for 5G Network Analytics
This chapter proposes a framework aimed on granting analysis capabilities to 5G
networks by the proper instantiation of its components to achieve autonomic management,
thus decoupling data analysis logic from specific data extraction procedures carried on
at the lowest architectural levels of the network. It allows the insertion of several
prediction algorithms, pattern recognition capabilities and production rules to generate
meaningful knowledge that will enhance decision-making processes from the performance
and efficiency perspective. Thereby, the framework provides the advantage to express
metrics gathered by sensors (initial facts) according to a knowledge representation
language in order to deduce conclusions about possible network scenarios driven by the
Endsley approach [BLVCMV+17]. Perception, comprehension and projection steps are
performed to understand the system state. The discovery of initial facts, which corresponds
to previously monitored data, accomplishes the perception step. Reasoning involves both
perception and comprehension, whereas prediction approaches the projection step. The
deduced final facts (conclusions) are described in the form of symptoms related with each
use case. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to assert that this framework provides a
symptom-oriented situational awareness bounded by the configuration defined for each
use case.
The major contributions of this proposal on the advances on knowledge-based
management approaches upon 5G infrastructures are summarized as follows:
A novel reasoning 5G-oriented architecture. A novel framework composed by
functional elements arranged on an orchestrated workflow is proposed to enable
reasoning capabilities in a 5G network. As a result, the framework generates
conclusions about the 5G network status. The introduced architecture distinguishes
two types of knowledge: procedural and factual. Procedural knowledge corresponds
to the use case configuration loaded to the system. Initial factual knowledge is
acquired by discovery methods applied on data previously collected by several sensors
distributed along the 5G network, whereas factual knowledge is generated by the
prediction, pattern recognition and knowledge inference modules introduced in this
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proposal. Thereby, the framework approaches the perception, comprehension and
projection steps of the Endsley model.
Instantiation of the framework. An instance of the proposed framework has been
created to enhance the understanding of the proposal. To this end, well-known
multiplatform open source technologies and a battery of prediction and machine
learning algorithms have been integrated in accordance with the framework design.
In addition, publicly available datasets were applied to allow its experimental
replicability. The generation of knowledge was successfully demonstrated in a
datacenter-oriented use case, but the current instance of the framework can be
applied on several use cases just by modifying its configuration.
Comprehensive experimentation on a real use case. To assess the accuracy of the
instantiation, a set of experiments have been conducted. They were oriented either
for the evaluation of the pattern recognition and prediction modules; and for the
evaluation of a real use case. Prediction and pattern recognition features exposed
good accuracy levels when applied over the reference datasets. Likewise, a particular
use case configuration to generate conclusions about traffic behaviour has been
tested. The experiments were conducted on real network traffic samples where the
inference of suspicious network traffic volumes in a datacenter exposed good precision
rates contrasted with the real reference scenario.
To facilitate the understanding of the proposal, this chapter has been divided into
six sections. Section 6.1 describes the design principles and constraints assumed for this
proposal. Section 6.2 introduces the framework architecture and a detailed explanation
of its components. In Section 6.3 an example of the framework instantiation is presented.
Section 6.4 presents the experimentation conducted for validating the proposal. Section
6.5 discusses the results obtained by the experimentation. Finally, Section 6.6 remarks
the conclusions of this chapter.
6.1 Design Principles and Constraints
The following design requirements and assumptions have been kept in mind at both design
and implementation stages of the reasoning and knowledge acquisition framework.
Scalability. The proposed framework must accommodate the 5G design principles,
and in particular, those associated with scalability, such as “Extensibility by design”,
“Expandability by design” or “Multi-level scalability by design” [NCC+16], through
the combination of scalable modular design, open interfaces and APIs to enable third
parties to create their own automatic network management services.
Support of use case onboarding. The knowledge acquisition framework adopts a
use case driven research methodology. Because of this it is required that from
design, it must support the onboarding of new different use case specifications.
Given the heavy reliance of the tasks performed with the characteristics of use
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cases, the basic definition of the observations to be studied (knowledge-base objects,
rules, prediction metrics, etc.) must be provided as factual knowledge by use case
operators, thus being the framework scalable to alternative contexts. In addition,
use case operators must provide procedural knowledge, thus configuring the analytic
tasks to be performed per use case.
Reference datasets. Laskov et al. [LDSR05] realized two essential observations
necessary to understand the different strategies for acquiring reference knowledge
and to decide the most appropriate for each use case: firstly, it must be taken into
account that labeled samples are very difficult to obtain, a situation that can be
aggravated if the sensor operates in real time, and/or on monitoring environments
where is not possible to extract all the data; on the other hand, there is no way
of collecting labeled samples which cover every possible incident, so the system is
potentially vulnerable to unknown situations. To these difficulties it is added the
problem that there are no collections of traffic captures in 5G networks, and that
the existing datasets of current traffic traces often have drawbacks such as lack of
completeness or labeling errors. Because of this, the proposed framework does not
go deep into the issue of the innate knowledge acquisition. The current approach
assumes that the reference datasets are provided by skilled operators or by accurate
machine learning algorithms, which therefore are valid for the specified use cases.
Granularity. 5G environments are complex monitoring scenarios where large
amounts of sensors collect information about the state of the network in real
time. In SELFNET all this information is processed in the Aggregation sub-layer,
which provides the necessary metrics to infer knowledge from them. However, this
information is not raw processed. As described in [LVV17], it is compiled into
Aggregated Data Bundles (ADBs), which summarize all the system information
observed over a time period related with the previously declared uses cases.
The length of the observation period defines the data granularity, which may be
determinant for the proper functioning of certain uses cases. However, the decision
of the best granularity is out of the scope of this proposal.
Stationary monitoring environment. By definition, the features monitored on a
stationary scenario are similar to those considered when building data mining
models. The assumption of operating on a stationary monitoring environment
entails ignoring in terms of learning process any variation in the characteristics of
the information to be studied, such as dimensionality or distribution. The main
disadvantage of this approach is the loss of precision when such changes occur,
in large part because the initially performed calibrations are not adapted to the
current status of the network. On the other hand, their proper accommodation
tends to retain the acquired calibration at the expense of addressing many other
issues, emphasizing among them to discover relevant variations in the data nature,
calibration upgrades based on the new features, or improvement of the original
datasets [DRAP15]. Being aware that the last approach poses important challenges,
and in order to facilitate the understanding of the proposed research, all those aspects
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related to the management of the non-stationary characteristics of the information
are overlooked.
High dimensional data. When the dimensions of the data to be studied are more
extensive than usual, it is possible that some reasoning and knowledge acquisitions
implementations lose effectiveness, either in terms of efficiency or accuracy. Because
of this, the bibliography provides a wide variety of publications focused on the
optimization of this kind of processes, as is discussed in [AY01]. Note that the
battery of algorithms included in the current instantiation of the framework does
not adapt any of these contributions, which does not mean that it is incompatible
with them. However, throughout the document the risks of operating with high
dimensional data are not taken into account, in this way postponing this problem
to future instantiations.
Software Security. Operating in a trusted environment is a challenging task that
should be addressed by the incorporation of the best software development practices
for both design and implementation. Even though the instantiation of this framework
involves the integration of different software components, security considerations in
terms of software development and network communications are overlooked since
experimental validation is prioritized.
6.2 Architecture
The proposed framework is composed by the functional elements illustrated in Figure 6.1.
They are settled down to interact as providers and consumers of facts not only discovered
from monitored data, but also deduced by reasoning procedures. The architectural
elements of the framework are pipelined sequentially as: Onboarding of use cases,
Discovery, Pattern Recognition, Prediction, Adaptive Thresholding, Knowledge Inference
and Notification. These elements are coordinated by the orchestration strategy defined
in [LVV17]. Hence, and assuming the design principles previously stated, the proposed
framework brings analytic capabilities focused on acquiring knowledge from the network
metrics (initial facts), and deduces conclusions (final facts) such as likelihood of the
network being attacked, anomalous congestion levels, among others.
The Discovery component obtains information, represented as facts, gathered by
network sensors in the lower levels of a 5G architecture by monitoring, data aggregation
and correlation procedures. It exempts the framework to the need of dealing with network
technology-dependent protocols or interfaces, and allows assuming that the constraints
inherent in the monitoring environment (for example, ciphering, privacy protection
politics, etc.) have no impact on the effectiveness of the proposal, since they have
been previously managed at lower data processing stages. New knowledge is acquired
by the Inference Engine based on the collected facts stored in the Working Memory, and
permits the inference of conclusions about the network status by applying production rules
configured in the Knowledge Base. Conclusions are expressed as symptoms, reflecting
situations that might affect or compromise network operability or a degradation of the
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agreed service levels. The framework also facilitates a situational awareness projection
of the network through the Prediction and Adaptive Thresholding components, by
calculating predictive metrics and forecasting intervals that allow pro-action responses
over the predicted scenarios. Likewise, the Pattern Recognition component implements
some of the recent paradigms of Artificial Intelligence, among them machine learning, data
mining, classification or novelty detection methods.
To deal with scalability, each analytic component is designed to be run independently,
exchanging only input and output data between them through buffering data structures or
message broker tools (such as Apache Kafka [Akf] or RabbitMQ [RbM]), thus decoupling
processing tasks. The underlying technology to instantiate each component (i.e. Weka,
Drools, among others) must also be able to scalable by design (vertically or horizontally)
to accommodate several deployment strategies when computing resources demands are
variable. In this way, the proposed framework is aligned with the principles of 5G by
developing a scalability solution adapted to the latest trends in the control and data planes
of 5G mobile architectures [EtM], allowing its deployment on the management side. The
role of each framework component is explained in detail in the following subsections.
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Figure 6.1: Knowledge acquisition framework for 5G environments.
6.2.1 Initial knowledge and Notifications
The Knowledge Base is filled from data acquired from the use case definitions at use case
Onboarding. Because of this, use case operators may declare procedural knowledge such
as inference rules Ru, prediction actions Ft, etc. and specify factual knowledge such as
Objects O, Facts Fa, Thresholds Th, etc. in compliance with the use case descriptors
defined in [Bar17]. They also provide the reference datasets required for machine learning
actions. Factual knowledge is gathered by the Discovery component, which periodically
receives ADBs which summarize the acquired observations. From the loaded metrics and
events, the knowledge acquisition framework builds facts (Fa). If they are required for
prediction, pattern recognition or adaptive thresholding, these observations are inserted in
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the temporally stored time series. Note that independent facts are removed at the end of
the ADB processing, as well as the new knowledge acquired from them. It is remarkable
that the abovementioned procedural and factual knowledge represent the inputs of the
proposed framework. However, it is worth mentioning that new factual knowledge is also
internally generated by the Prediction, Pattern Recognition and Adaptive Thresholding
components for the inference of new knowledge.
The set of actions on Notification informs the final facts (conclusions) acquired
by the framework. This step packs the conclusions by inserting or modifying the
related meta-knowledge to accommodate contextual information, such as facts location,
timestamps, output format representation (i.e. JSON), among others. Once an ADB is
fully analyzed, these actions also erase and restart the auxiliary functionalities on the
analytics and several data structures. Only the information and buffers required for
building time series with data to be extracted from future ADBs is temporally persistent.
6.2.2 Prediction Module
This component drives the inference of knowledge related with prediction facts built from
the monitored data. Its main purpose is to insert facts about forecasted metrics in the
Working Memory, and the observation of variations of interest such as discordant values
or relevant decreases or increases on the analyzed data. Although the framework does not
support persistent storage, several data must be temporally preserved to allow registering
time series and information needed for enhancing the decision and calibration of the
prediction algorithms. Then the forecasting strategies must be cautiously selected and
adjusted with the purpose of providing the more accurate results. Once the predictions are
calculated, the system includes the discovered knowledge (facts) into the Working Memory.
Note that this data processing stage depends on synchronous ADB loading where time
series are fed with observations fetched from the ADBs. It requires two types of knowledge:
procedural and factual. Procedural knowledge is provided via use case onboarding in their
data descriptors. Likewise, factual knowledge is acquired by the Discovery component,
when new ADBs are loaded. Once the time series with the required length are built,
several prediction methods are evaluated to decide the most accurate algorithm fitted to
the given time series. The selection of the best forecasting methods entails several steps.
Once data is acquired, a time series of size N , and the forecasting horizon T are taken as
input parameters for a preprocessing task. The last T elements are subtracted from the
original time series and the remaining N − T elements are used for forecasting. In the
meantime, the subtracted T elements are reserved to be used for evaluation. Parameter
calibration takes place for all the forecasting algorithms included in the framework, each
one has a variable number of parameters. Every individual parameter can be tested with
different values, thus allowing a forecasting algorithm to be run with different calibration
coefficients.
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6.2.3 Adaptive Thresholding Module
Throughout the tasks involved in the reasoning process, it is necessary to define under
what circumstances an observation about the monitoring environment must conditionate
the inference of new knowledge. This is a complicated challenge, which must take into
account both the situational awareness of the monitoring scenario and the specific use cases
on which the self-organizing deployment for incident management has been implemented.
Therefore, the instantiated adaptive thresholding strategies must pose dynamic solutions,
subject to the changes in the different features of the scenario on which they operate, and
must be configurable according to the level of constraint that operators decide (note that
the restrictiveness may also be stablished by machine learning approaches). Because of
this, the calculated thresholds act on any source of knowledge of the Knowledge Inference
engine (e.g., Discovery, Prediction, Pattern Recognition, etc.), or may be part of the
production rules. This makes the results they provide considered as factual knowledge
by the knowledge-based of the framework, being Adaptive Thresholding and additional
knowledge acquisition step dependent of the rest of the components of the proposal.
6.2.4 Pattern Recognition Module
The Pattern Recognition component of the proposed framework operate at two different
stages: training and discovery. At training, the knowledge representation to be taken
into account, as well as the description of the pattern recognition actions are included
into the procedural knowledge according to the use case specifications. This step involves
generating/loading reference datasets and construction of the best models in function of
the most relevant data features on the sets of metrics to be analyzed. The training step
may take place in two moments of the analytic process. Firstly, models from reference
data can be built before operating on real monitored samples. On the other hand the
training step may operate at runtime, so the reference samples are gathered from the
first observations on the monitoring environment. At the discovery stage, the knowledge
acquisition framework launches the pattern recognition actions defined by the use case
operators. Samples are constructed from the aggregated metrics observed, and they are
analyzed based on the models built at training stage. The framework at least allows
two pattern recognition actions: classification and novelty detection. When classifying, a
reference dataset is loaded before the monitoring of the protected environment. A battery
of classification algorithms is executed in concurrency, which are properly calibrated and
combined as an ensemble of models [Zim14][Rok10]. Then the most accurate classifier is
identified by cross-validation on the reference sample collection [K+95], and it is applied
at the discovery step. On the other hand, the novelty detection actions are usually
defined as the tasks of recognizing that test data differ in some respect from the data
that are available during training, which also can be generalized as one-class classification
[PCCT14]. These methods are usually applied to solve problems where the analytic system
was provided by a long and complete collection of reference samples (commonly “normal”
observations), and it is required to decide if the observed data can be tagged as belonging
to the population on the reference dataset, or if it has “discordant” nature. The proposed
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framework implements novelty detection similarly to classification, in this way also based
on an ensemble of sensors. However, in this case, the training stage considers data observed
at runtime from the monitoring environment. Particularly, the first monitored metrics
define the reference dataset, and hence are tagged as normal observations. The length of
this collection is previously defined by the use case operators. It can be manually delimited
or decided by the results of the cross-validation scheme; in the second case, if the accuracy
is greater than certain threshold, the model is considered acceptable and there is no need
to process additional samples.
6.2.5 Knowledge Inference Module
The knowledge inference component allows deducing information from previous
observations (facts) based on procedural knowledge represented as rule sets. In order
to align the decision strategy of which rules should be activated and when, with the
previously assumed design principles and requirements, the implemented approach is
driven by production rules. This facilitates the deployment of a modus ponens (forward
chaining) decision scheme where attributes enable the deduction of goals, which are final
facts encapsulated as symptoms before their report to the decision-making layer. It should
be kept in mind that throughout the bibliography, Rete algorithms are the most popular
and proved proposals to address the efficient implementation and execution of forward
chaining on complex monitoring environments. Created by Forgy [For82] , these methods
separate the rule management into two steps: rule compilation and runtime execution.
The first stage describes how the rules in the Working Memory are processed to state
an efficient discriminant network, where upper nodes tend to present many matches, in
contrast with the lower elements (the bottom are termed terminal nodes). The main
reason on building this structure is to optimize the number of triggered rules, while at
runtime, the previously built network allows inferring the new knowledge. Thereby, Rete
algorithms are appropriated to address the knowledge inference purposes of the proposed
framework.
6.3 Instantiation
As an illustrative example of instantiation of the proposed framework, this section
describes how it has been deployed with the aim on contributing with the management
of a real network. Its contribution is focused on the recognition of discordant behaviors
based on analyzing the variations of the traffic volume, which borne in mind the prediction
of their evolution, the construction of adaptive thresholding to decide when they may be
considered unexpected, and novelty detection based on several distances and similarity
measures. It is important to emphasize that the instantiated solution could be replaced
by an alternative implementation and still achieving similar results. Nevertheless, this
instantiation aims to describe a simple, didactic and scalable solution, that provides
a greater understanding of the proposed framework and draft several basic guidelines
for its adaptation to other problems. With this purpose, the following introduces the
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implementation of each reasoning and knowledge acquisition component considered at the
experimentation stage.
6.3.1 Initial Knowledge and Notifications Implementation
The initial knowledge of the instantiated framework is directly provided by the use case
operators, hence postponing auto-calibration and other machine learning approaches for
future work. It includes specific information about what activities must be monitored,
what knowledge acquisition actions should be accomplished and what kind of reasoning
must be carried out; the latter is guided by production rules and the inference of
conclusions about the state of the network. Therefore, it can be said that the initial
knowledge is the configuration of the framework and the strategy of acquiring the initial
facts to be analyzed. These facts arrive to the system compiled as ADBs, which gather
the information monitored in certain time periods. As stated before, the different
sensors deployed on the 5G infrastructure are considered the most important information
providers. For this framework instantiation the initial metric to be studied is the traffic
volume per observation, which is assumed to be already reported by the sensors. With this
collected data, the framework creates the required time series, enabling the possibility to
apply prediction methods, i.e., to estimate the traffic volume at the coming observations
according to a given forecasting horizon. The system is also configured to build adaptive
thresholds based on the forecasts. They allow to identify if the observed traffic volume
differs significantly from the predictions. Herein, those traffic observations are labeled
as unexpected. On the other hand, the pattern recognition component is configured for
novelty detection based in analyzing difference distances and similarity measures between
each monitored observation and that of an immediately preceding monitoring period.
Note that his action requires building one-class classification models, which demand a
reference dataset. It is obtained from the first observations made, so directly loading an
external dataset is not required. The discordant observations are in this stage labeled
as fluctuations. On the other hand, the Knowledge Inference component is configured by
production rules to conclude that an observation marked as unexpected and fluctuation is a
suspicious event, hence being notified as a symptom. The findings are reported through a
message broker software to be consumed by external sources, i.e., to perform more complex
decision-making procedures. Table 6.1 summarizes the initial knowledge and notifications
of the proposed framework instantiation considered at the experimentation.
6.3.2 Prediction Implementation
The current instantiation of the proposed framework does not support objects with
multiples values. Because of this, the adapted battery of forecasting algorithms only
considers univariate time series. This does not mean that this capability cannot be
included in future instantiations, but it has been considered that working with a simpler
instantiation facilitates the comprehension of the prototype, as well as the specification of
new use cases. Two families of well-known forecasting methods are implemented: moving
averages and exponential smoothing, as detailed in Table 6.2. They process the time series
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Table 6.1: Summary of the instantiated initial knowledge and notifications.
Initial Factual Knowledge
Element Description
Object Traffic volume monitored per sensor (Vt).
Acquisition Via ADB.
Procedural Knowledge
Component Behavior
Prediction Forecast traffic volume (Vt) given a certain prediction horizon.
Adaptive thresholding Construction of decision thresholds from forecasted metrics.
Pattern Recognition
Novelty detection based on several distances and similarity
metrics related with Vt and Vt−1.
Knowledge Inference
It is deduced that if Vt observations exceed adaptive thresholds,
they are unexpected.
If Vt observations are considered novelties, it is deduced
that they are fluctuations.
If Vt is unexpected and fluctuation then it is suspicious.
Notification Reports suspicious events are reported via message broker software.
of monitored metrics in concurrency, and the decision of the best algorithm grounds on
considering the minimum Symmetric Mean Absolute Percentage Error (sMAPE) [Mak00]
as the forecasting error measure. sMape considers the set of real subtracted N − T values
X and the T forecasted values as inputs. It is described by the following expression:
sMAPE = 200%
n∑
t=1
|Ft −Xt|
|Ft|+ |Xt| (6.1)
where X represents the real time series values and F are the forecasted values estimated
for the given observations.
6.3.3 Adaptive Thresholding Implementation
To evaluate the prediction errors, two adaptive thresholds are constructed: an upper
threshold Athup and a lower threshold Athlow. They establish the Prediction Interval
(PI) of the observations, which is defined in the same way as is usually performed in the
bibliography [MWH97], hence assuming the following expressions:
Athup = p0 +K ×
√
var(Et) (6.2)
Athlow = p0 −K ×
√
var(Et) (6.3)
where Et is the prediction error in t and p0 is the prediction of the last observation. The
prediction error is given by the absolute value on the difference between the forecast and
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Table 6.2: Battery of forecasting algorithms.
Method Type
Cumulative Moving Average (CMA) [Men15] Moving Average
Simple Moving Average (SMA) [Mul94a] Moving Average
Double Moving Average (DMA) [Mul94a] Moving Average
Weighted Moving Average (WMA) [FL14] Moving Average
Simple Exponential Smoothing (EMA) [ASMW15] Moving Average
Double Exponential Moving Average (DEMA) [Mul94b] Moving Average
Triple Exponential Moving Average (TEMA) [Mul94a] Moving Average
Simple Exponential Smoothing (SES) [Bro57] Smoothing
Double Exponential Smoothing (DES) [GJ06] Smoothing
Triple Exponential Smoothing (TES) [Win60] Smoothing
the t observation. The variance V ar(Et) is calculated considering the prediction error at
the prediction period t (i.e., the horizon of the estimation). In addition, the thresholds
include a parameter K, from which use case operators can adjust the sensitivity of the
upper and lower limits.
6.3.4 Pattern Recognition Implementation
The instantiation of the framework considered at the performed experimentation assumes
that the use case operators provide the collection of reference samples to be taken into
account throughout the pattern recognition process. This implementation embraces
the Attribute-Relation File Format (ARFF), Comma-Separated Values (CSV) or Packet
Capture (pacp) feature descriptions in order to represent the reference datasets required
for the construction of data mining models [Acw], in this way assuming their advantages,
but also their drawbacks. As is the case on the Prediction component, a battery of pattern
recognition and novelty detection methods is considered, which is summarized in Table
6.3. The decision of the best approach and calibration is driven by the results in terms of
accuracy of a cross-validation test launched at training step.
Table 6.3: Battery of pattern recognition algorithms.
Method Action
Decision Stump [FI92] Classification
Reducing Error Pruning Tree [SL91] Classification
Random Forest [Bre01] Classification
Bootstrap Aggregation [Bre96] Classification
Adaptive Boosting [ROM01] Classification
Bayesian Network [BG16] Classification
Naive Bayes [JL95] Classification and Novelty detection
Support Vector Machines (SVM) [BL02] Classification and Novelty detection
Generation of synthetic data + Bootstrap Aggregation [HFW08] Novelty detection
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6.3.5 Knowledge Inference Implementation
It is well known that one of the classical problems with the software that implements Rete
algorithms is the lack of interoperability with other high-level languages and complex
data structures, such as class hierarchies, complex knowledge representations or abstract
data. Nowadays there are few open source implementations with these capabilities, as
is the case of Drools [SDB]. Given that its effectiveness has been continuously proved
in European projects of different nature [ArP, DC2], Drools was implemented in the
current instantiation of the proposed framework in order to manage the execution of the
rule-based knowledge acquisition at the knowledge inference component. As highlighted
by their authors, Drools is a Business Rules Management System (BRMS) solution that
provides, among others, a core Business Rules Engine (BRE) and a modification of the
original Rete algorithm adapted to Object-oriented scenarios which also bring solutions to
optimization problems, such as rule priorization, concurrency execution of tasks, changes
on rule execution modes, synchronization of events, different forms of metadata or sliding
processing.
6.4 Experiments
The following describes the evaluation scenario, reference datasets and the use cases
considered throughout the performed experimentation.
6.4.1 Evaluation Scenario
Since there are not collections of 5G network traffic, the performed experimentation is
focused on the study of traffic traces gathered as public domain datasets, hence facilitating
the replication of the obtained results. In particular, the evaluation scenario is focused
on the study of real traffic monitored on high-speed Internet backbone links published at
2016 within the CAIDA anonymized Internet Traces Dataset [DSC]. With this purpose
an illustrative use case is defined, which guides the knowledge acquisition framework
to infer new facts related with the variations of the traffic volume monitored. It is
important to highlight that since the dataset only provides raw data, it is not possible to
corroborate the incidents discovered with those identified by their authors. But such
disadvantage is compensated by the fact that CAIDA is a well-known dataset with
realistic information about current networks in the backbone, particularly in a data center.
Throughout the experimentation, this framework has been instantiated according to the
orchestration strategy introduced in [LVV17]. In this way, the analytic components act
sequentially as sets of actions in the following order: pattern recognition, prediction,
adaptive thresholding and knowledge inference. They are instantiated as described in
Section 6.3: pattern recognition includes the battery of algorithms detailed in Table 6.3,
prediction integrated the forecast methods summarized in Table 6.2, adaptive thresholding
adapts the method published in [MWH97], and knowledge inference imports the engine
provided by Drools [SDB]. Both prediction and pattern recognition capabilities have been
evaluated according to functional standardized methodologies. Firstly, the effectiveness
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of the forecast capabilities was tested adopting the M3-Competition scheme [Mak00] , in
this way facilitating the comparison of the obtained results with previous publications.
On the other hand, pattern recognition is validated based on the NSL-KDD dataset and
the evaluation methodology proposed in [TBLG09] . As in the previous test, the results
are contrasted with contributions that introduced similar features. Adaptive thresholding
and knowledge inference implement well-known techniques previously considered in similar
projects, so their effectiveness is assumed prior to the experimentation stage.
6.4.2 Reference Datasets
The performed experimentation applied three collections of reference data: NSL-KDD,
M3-Competition and CAIDA’16. They are described below.
6.4.2.1 NSL-KDD
NSL-KDD is a dataset suggested to solve some of the inherent problems of the KDD’99
dataset, which were reviewed by Tavallaee et al. in [TBLG09], among them: presence
of redundant records in the training set, record duplication, or imbalance of the number
of samples per group. Note that quoting their authors “this new version of the KDD
data set still suffers from some of the problems discussed by McHugh [McH00] and
may not be a perfect representative of existing real networks, because of the lack of
public data sets for network-based IDSs, we believe it still can be applied as an effective
benchmark data set”. Additionally, NSL-KDD authors analyzed the difficulty level of the
samples in KDD’99, and according to the results, they proposed two different collections:
KDDTrain+ 20Percent KDD’99+) and KDDTest−21 (KDD’99−21), where the second
includes records with difficulty level of 21 out of 21. It is important to note that according
to Bhatia et al. [BSMT14], KDD’99 is one of the most referenced methodologies in
the bibliography, and possibly the only one that presents a dataset of network security
incidents with reliable labeling. The original KDD’99 collection was created for the
competition KDD Cup, and it is based on the captures of traffic provided by the DARPA’98
dataset; in particular, legitimate (class normal, 97,277 (19.69%)) samples and the following
simulated threats:
Denial of Service attack (DoS): classes back, land, neptune, pod, smurf and teardrop;
391,458 (79.24%) instances.
User to Root attack (U2R): classes Buffer overfow, loadmodule, perl and rootkit ; 52
(0.01%) instances.
Remote to Local attack (R2L); classes Guess passwd, ftp write, imap, phf, multihop,
warezmaster, warezclient and spy ; 1126 (0.23%) instances.
Probing attacks: classes satan, ipsweet, nmap and portsweep; 4,107 (0.83%)
instances.
Their samples are characterized by 41 different features usually divided into three
groups: basic features, traffic features and content features. The first group gathers all
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the attributes that can be extracted from a TCP/IP connection (e.g. duration, protocol,
service, src bytes, flag, etc.). On the other hand, the traffic features are computed
with respect to a window interval, and describe host features (e.g. dst host count,
dst host same srv rate, dst host serror rate, etc.) and server features (e.g. srv count,
srv serror rate, diff srv rate, etc.). Finally, a group of features provides information able to
unmask suspicious behaviors in the data portion, i.e., independent of the time period(e.g.
root shell, logged in, hot, urgent, etc.). KDD’99 proposed as evaluation methodology
to split the dataset into two groups: a 20% subset as training samples and the rest
for testing. Note that NSL-KDD sanitized the original collection eliminating 78.05% of
training samples (93.32% attack instances, 16.44% normal instances), and 75.15% of the
test set (88.26% attack instances, 20.92% normal instances). Given that most of the
discards where instances repeated in training and evaluation samples, the evaluation of
classifiers with NSL-KDD displays considerably less precise results than KDD’99, posing
much greater difficulty to the evaluated proposals.
6.4.2.2 M3 Competition
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are not standardized methodologies to
assess the effectiveness of forecasting algorithms on 5G environments; in fact, there are
also no collections of samples of these monitoring scenarios. In view of this, the most
reliable way of demonstrating the capacity of the SELFNET prediction framework is
to evaluate it from general purpose methodologies adapted to time series prediction.
Among them it is worth considering a well-known scheme such as the M3-Competition
[Mak00]. It provides a collection of 3003 time series categorized as: financial, industry,
macroeconomics, microeconomics, demography and other. In order to ensure that every
prediction method is able to process the proposed data, it was observed that time series
have a minimum length of 14 observations for Yearly series (the median is 19 observations),
16 for Quarterly series (the median is 44 observations), 48 for Monthly time series (the
median is 115 observations), and 60 for other series (the median is 63). Hence three
blocks of data are clearly described: Yearly, Quarterly and Monthly. Note that all the
time series are positive to avoid problems related with the various MAPE measures. If the
original time series has negative values, they are replaced by zero. Table 6.4 displays the
classification of these time series. In the original competition, the participants run their
algorithms considering several prediction horizons (i.e., prediction periods): from t+ 1 to
t + 6 on Yearly data, from t + 1 to t + 8 for Quarterly data and from t + 1 to t + 18 for
Monthly data.
The dataset was evaluated according to five metrics: symmetric Mean Absolute
Percentage Error (MAPE) or sMAPE, Average Ranking, median symmetric APE,
Percentage Better, and median RAE (Relative Absolute Error). Among them, the sMAPE
is the most frequent in the bibliography, bearing in mind both old and recent contributions.
Because of this, sMAPE is the base of the performed experimentation.
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Table 6.4: Time series categories and attributes of the M3 dataset.
Micro Industry Macro Finance Demographic Other Total
Year 146 102 83 58 245 11 645
Quart. 204 83 336 76 57 756
Month 474 334 312 145 111 141 1428
Other 4 29 141 174
Total 828 519 731 308 413 204 3003
6.4.2.3 CAIDA Anonymized Internet Traces 2016
The Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) has published the Anonymized
Internet Traces 2016 Dataset [DSC], which contains traces obtained through the passive
equinix-chicago monitor located at the Equinix [PEq] datacenter in Chicago. These
traces represent real internet traffic samples used for research purposes. Moreover, it
is important to bear in mind that all traces are anonymized, and their payload has been
removed. Thereby the resultant pcap files store only layer 3 and layer 4 packet headers
to be accounted when gathering network statistics. Traces are, in fact, an hour monitored
traffic captured each month. Even when traffic traces are stored each month, current yearly
CAIDA datasets are a collection of four Internet traffic trace (one per quarter).A one-hour
traffic trace is split in several pcap files, each of them corresponding to a one-minute traffic.
Currently, CAIDA 2016 dataset has published Internet traces captured at 21 January
(Ds-January), 18 February (Ds-February), 17 March (Ds-March), and 6 April (Ds-April).
All of them captured from 14:00:00 to 14:59:59 h.
The first part of the experimentation was conducted using a three-minutes sample of
traffic traces extracted from Ds-Jan. They correspond to network data packets captured
from 14:00:00 to 14:02:59. In order to measure traffic volume, a time series of 180 elements
was constructed by accumulating the total number of bytes per second. At this stage of
the research, it was not feasible to extend the length of the time series due to storage and
parsing time limitations. Henceforth, this sample data is referred as CAIDA’16-sample.
In the second part of the experimentation, network traffic measures were gathered from
the statistics files published by CAIDA. Each statistics file corresponds to a one-minute
traffic observed in a one-hour dataset. Thereby, every dataset has 60 statistics files.
Unlike the described CAIDA’16-sample, there was no need to parse pcap files since every
one-minute statistics file provides the total number of transmitted bytes. This is exactly
the same metric used in the first part of the experimentation, being the only difference the
granularity. Consequently, four time series of 60 elements were constructed from Ds-Jan,
Ds-Feb, Ds-Mar and Ds-Apr, being each element of the time series the observed traffic
volume expressed in bytes per minute. Henceforth, the generated time series are referred
as CAIDA’16-monthly.
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6.4.3 Use Case: Detection of Anomalous Traffic Volume Variations
This use case goal is to infer if the observed network traffic volume presents an
anomalous behavior. For this purpose, the knowledge inference framework components
are instantiated, contributing to the generation of new facts that are used to evaluate
the production rules configured to infer knowledge. The process is triggered once the
novelty detection capabilities of the Pattern Recognition component identify a change in
the network behavior. This task requires building a model of the normal traffic behavior,
which is created by assuming the first observations as reference samples and their following
six attributes: Euclidean, Squared X2, Canberra, Pearson, Bhattacharyya and Divergence
distances between the last two observations. The use of these metrics in network anomaly
detection is detailed reviewed in [BBK14].
Provided by the generated facts about possible anomalous traffic pattern, the
Prediction component calculates the forecasting values for the time series considering 1, 5
and 10 time horizons, and the results are also inserted in the working memory. With the
forecasted metrics, the Adaptive Thresholding component deduces the prediction intervals
(PI) for each observation, registering them in the working memory as new acquired facts.
The upper and lower thresholds are computed upon the forecasting error. Previously
generated facts about abnormal traffic patterns, forecasting values and thresholds allow
the Inference Engine to deduce the existence of anomalous traffic volume variations when
two conditions are met: traffic volume has been labeled as abnormal and the observation
is either exceeding the upper prediction interval or below the lower bound. Note that
combining both of them allows considering the presence of outliers regarding the general
traits of the behavior observed in the monitored environment, as well as unexpected
variations from the latest observations. In this way, the incidents will be reported with
greater certainty about their nature.
6.5 Results
The following describes the results obtained when analyzing the aforementioned datasets.
6.5.1 Prediction Capabilities Evaluation
The M3 dataset described in the previous section led to the evaluation of the framework
under different time series; being Yearly, Monthly, Quarterly and Others the time series
classifications as described in Table 6.4. The results of the evaluated forecasting methods
are shown in Tables 6.5–6.8. For each method, the sMAPE value for a given forecasting
horizon (t+ 1 up to t+ 18) is in fact the mean of the sMAPE values obtained for the same
forecasting horizon in a set of time series (#Obs) with the same data nature.
Yearly data has been evaluated under the proposed framework and their results are
detailed in Table 6.5. The obtained mean sMAPE values computed over 645 time series
range from 6.6 to 9.4, thus, exposing a better accuracy for all the evaluated forecasting
horizons (t + 1 to t + 6) compared to the other forecasting algorithms used in the M3
competition. Consequently, an average sMAPE of 7.1 computed for the 1 to 4 horizons,
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and a 7.7 value for the 1 to 6 horizons, expose also an overall better accuracy in comparison
with the M3 methods, which values range from 13.65 to 21.59.
Quarterly data results are shown in Table 6.6. The mean sMAPE values were computed
by the proposed framework over 756 time series, and they range from 4.4 to 5.2, thus,
exposing a better accuracy for most of the evaluated forecasting horizons (t + 1 to t +
8), being t + 1 the only case where the framework does not show the best performance
compared to the other M3 forecasting algorithms. However, the average sMAPE values
of 6 for the 1 to 4, 4.9 for the 1 to 6, and 4.8 for the 1 to 8 forecasting horizons shown a
better accuracy, particularly when the horizon is incremented. The average sMAPE for
the existing methods are in fact ranging from 7 to 10.96 in any case.
Monthly data has also been evaluated under the framework, presenting their results
in Table 6.7. The obtained mean sMAPE values computed over 1428 time series range
from 9.6 to 12.7, exposing again a better accuracy for most of the evaluated forecasting
horizons (t + 1 to t + 18) with values ranging from 9.6 to 12.7, being t + 2 and t + 4 the
only cases where the framework has a slightly less performance of −0.5 and −0.1 for t+ 2
and t + 4, respectively, compared with the mean SMAPE obtained by other algorithms
with values ranging from 10.7 to 24.3, considering all the forecasting horizons. Hence,
the average sMAPE values also show the best accuracy for the proposed framework, with
values ranging from 11.1 to 11.6, being only the average sMAPE of 11.6 for the 1 to 4
horizons slightly bigger than the lowest one in this category, obtained by Theta (11.54).
The remaining M3 average sMAPE values computed for the 1 to 6, 1 to 8, 1 to 12, 1
to 15 and 1 to 18 forecasting horizons range from 11.54 to 18.4 in any case. Therefore,
this overall results exposed the best accuracy with Monthly data. It is worth mentioning
that this set of time series are the longest used in the competition (with a mean of 115
observations).
Finally, Other data has also been evaluated following the same approach used for
Quarterly data, but with 174 time series (see Table 6.8). As compared to the preceding
time series categories (Yearly, Quarterly and Monthly), in this case the results were
significantly better, except for the t + 1 horizon where the mean sMAPE obtained by
this proposal was 1.8 compared with the minimum value of 1.6 obtained by the Autobox
2 method. The remaining forecasting horizons shown a value ranging from 1.5 to 2.4,
exposing an increasing accuracy as long as the forecasting horizon grows. In consequence,
the average sMAPE values for the 1 to 4, 1 to 6 and 1 to 8 horizons show also better
results when the framework performs the forecasting.
6.5.2 Pattern Recognition Capabilities Evaluation
The results obtained for the different classifiers at pattern recognition actions considering
NSL-KDD’99+ are summarized in Table 6.9, and the results with NSL-KDD’99−21 are
displayed in Table 6.10. On the other hand, Table 6.11 compares the effectiveness of the
SELFNET Pattern Recognition set of actions with some of the most relevant proposals
in the bibliography; in particular, those reviewed by Ashfaq et al. [AWH+17]. This
publication was released at early 2017 and discusses the effectiveness of most of the latest
proposals for intrusion detection that assumed the NSL-KDD’99 evaluation methodology,
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Table 6.5: SMAPE on M3-Competition for Yearly data.
Method
Forecasting Horizon Average
#Obs
t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 1 to 4 1 to 6
Naive 8.5 13.2 17.8 19.9 23 24.9 14.85 17.88 645
Single 8.5 13.3 17.6 19.8 22.8 24.8 14.82 17.82 645
Holt 8.3 13.7 19 22 25.2 27.3 15.77 19.27 645
Dampen 8 12.4 17 19.3 22.3 24 14.19 17.18 645
Winter 8.3 13.7 19 20 25.2 27.3 15.77 19.27 645
Comb S-H-D 7.9 12.4 16.9 24.1 22.2 23.7 14.11 17.07 645
B-J automatic 8.6 13 17.5 18.2 22.8 24.5 14.78 17.73 645
Autobox 1 10.1 15.2 20.8 22.5 28.1 31.2 17.57 21.59 645
Autobox 2 8 12.2 16.2 19 21.2 23.3 13.65 16.52 645
Autobox 3 10.7 15.1 20 20.4 25.7 28.1 17.09 20.36 645
Robust-Trend 7.6 11.8 16.6 20.3 22.1 23.5 13.75 16.78 645
ARARMA 9 13.4 17.9 19.1 23.8 25.7 15.17 18.36 645
Automat ANN 9.2 13.2 17.5 19.7 23.2 25.4 15.04 18.13 645
Flores/Pearce 1 8.4 12.5 16.9 19.1 22.2 24.2 14.22 17.21 645
Flores/Peace 2 10.3 13.6 17.6 19.7 21.9 23.9 15.31 17.84 645
PP-autocast 8 12.3 16.9 19.1 22.1 23.9 14.08 17.05 645
ForecastPro 8.3 12.2 16.8 19.3 22.2 24.1 14.15 17.14 645
SmartFcs 9.5 13 17.5 19.9 22.1 24.1 14.95 17.68 645
Theta-sm 8 12.6 17.5 20.2 13.4 25.4 14.6 17.87 645
Theta 8 12.2 16.7 19.2 21.7 23.6 14.02 16.9 645
RBF 8.2 12.1 16.4 18.3 20.8 22.7 13.75 16.42 645
ForecastX 8.6 12.4 16.1 18.2 21 22.7 13.8 16.48 645
This proposal 6.9 6.6 7.6 7.2 8.5 9.4 7.1 7.7 645
in this way assuming as principal classification criterion the accuracy they proved. In the
case of the subset of samples NSL-KDD’99+, the best classifier in SELFNET was Adaptive
Boosting with 82.2% accuracy. This result is close to the best accuracy in the reviewed
bibliography (84.12%), where the clustering approach introduced by Herna´ndez-Pereira
[HPSRFRAB09] was applied on flag and service features of the dataset, combined with
the fuzziness based semi-supervised learning approach proposed by Ashfaq et al. Bearing
in mind that in this experiment the SELFNET Pattern Recognition framework did
not use data preprocessing capabilities (unlike in the aforementioned publication), it is
possible to conclude that SELFNET effectiveness is sufficient for the next experiments,
hence leaving preprocessing for future implementations. In the second test, the subset
of samples NSL-KDD’99−21 was considered. The best configuration of the SELFNET
Pattern Recognition framework achieved 89.9% accuracy when executed with generation of
synthetic samples. The average accuracy on the latest publications is 60.3%; in particular,
the best classifier tested by Ashfaq et al. demonstrated 68.2% accuracy when considering
Adaptive Boosting and the previously described preprocessing. Again, it is possible
consider that the achieved effectiveness is enough to validate its effectiveness.
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Table 6.6: SMAPE on M3-Competition for Quarterly data.
Method
Forecasting Horizon Average
#Obs
t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 8 1 to 4 1 to 6 1 to 8
Naive 5.4 7.4 8.1 9.2 10.4 12.4 13.7 7.55 8.82 9.95 756
Single 5.3 7.2 7.8 9.2 10.2 12 13.4 7.38 8.63 9.72 756
Holt 5 6.9 8.3 10.4 11.5 13.1 15.6 7.67 9.21 10.67 756
Dampen 5.1 6.8 7.7 9.1 9.7 11.3 12.8 7.18 8.29 9.33 756
Winter 5 7.1 8.3 10.2 11.4 13.2 15.3 7.65 9.21 10.61 756
Comb S-H-D 5 6.7 7.5 8.9 9.7 11.2 12.8 7.03 8.16 9.22 756
B-J automatic 5.5 7.4 8.4 9.9 10.9 12.5 14.2 7.79 9.1 10.26 756
Autobox 1 5.4 7.3 8.7 10.4 11.6 13.7 15.7 7.95 9.52 10.96 756
Autobox 2 5.7 7.5 8.1 9.6 10.4 12.1 13.4 7.73 8.89 9.9 756
Autobox 3 5.5 7.5 8.8 10.7 11.8 13.4 15.4 8.1 9.6 10.93 756
Robust-Trend 5.7 7.7 8.2 8.9 10.5 12.2 12.7 7.63 8.86 9.79 756
ARARMA 5.7 7.7 8.6 9.8 10.6 12.2 13.5 7.96 9.09 10.12 756
Automat ANN 5.5 7.6 8.3 9.8 10.9 12.5 14.1 7.8 9.1 10.2 756
Flores/Pearce 1 5.3 7 8 9.7 10.6 12.2 13.8 7.48 8.78 9.95 756
Flores/Peace 2 6.7 8.5 9 10 10.8 12.2 13.5 8.57 9.54 10.43 756
PP-autocast 4.8 6.6 7.8 9.3 9.9 11.3 13 7.12 8.28 9.36 756
ForecastPro 4.9 6.8 7.9 9.6 10.5 11.9 13.9 7.28 8.57 9.77 756
SmartFcs 5.9 7.7 8.6 10 10.7 12.2 13.5 8.02 9.16 10.15 756
Theta-sm 7.7 8.9 9.1 9.7 10.2 11.3 12.1 8.86 9.49 10.07 756
Theta 5 6.7 7.4 8.8 9.4 10.9 12 7 8.04 8.96 756
RBF 5.7 7.4 8.3 9.3 9.9 11.4 12.6 7.69 8.67 9.57 756
ForecastX 4.8 6.7 7.7 9.2 10 11.6 13.6 7.12 8.35 9.54 756
AAM1 5.5 7.3 8.4 9.7 10.9 12.5 13.8 7.71 9.05 10.16 756
AAM2 5.5 7.3 8.4 9.9 11.1 12.7 14 7.75 9.13 10.26 756
This proposal 5.3 5.2 4.5 4.7 4.4 4.8 4.9 6.0 4.9 4.8 756
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Table 6.7: SMAPE on M3-Competition for Monthly data.
Method
Forecasting Horizon Average
#Obs
t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 8 t + 12 t + 15 t + 18 1 to 4 1 to 6 1 to 8 1 to 12 1 to 15 1 to 18
Naive 15 13.5 15.7 17 14.9 14.7 15.6 15 19.3 20.47 15.3 15.13 15.29 15.57 16.18 16.91 1428
Single 13 12.1 12.1 15.1 13.5 13.1 13.8 14.5 18.3 19.4 13.53 13.44 13.6 13.83 14.51 15.32 1428
Holt 12.2 11.6 13.4 14.6 13.6 13.3 13.7 14.8 18.8 20.2 12.95 13.11 13.33 13.77 15.51 15.36 1428
Dampen 11.9 11.4 13 14.2 12.9 12.6 13 13.9 17.5 18.9 12.63 12.67 12.85 13.1 13.77 14.59 1428
Winter 12.5 11.7 13.7 14.7 13.6 13.4 14.1 14.6 18.9 20.2 13.17 13.28 13.52 13.88 14.62 15.44 1428
Comb S-H-D 12.3 11.5 13.2 14.3 12.9 12.5 13 13.6 17.3 18.3 12.83 12.79 12.92 13.11 13.75 14.48 1428
B-J automatic 12.3 11.4 12.8 14.3 12.7 12.6 13 14.1 17.8 19.3 12.78 12.74 12.89 13.21 13.96 14.81 1428
Autobox 1 13 12.2 13 14.5 14.1 13.4 14.3 15.4 19.1 20.4 13.27 13.42 13.71 14.1 14.93 15.83 1428
Autobox 2 13.1 12.1 13.5 15.3 13.3 13.8 13.9 15.2 18.2 19.9 13.51 13.52 13.76 14.16 14.86 15.69 1428
Autobox 3 12.3 12.3 13 14.4 14.6 14.2 14.8 16.1 19.2 21.2 12.99 13.47 13.89 14.43 15.2 16.18 1428
Robust-Trend 15.3 13.8 15.5 17 15.3 15.6 17.4 17.5 22.2 24.3 15.39 15.42 15.89 16.58 17.47 18.4 1428
ARARMA 13.1 12.4 13.4 14.9 13.7 14.2 15 15.2 18.5 20.3 13.42 13.59 14 14.41 15.08 15.84 1428
Automat ANN 11.6 11.6 12 14.1 12.2 13.9 13.8 14.6 17.3 19.6 12.31 12.55 12.92 13.42 14.13 14.93 1428
Flores/Pearce 1 12.4 12.3 14.2 16.1 14.6 14 14.6 14.4 19.1 20.8 13.74 13.93 14.22 14.29 15.02 15.96 1428
Flores/Peace 2 12.6 12.1 13.7 14.7 13.2 12.9 13.4 14.4 18.2 19.9 13.26 13.21 13.33 13.53 14.31 15.17 1428
PP-autocast 12.7 11.7 13.3 14..3 13.2 13.4 14 14.3 17.7 19.6 13.02 13.11 13.37 13.72 14.36 15.15 1428
ForecastPro 11.5 10.7 11.7 12.9 11.8 12.3 12.6 13.2 16.4 18.3 11.72 11.82 12.06 12.46 13.09 13.86 1428
SmartFcs 11.6 11.2 12.2 13.6 13.1 13.7 13.5 14.9 18 19.4 12.16 12.58 12.9 13.51 14.22 15.03 1428
Theta-sm 12.6 12.9 13.2 13.7 13.4 13.3 13.7 14 16.2 18.3 13.1 13.2 13.44 13.65 14.09 14.66 1428
Theta 11.2 10.7 11.8 12.4 12.2 12.4 12.7 13.2 16.2 18.2 11.54 11.8 12.3 12.5 13.11 13.85 1428
RBF 13.7 12.3 13.7 14.3 12.3 12.8 13.5 14.1 17.3 17.8 13.49 13.18 13.4 13.67 14.21 14.77 1428
ForecastX 11.6 11.2 12.6 14 12.4 12.2 12.8 13.9 17.8 18.7 12.32 12.31 12.46 12.83 13.6 14.45 1428
AAM1 12 12.3 12.7 14.1 14 14 14.3 14.9 18 20.4 12.8 13.2 13.63 14.05 14.78 15.69 1428
AAM2 12.3 12.4 12.9 14.4 14.3 14.2 14.5 15.1 18.4 20.7 13.03 13.45 13.87 14.25 15.01 15.93 1428
This proposal 11.0 11.2 11.7 12.5 11.6 11.4 10.6 9.6 11 12.7 11.6 11.6 11.4 11.1 11.2 11.4 1428
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Table 6.8: SMAPE on M3-Competition for other data.
Method
Forecasting Horizon Average
#Obs
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+8 1 to 4 1 to 6 1 to 8
Naive 2.2 3.6 5.4 6.3 7.8 7.6 9.2 4.38 5.49 6.3 174
Single 2.1 3.6 5.4 6.3 7.8 7.6 9.2 4.36 5.48 6.29 174
Holt 1.9 2.9 3.9 4.7 5.7 5.6 7.2 3.32 4.13 4.81 174
Dampen 1.8 2.7 3.9 4.7 5.8 5.4 6.6 3.28 4.06 4.61 174
Winter 1.9 2.9 3.9 4.7 5.8 5.6 7.2 3.32 4.13 4.81 174
Comb S-H-D 1.8 2.8 4.1 4.7 5.8 5.3 6.2 3.36 4.09 4.56 174
B-J automatic 1.8 3 4.5 4.9 6.1 6.1 7.5 3.52 4.38 5.06 174
Autobox 1 2.4 3.3 4.4 4.9 5.8 5.4 6.9 3.76 4.38 4.93 174
Autobox 2 1.6 2.9 4 4.3 5.3 5.1 6.4 3.19 3.86 4.41 174
Autobox 3 1.9 3.2 4.1 4.4 5.5 5.5 7 3.39 4.09 4.71 174
Robust-Trend 1.9 2.8 3.9 4.7 5.7 5.4 6.4 3.32 4.07 4.58 174
ARARMA 1.7 2.7 4 4.4 5.5 5.1 6 3.17 3.87 4.38 174
Automat ANN 1.7 2.9 4 4.5 5.7 5.7 7.4 3.26 4.07 4.8 174
Flores/Pearce 1 2.1 3.2 4.3 5.2 6.2 5.8 7.3 3.71 4.47 5.09 174
Flores/Peace 2 2.3 2.9 4.3 5.1 6.2 5.7 6.5 3.67 7.73 4.89 174
PP-autocast 1.8 2.7 4 4.7 5.8 5.4 6.6 3.29 4.07 4.62 174
ForecastPro 1.9 3 4 4.4 5.4 5.4 6.7 3.31 4 4.6 174
SmartFcs 2.5 3.3 4.3 4.7 5.8 5.5 6.7 3.68 4.33 4.86 174
Theta-sm 2.3 3.2 4.3 4.8 6 5.6 6.9 3.66 4.37 4.93 174
Theta 1.8 2.7 3.8 4.5 5.6 5.2 6.1 3.2 3.93 4.41 174
RBF 2.7 3.8 5.2 5.8 6.9 6.3 7.3 4.38 5.12 5.6 174
ForecastX 2.1 3.1 4.1 4.4 5.6 5.4 6.5 3.42 4.1 4.64 174
This proposal 1.8 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.3 1.5 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.0 174
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Table 6.9: Results when analyzing NSL-KDD’99+.
Classifier Class TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure MCC AUC PRC Area Accuracy
Decision Stump
Normal 0.955 0.731 0.695 0.955 0.804 0.642 0.819 0.683
0.799Anomaly 0.683 0.045 0.952 0.683 0.795 0.642 0.819 0.831
Average 0.8 0.162 0.841 0.8 0.8 0.642 0.819 0.767
RepTree
Normal 0.909 0.256 0.729 0.909 0.809 0.649 0.822 0.721
0.815Anomaly 0.744 0.091 0.915 0.744 0.821 0.649 0.822 0.858
Average 0.815 0.162 0.835 0.815 0.816 0.649 0.822 0.799
Random Forest
Normal 0.973 0.323 0.695 0.973 0.811 0.658 0.959 0.947
0.803Anomaly 0.677 0.027 0.971 0.677 0.798 0.658 0.959 0.961
Average 0.804 0.155 0.852 0.804 0.803 0.658 0.959 0.955
Bootstrap Aggregation
Normal 0.917 0.249 0.736 0.917 0.816 0.663 0.928 0.909
0.822Anomaly 0.751 0.083 0.923 0.751 0.828 0.663 0.928 0.916
Average 0.822 0.155 0.842 0.822 0.823 0.663 0.928 0.913
Adaptive Boosting
Normal 0.968 0.399 0.648 0.968 0.776 0.589 0.935 0.919
0.822Anomaly 0.601 0.032 0.961 0.601 0.74 0.589 0.935 0.941
Average 0.759 0.19 0.826 0.759 0.755 0.589 0.935 0.932
Bayesian Network
Normal 0.973 0.429 0.632 0.973 0.766 0.57 0.945 0.94
0.759Anomaly 0.571 0.027 0.965 0.571 0.718 0.57 0.945 0.955
Average 0.744 0.2 0.822 0.744 0.739 0.57 0.945 0.949
Naive Bayes
Normal 0.931 0.367 0.657 0.931 0.771 0.572 0.895 0.844
0.761Anomaly 0.633 0.69 0.924 0.633 0.751 0.572 0.914 0.911
Average 0.761 0.198 0.809 0.761 0.759 0.572 0.908 0.882
SVM
Normal 0.954 0.355 0.670 0.954 0.787 0.608 0.799 0.659
0.77Anomaly 0.645 0.046 0.948 0.645 0.768 0.608 0.799 0.814
Average 0.778 0.179 0.829 0.778 0.776 0.608 0.799 0.747
Synthetic data
Normal 0.922 0.302 0.698 0.922 0.794 0.620 0.916 0.901
0.794Anomaly 0.698 0.078 0.922 0.698 0.794 0.620 0.918 0.913
Average 0.794 0.175 0.825 0.794 0.794 0.620 0.917 0.908
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Table 6.10: Results when analyzing NSL-KDD’99−21.
Classifier Class TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure MCC AUC PRC Area Accuracy
Decision Stump
Normal 0.848 0.416 0.311 0.848 0.456 0.33 0.716 0.292
0.631Anomaly 0.584 0.152 0.945 0.584 0.722 0.33 0.716 0.893
Average 0.632 0.2 0.83 0.632 0.674 0.33 0.716 0.783
RepTree
Normal 0.635 0.342 0.292 0.963 0.4 0.231 0.751 0.372
0.643Anomaly 0.658 0.365 0.89 0.658 0.757 0.231 0.751 0.923
Average 0.654 0.361 0.782 0.654 0.692 0.231 0.751 0.823
Random Forest
Normal 0.875 0.425 0.314 0.875 0.462 0.347 0.794 0.576
0.629Anomaly 0.575 0.125 0.954 0.575 0.718 0.347 0.794 0.935
Average 0.63 0.179 0.838 0.63 0.671 0.347 0.794 0.87
Bootstrap Aggregation
Normal 0.637 0.35 0.281 0.637 0.396 0.225 0.743 0.465
0.647Anomaly 0.65 0.363 0.89 0.65 0.751 0.225 0.743 0.922
Average 0.647 0.361 0.78 0.647 0.687 0.225 0.743 0.839
Adaptive Boosting
Normal 0.866 0.518 0.217 0.866 0.413 0.272 0.724 0.394
0.522Anomaly 0.482 0.134 0.942 0.482 0.638 0.272 0.724 0.901
Average 0.552 0.204 0.82 0.552 0.597 0.272 0.724 0.809
Bayesian Network
Normal 0.878 0.563 0.257 0.878 0.398 0.25 0.744 0.486
0.516Anomaly 0.437 0.122 0.942 0.437 0.597 0.25 0.744 0.928
Average 0.517 0.202 0.817 0.517 0.561 0.25 0.744 0.848
Naive Bayes
Normal 0.678 0.469 0.243 0.678 0.358 0.161 0.648 0.294
0.557Anomaly 0.531 0.322 0.882 0.531 0.663 0.161 0.65 0.876
Average 0.558 0.348 0.766 0.558 0.607 0.161 0.65 0.77
SVM
Normal 0.180 0.001 0.982 0.180 0.304 0.385 0.589 0.325
0.850Anomaly 0.999 0.820 0.846 0.999 0.916 0.385 0.589 0.846
Average 0.851 0.672 0.871 0.851 0.805 0.385 0.589 0.752
Synthetic data
Normal 0.905 0 1 0.095 0.905 N/A N/A N/A
0.899Anomaly 0 0.095 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Average 0.905 0 1 0.095 0.95 N/A N/A N/A
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Table 6.11: Comparison with related works in terms of accuracy.
Method NSL-KDD’99+(%) NSL-KDD’99−21(%)
J48 81.05 63.97
Naive Bayes 76.56 55.77
NB tree 82.02 66.16
Random forests 80.67 63.25
Random tree 81.59 58.51
M-L perceptron 77.41 57.34
SVM 69.52 42.29
Fuzzy 82.41 67.06
Fuzzy D&D 84.12 68.82
This proposal (Classification) 82.2 64.7
6.5.3 Use Case Evaluation
The following sections describe the two experiments carried on upon the CAIDA’16
reference dataset, analyzed under different levels of data granularity for each: per second
and per minute.
6.5.3.1 Experiment 1: CAIDA’16-Sample
The first step on the CAIDA traffic volume analysis according to the aforementioned use
case is novelty detection. With this purpose, the first 35 observations on the monitored
environment are considered as reference samples for building the normal network usage
model. The evaluation of the model demonstrated 91.4894% accuracy when tested via
cross-validation. The best selected pattern recognition setting was the combination of
generating synthetic data as counterexample [HFW08] and its analysis with Bootstrap
Aggregation [Bre96] based on decision stump [FI92]. Discordant traffic volume values were
monitored at observations 86–88 (21 January 2016 14:01:25 to 14:01:29), 113 (21 January
2016 14:01:54), 115 (21 January 2016 14:01:56), 139–141 (21 January 2016 14:02:20 to
14:02:23). Figure 6.2 summarizes the anomalous observations discovered. The impact of
the six attributes taken into account is illustrated in Figure 6.3. As can be observed, each
of them highlights the fact that at the aforementioned observations on the traffic volume,
there is a discordant with the reference data.
The next knowledge acquisition step is to infer new facts from predictions. The
obtained results are summarized in Table 6.12, and Figure 6.4 illustrates the evolution of
the predictions for horizon 1 (Figure 6.4a), horizon 5 (Figure 6.4c) and horizon 10 (Figure
6.4e). From them it is easy deduce that the higher horizon, the higher forecast error.
On the other hand, their different adaptive thresholds are shown in Figure 6.4b,d,f. The
thresholds provide greater margin of error when the forecasting error is higher. Because
of this, the selection of an appropriate horizon plays an essential role in the use case
effectiveness, since it conditions the level of restriction on which operates the knowledge
acquisition framework.
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Figure 6.2: Discordant observations at novelty detection for CAIDA’16-sample.
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Figure 6.3: Metric variations on samples.
Another aspect to keep in mind is the impact of the K adjustment value at the decisions
taken. This parameter regulates the restraint of the adaptive thresholds. Figure 6.5
illustrated the variation of the ratio of observations tagged as normal when modifying
K. Regardless of the prediction horizon, when K shows lower values the number of
observations labeled as unexpected is higher; hence the level of restriction on which the
framework operates is higher. Conversely, as K grows the normal labeling rate increases,
in this way overlooking situations that in the previous cases were considered discordant.
Finally, letting a forecasting horizon of 1 observation and K = 1, Figure 6.6a illustrated
the traffic volume evolution on CAIDA’16-sample and the adaptive thresholds inferred at
the proposed framework. Figure 6.6b summarizes the unexpected observations discovered,
which provide the rest of the information required to produce conclusions (symptoms).
Unexpected traffic volumes occur at observations 86–93 (21 January 2016 14:01:25 to
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14:01:34), 113 (21 January2016 14:01:54), 115 (21 January 2016 14:01:56), 139–143 (21
January 2016 14:02:20 to 14:02:25) and 146 (21 January 2016 14:02:25). By contrasting
Figures 6.2 and 6.6b it is possible deduce when the knowledge acquisition instantiation of
the proposed framework infers symptoms as final facts related with the implemented use
case (i.e., observations tagged as “suspicious”). It takes place each time a novelty behavior
is discovered and the traffic volume is unexpected, which occurs at observations 86–88 (21
January 2016 14:01:25 to 14:01:29), 113 (21 January 2016 14:01:54), 115 (21 January 2016
14:01:56), 139–141 (21 January 2016 14:02:20 to 14:02:23).Suspicious variations on the
volume of the monitored data are reported to the decision-making sub-layer, where the
countermeasures to be deployed are planned and orchestrated.
Table 6.12: Forecasting results for each horizon.
Forecasting Horizon (H) Selected Algorithm Parameter Calibration SMPAPE
1 Multiplicative Holt-Winters alpha = 0.5, beta = 0.1, gamma = 0.9 0.0004
5 Multiplicative Holt-Winters alpha = 0.1, beta = 0.3, gamma = 0.9 0.6972
10 Additive Holt-Winters alpha = 0.1, beta = 0.3, gamma = 0.1 1.7622
6.5.3.2 Experiment 2: CAIDA’16-monthly
This experiment was performed upon CAIDA’16-monthly data, by following the same
approach conducted in the previous section. Since CAIDA’16-monthly is composed by
four time series (traffic traces collected at January, February, March and April), they
are individually analyzed by the framework. Being novelty detection and forecasting
the set of actions in the knowledge acquisition process, the conclusions deduced by the
framework are summarized in Figure 6.7. Observations are shown in Figure 6.7a,c,e,g; and
the comparison between novelty detection and unexpected traffic detected at each monthly
dataset are plotted in Figure 6.7b,d,f,h, which are the required facts to produce symptoms.
When analyzing CAIDA’16 at January and February it can be concluded that even
when discordant observations are detected in the novelty detection stage, unexpected
traffic volumes are not observed in any of the time series. Thereby, there are no anomalous
traffic volume variations reported by the framework. It is explained due to the required
conditions (novelty and unexpected traffic) do not occur simultaneously at any observation.
On the other hand, March and April CAIDA’16 datasets detected both unexpected
and discordant traffic volume observations in the analyzed time series. By contrasting
the traffic labeled as “unexpected” with the novelty detection results at the March
dataset (Figure 6.7f), the inference of anomalous traffic symptoms take place at
observations 29 (17 March 2016 14:28) and 31 (17 March 2016 14:30). Likewise, at
the April dataset (Figure 6.7h), symptoms are inferred at observations 29 (6 April 2016
14:28), 31 (6 April 2016 14:30), and 32 (6 April 2016 14:31); where network traffic is
simultaneously considered “unexpected” and “fluctuant”, so the two required conditions
to trigger the “suspicious” traffic symptoms are met.
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Figure 6.4: Evolution of prediction and adaptive thresholding on CAIDA’16 sample.
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0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0
1
2
3
4
5
x 107
Observation
By
te
s
 
 
Volume
ATh Sup
ATh Inf
(a) Traffic volume variation on CAIDA’16-sample
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
 
 
 
 
Observation
La
be
l
 
 
Unexpected
Normal
(b) Unexpected observations on CAIDA’16-sample
Figure 6.6: Thresholds and Unexpected traffic on CAIDA’16-sample.
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Figure 6.7: Evolution of observations, thresholding and novelty detection on CAIDA’16
monthly.
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6.6 Final Remarks
This chapter presented a reasoning-based framework for the acquisition of knowledge in 5G
networks, and an instantiation of this framework has been performed. For this purpose,
every component has been equipped with very basic capabilities, which has led to the
implementation of well-known data mining algorithms and machine learning schemes
within each of them. The experimentation has focused on two fundamental aspects:
demonstrating that each component operates properly and testing the potential of the
proposal in a real use case. At the first stage, the functional standards NSL-KDD and
M3-competition have been considered. The obtained results corroborated the efficacy
of the deployed components by comparison with similar proposals. On the other hand,
the defined use case allowed the acquisition of knowledge related to variations of traffic
volume on the monitoring environment. This has been tested with real traffic, in particular
with traces provided by the CAIDA’16 collection. The results effectively demonstrated its
accuracy when generating useful information for the management of the occurred incidents.
In this way, it contributes on the provision of self-management capabilities adapted to
emergent network contexts.
Chapter 7
Entropy-based Economic Denial of
Sustainability (EdoS) detection
In recent years, an important increase in the amount and impact of Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) threats has been reported by different information security organizations.
They typically target on the depletion of the computational resources of the victim
system to prevent their operability. Inspired by such methods, Economic Denial of
Sustainability (EDoS) attacks pose a similar motivation, but adapted to cloud computing
environments, where the denial is targeted on damaging the economy of both suppliers and
customers. Therefore, the most common EDoS approach is making the offered services
unsustainable by exploiting their auto-scaling algorithms. In order to contribute to their
mitigation, this chapter introduces a novel EDoS detection method based on the study of
entropy variations related with metrics considered to infer the behavior of the monitored
environment. Through the prediction and definition of adaptive thresholds, unexpected
behaviors capable of fraudulently demand new resources are distinguished. For validating
purposes, an experimental scenario adapted to the singularities of the EDoS threats has
been implemented and the proposal accuracy has been effectively assessed.
With the purpose of cooperate with the research community towards their mitigation,
the following main contributions are accomplished:
A multi-layered architecture for EDoS attack detection, which describes the
management of the acquired information from its monitoring to the notification
of possible threats.
A novel entropy-based EDoS detection approach, which assuming its original
definition, allows to discover unexpected behavior on local-level metrics related with
the auto-scaling capabilities of the victim system.
An evaluation methodology adapted to the singularities of the EDoS threats and the
assumptions driven by their original definition.
Comprehensive experimental studies that validate the proposed detection strategy,
in this way motivating its adaptation to future use cases.
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In order to facilitate the understanding of this chapter, their contents are structured
into seven sections. Section 7.1 summarizes the assumptions and limitations considered in
the EDoS detection architecture. Section 7.2 describes the EDoS detection architecture
proposed in this work. The performed experimentation is described in Section 7.3, and
the obtained results are then discussed in Section 7.4. Finally, Section 7.5 presents the
conclusions of this chapter.
7.1 Assumptions and limitations
With the purpose of establish the basis for defining an appropriate design methodology,
the peculiarities of the conventional Denial of Service attacks, the legitimate mass access
to the protected services (i.e., flash crowds), and their differences with the Denial of
Sustainability threats have been taken into account. They allowed to define the following
assumptions and limitations concerning the proposal described in the rest of this section:
As remarked by Hoff in the original definition of EDoS attacks [Hof08], they pose
threats that do not aim on deny the service of the victim systems, but increase the
economic cost of the services they offer to make them unsustainable.
Hereinafter, Chris H. clarified that at network-level, EDoS threats resemble activities
performed by legitimate users [Hof09]. This implies that the distribution of
the different network metrics (number of request, number of sessions, frequency,
bandwidth computation, etc.) does not vary significantly when these attacks are
launched. This is because in order to ensure their effectiveness, they must go
unnoticed.
It is possible to identify EDoS attacks by analyzing performance metrics at
local-level. Given that at network-level there are no differences between EDoS
and normal traffic, the requests performed by these threats must involve a greater
operational cost.
Requests performed by EDoS attacks have a similar quality to those from legitimate
users (for example, a similar success rate). However, attackers may exploit
vulnerabilities (usually at Application layer) to extend their impact [SGSC16].
DDoS attacks usually originate from a large number of clients, where each of them
performs a huge number of low-quality requests. On the other hand, EDoS attacks
also come from many sources, but each client performs an amount of requests
similar to that of legitimate users. Unlike in flash crowds, EDoS attacks affect
the predictability of the performance metrics related to the costs resulting from
attending the requests served by the victim [ZJW+14].
The security mechanisms implemented on each software component involved in the
enforcement of cloud auto-scaling policies should raise the likelihood of preventing
EDoS attacks. However, such isolated security approach lacks a global detection
strategy for disclosing unnoticed EDoS patterns. Hence, this proposal delves into the
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EDoS detection analytics methods, disregarding the security considerations assumed
on the development and implementation of the different components.
7.2 EDoS Detection Architecture
Based on the assumptions and limitations stated so far, it is possible to assume that,
by studying the predictability of performance metrics at local-level (e.g., processing time,
memory consumption, input and output operations, CPU consumption, etc.), it is possible
successfully identify EDoS attacks. This is taken into account in the following subsections,
where the introduced detection strategy is described. The proposal has the architecture
illustrated in Figure 7.1. Therefore, it must perform three main tasks: (1) monitoring and
aggregation; (2) novelty detection and (3) decision-making. They are described below.
Clients
Server
Requests
Host-side
Monitoring
Aggregation
Prediction
Thresholding
Novelty Detection
Decision-Making
Response
Local metrics
Aggregated metrics
Performance
Outliers
Alerts
Figure 7.1: Architecture for EDoS attack detection.
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7.2.1 Monitoring and Aggregation
At the monitoring stage, the factual knowledge necessary to deduce the nature of the
requests to be analyzed is collected. Therefore, the detection system monitors local metrics
related to the operational cost of responding the received request. Assuming that in order
to success, EDoS attacks attempt to trigger the auto-scaling mechanisms of the victim-side,
the metrics that determine these actions acquire special relevance. Note that they are
widely studied in the bibliography, which vary according to the management services.
Examples of well-known local-level metrics are: CPU utilization, warming time, response
time, number of I/O requests, bandwidth or memory consumption [BBBS17, SGSC16].
Because of its relevance in the recent Cloud computing commercial solutions (e.g., Google
Cloud, Amazon EC2, etc.) the performed experimentation considered the percentage CPU
usage of the victim system.
On the other hand, it is important to borne in mind that the analysis of the
predictability degree of events has played an essential role in the defense against
conventional DDoS threats. Among the most used aggregated metrics, it is worth
mentioning the classical entropy adaptation to the information theory proposed by
Shannon [Sha48]. Note that in approaches like [BBK15] it is demonstrated its effectiveness
when applied to DDoS detection, being a strong element in the discovery of flooding
threats. Recent publications such as [BS15, IT11, JSTD16] tried to adapt this paradigm
to the EDoS problem. However, most of them made the mistake of only considering
information monitored at network-level, hence ignoring part of the information that truly
defines the auto-scaling policies. Because of this, the Aggregation stage of the proposed
method calculates the information entropy H(X) of the {x1, x2, . . . , xn} instances of
the qualitative variable X monitored per observation, as well as their {p1, p2, . . . , pn}
probabilities. The proposed detection scheme defines X as “the response time (rate) to
the different requests performed by each client”. Given that X describes discrete events,
its entropy is expressed as follows:
H(X) =
n∑
i=1
pi loga pi (7.1)
where loga b. logb x = loga x. H(X) is normalized, hence being calculated when dividing
the obtained value by the maximum observable entropy logb n. When the maximum
entropy is reached, all the monitored clients made requests with the same CPU overload;
on the contrary, if the registered entropy is 0 then 1) a single customer carried out all
the requests, or 2) there was no CPU consumption during the observation period. The
sequence of monitored entropies is studied as a time series H(X)Nt=0.
7.2.2 Novelty Detection
The next analytic step is to recognize the observations that significantly vary from
normal behaviors. This is a one-class classification problem where it is assumed that
the normal data compiles the previous H(X)t=1,..., H(X)t=N−1 observations and it is
intended to deduce if H(X)t=N belongs to the same activities. The bibliography provides
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a large variety of solutions to this problem [PCCT14]. However, because it was assumed
that EDoS attacks could be identified by discovering discordances at the predictability of
local-level aggregated metrics [ZJW+14], the proposed system implements a forecasting
approach.
7.2.2.1 Detection Criteria
In particular, the entropy for certain horizon h, Hˆ(X)t=N+h, is predicted. Hence,
letting the following Euclidean distance:
dist(o, oˆ) =
√
(Hˆ(X)t=N+h − (X)t=N+h)2 (7.2)
If (X)t=N+h differs from Hˆ(X)t=N+h, so dist(o, oˆ) > 0 an unexpected behavior is
detected. The significance of this anomaly is established by two adaptive thresholds:
Upper Threshold (Thsup) and Lower Threshold (Thinf ). A novelty was discovered if any
of the following conditions is met:
dist(o, oˆ) > 0 and H(X)t=N+h > Thsup
dist(o, oˆ) > 0 and H(X)t=N+h < Thinf
(7.3)
7.2.2.2 Prediction
The implemented prediction methodology adopted the Autoregressive Integrated
Moving Average ARIMA(p, d, q) paradigm [HT82], which defined by the following
general-purpose forecast model:
Yτ−1 − a1Yτ−1 − · · · − ap′Yτ−p′ = t + θ1t−1 + · · ·+ θqt−q (7.4)
where ai are the parameters of the autoregressive part, θi are the parameters of the
moving average part and t is white noise. The adjustment of p, d, q may be the
ARIMA model equal to other classical forecasting models. For example simple random
walk (ARIMA(1, 1, 0)), AR(ARIMA(1, 0, 0)), MA(ARIMA(0, 0, 1)), simple exponential
smoothing (ARIMA(0, 1, 1)), double exponential smoothing (ARIMA(0, 2, 2)), etc.
Predictions (yˆt) on ARIMA models are inferred by a generalization of the autoregressive
forecasting method expressed as follows:
yˆt = µ+ φ1Yτ−1 + φpYτ−p − φ1t−1 − · · · − φqt−q (7.5)
and the calibration of the adjustment parameters p, d, q considered the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) as described in [OHT05].
7.2.2.3 Adaptive Thresholding
On the other hand, the adaptive thresholds define the Prediction Interval (PI) of the
sensor, which is deduced in the same way as it is usually described in the bibliography,
hence assuming the following expressions:
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Thsup = H(X)t=N+h +K
√
σ2var(dist(o, oˆ))
Thinf = H(X)t=N+h −K
√
σ2var(dist(o, oˆ))
(7.6)
and being K the confidence interval of the estimation (by default Zα
2
). Note that despite
linking its value to the normal distribution, it was demonstrated that when time series
does not approach such distribution, the obtained error is unrepresentative [HKOS05].
Figure 7.2 illustrates an example of novelty detection. In the first 60 observations non
H(X) exceeds the adaptive thresholds; but at observation 61 an EDoS attack was launch,
and the inferred changes meet the conditions to be considered novel.
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Figure 7.2: Example of novelty detection.
7.2.3 Decision-Making and Response
According to the principles of anomaly-based intrusion detection compiled and
discussed by Chandola et al. [Cha09], once assumed the appropriate premises, the
identification of discordant behaviors may be indicative of malicious activities. As stated at
the beginning of this chapter, the introduced EDoS detection system lies on the original
definitions of C. Hoff and R. Cohen. Therefore, when a local metric directly related
with triggering auto-scaling capabilities on Cloud computing became unpredictable, it
is possible deduce that the protected environment is misused, hence jeopardized. This
occurs when dist(o, oˆ) > 0 and 1) H(X)t=N+h > Thsup or 2) H(X)t=N+h < Thinf .
Because the performed research focused only on detect the threats, its response is to
notify the detected incident. The report may trigger mitigation measures such as initiate
more restrictive control access [MARH13, KN09, AAB13] or deploy source identification
capabilities [ITJ12] (which decision and development is out of scope). Therefore, it entails
a good complement to many of the proposals in the bibliography.
7.3 Experiments
The following sections describe the Cloud-based testbed and related architectural
components considered throughout the performed experimentation. They are depicted
in Figure 7.3.
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Figure 7.3: Cloud execution environment for experiments.
7.3.1 Execution Environment
The experimental cloud computing environment was built with Openstack [Ope],
a well-known open source cloud platform suitable to deploy public and private cloud
environments of any size. The auto-scaling features of this cloud platform have also been
tested effectively on recent publications. The Openstack deployment for the experimental
testbed was composed by one controller node and one compute node. The controller runs
core Openstack services and it also holds the Networking (Neutron), Compute (Nova)
essentials, Telemetry (Ceilometer) and Message Queue (RabbitMQ) services. In addition,
it runs the Orchestration (Heat) services to allow the configuration of auto-scaling policies.
The compute node runs in a separate server, hosting the Nova core services. A new
Compute instance has been launched to deploy the web service used for experimentation.
This virtual instance runs an Ubuntu 16.04-x64 server with 8 CPU cores and 8 GB of
RAM memory.
On top of the operating system, a REST (Representational State Transfer) web
service written in Flask [SFl] has been implemented. A REST web service has been
chosen due to its simplicity and rapid development. REST is the predominant web API
design model built upon HTTP methods, which accommodates the system to interact
with several entities (i.e., humans, IoT devices). In REST every client request 1) only
generates a single server response (one-shot) and 2) every response must be generated
immediately (one-way). This request-response model is suitable to focus the analysis on
the measurement of CPU processing times, by tracking the connected user and the impact
of its client requests on the CPU consumption.
In addition to the web service, two modules were developed to be run in the
background: The HTTP Usage Monitor module and the Entropy Modeler. The former
logs information regarding the monitoring of client requests processing times, whereas
the latter performs novelty detection methods to trigger anomaly-based alerts to the
Openstack orchestration services.
On the client-side, a set of REST-clients have been deployed to generate traffic
according to several execution scenarios. The implementation details and characteristics
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of the components tested in the experimentation stage are explained in the forthcoming
sections.
7.3.2 Server-Side Components
The following describes the deployed server-side components: RESTful Web Service,
HTTP Usage Monitor and the Entropy Modeler.
7.3.2.1 RESTful Web Service
To facilitate a seamless interaction with HTTP clients, a REST web service has
been implemented on Flask, a Python-based framework for rapid development of web
applications. The REST service exposes four HTTP endpoints that produce the execution
of different list-sorting operations on the server, each of them consumes a different amount
of CPU time which is measured in the background. The endpoints and their average
execution times are summarized in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: HTTP GET endpoints and CPU average cost.
URI Parameters Avg. CPU Time in Sec. (1000 exec.)
/1 ?id={clientID} 0.02158
/2 ?id={clientID} 0.02781
/3 ?id={clientID} 0.03673
/4 ?id={clientID} 0.33604
7.3.2.2 HTTP Usage Monitor
Once the server receives a client HTTP request, the Usage Monitor module
permanently measures the amount of CPU time consumed to process the request before
sending the response back to the client. The module makes use of Python libraries and
standard Linux utilities to track the CPU consumption per each client request. The
collected data is then aggregated per client in configurable time intervals before being
logged to the system. If more than one client connection is being observed in the given
time interval, only the sum (aggregated metric) of all the processing times is logged. This
allows the creation of a time series, required for the next processing level.
7.3.2.3 Entropy Modeler
This module gathers the time series logged by the HTTP Usage Monitor and computes
the entropy of the CPU time usage of the different requests performed by each client. With
the resultant normalized entropy, the module forecasts the next h observations for the given
time series, in conformance with the ARIMA model. The predicted values are taken to
estimate the forecasting upper and lower thresholds. Whenever the resultant entropy falls
outside the prediction intervals, a Traffic Anomaly alert is reported to the auto-scaling
engine of the corresponding Cloud platform (i.e., Openstack Heat).
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7.3.3 Client-Side Component
On a separate server, several clients have been implemented as Python multi-threading
scripts for HTTP traffic generation, which is sent to the web service hosted in the
Openstack virtual machine instance. The generated number of traffic requests is a
discrete variable that follows a random Poisson distribution, since their similarity with
this distribution is widely assumed by the research community [BTI+03]. It is modeled
according to the traffic load requirements for each evaluation scenario. Every client is
represented by a process thread, which models multiple parallel clients handling their
own sets of requests independently from others. When normal network conditions are
modeled, all the clients send an HTTP GET request to the lower CPU-consuming requests
(endpoints 1–3) described in Table 7.1. When an attacker is modeled, it only calls the
most complex endpoint (4), which has higher CPU demands at server-side. Note that GET
requests can also accept the client ID as a parameter. It facilitates the implementation
of different client connections originated in the same computer since all the thread-based
clients share the same source IP address, but are differentiated by client ID.
7.3.4 Test Scenarios
Five main scenarios have been showcased to validate the proposal. All of them compare
the entropy levels of CPU processing times under normal traffic conditions against the
entropy measured when an EDoS attack is launched. Those attacks target to produce
CPU overhead. Therefore, the attack decrements the server capacities to handle more
connections, and it forces the decision to scale up the current virtual machine instance
when the CPU usage is above a pre-defined CPU limit in the Cloud-platform auto-scaling
engine.
The set of network traffic conditions described in Table 7.2 are assumed throughout
the experiments. There, clients (C) generate the total number of web requests (TR) at the
expected rate (ERS). It is worth remarking that ERS corresponds to the expected number
of occurrences (λ) of the Poisson distribution. Therefore, the generated web requests
represent the sample of connections to be analyzed. The MTR observation number (5000)
is the frontier that divides the TR into two groups of 5000 client requests each. The
first one operates under the normal traffic conditions described in Table 7.2; whereas
a percentage of the second group contains the malicious requests, letting the remaining
connections to operate under the normal conditions. For instance, in the second group a
5% malicious requests rate indicates that 250 malicious requests and 4750 normal requests
were observed. Table 7.3 defines the evaluation scenarios (E1 to E5) considered to deploy
the EDoS attacks.
The experiments performed for each scenario started their execution with the normal
web traffic conditions (first group of connections), with all the participant clients
requesting the endpoints 1–3, as explained before. However, at the time specified by
the MTR connection, the attack was launched. It compromised several normal clients
(C), which sent malicious requests to the endpoint 4, thus increasing the CPU overhead.
It is important to remark that the attackers connect to the server under the same ratio
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Table 7.2: Normal traffic conditions for experiments.
Characteristic Value
Web clients (C) 500
Expected requests per second (ERS) 60
Total web requests (TR) 10,000
Malicious Triggering Request (MTR) 5000
Table 7.3: Network attack conditions and scenarios.
Parameter E1 E2 E3 E4 E5
Malicious Request Rate (MRR) 1% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Attacker Clients (AC) 5 25 50 75 100
Total number of malicious requests (TR−MTR)×MRR 150 250 500 750 1000
(ERS) configured for normal clients, making them unnoticeable since their connection
rate resembled legitimate traffic, but they targeted to exploit the highest time-consuming
endpoint which was exposed as a service vulnerability. To validate the proposal, it has
been considered a Cloud auto-scaling policy, configured to launch a new virtual machine
instance when the CPU consumption ran above 40% in a one minute interval.
7.4 Results
The experiments were performed with the parametrization presented in Table 7.3,
adapted to each evaluation scenario. The first monitored metric was the CPU time
consumption caused to process web requests launched from clients. A summary of the
CPU consumption of the server, measured on one-second intervals, is depicted in Figure
7.4. There, in all scenarios, half of the client connections exposed the same behavior
until the attack was triggered (MTR). From that moment on, the CPU overhead was
influenced by the traffic attack volume described in Table 7.3. Bearing in mind the
defined auto-scaling policy, it is noted that the scenarios E3, E4 and E5 would have
automatically launched a new virtual machine instance if the presence of the attack had
been unnoticed. Hence demonstrating the consequences of the EDoS threats and bringing
the attack detection strategy to play an essential role. On the other hand, besides the
CPU estimation, the entropy of the per-client processing time was constantly measured
by the Entropy Modeler on one-second intervals, as plotted in Figure 7.5. The graph
shows that the overall behavior of the entropy was contrary to the behavior noticed in the
CPU overhead with the higher entropy values before the MTR observation. The slumped
entropy level was slightly noticeable on scenario E1 (Figure 7.5(a)), but became quite
more perceptible on scenarios E2 to E5 (Figure 7.5(b) to 7.5(e)). Thereby, this pattern
was directly influenced by the presence of the compromised devices, decreasing the entropy
as long as more malicious requests were generated.
Only when the entropy was measured for the observed time, the Entropy Modeler
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estimated the prediction thresholds to infer if the observed entropy was running outside
the predicted intervals, thus leading to the decision of triggering an alert if the EDoS
attack was detected.
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Figure 7.4: Average CPU consumption per scenario.
The precision observed at the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) space is
summarized in Figure 7.6. There five curves are illustrated, each one associated with
one of the aforementioned evaluation scenarios (E1, E2, E3, E4, E5). Table 7.4 compiles
several evaluation metrics (True Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR) and Area
Under Curve (AUC)) and the best calibrations (K) to reach the highest accuracy. Bearing
in mind these results, it is possible to deduce that the proposed method has proven to be
more effective when the attack is originated from a larger number of compromised nodes
(e.g., E5 with 20% of the total number of connected clients). This is because a greater
number of instances of the random variable X represent similar probabilities, which leads to
a more significant decrease in the H(X) entropy, and therefore to display less concordance
with the normal observations.
On the other hand, labeling errors have occurred mainly due to issuing false positives,
in situations where fluctuations of H(X) derived from changes in the behavior of legitimate
clients acquire a similar relevance to those inferred by malicious activities. Note that
the larger is the number of compromised nodes that take part of the attacks, the greater
possibility of forcing auto-escalating reactions. Based on this fact it is possible to state that
the proposed method improves its detection capabilities when facing more harmful threats.
In addition, the existence of a K calibration parameter allows operators to easily configure
the level of restriction in which the system operates: When greater discretion is required, K
must adopt higher values. This considerably reduces the likelihood of issuing false alerts,
hence facilitating to minimize the cost of the countermeasures to be applied. On the
opposite case, when the monitoring environments require greater protection it is advisable
to decrease K, hence improving the possibility of detecting threats, but potentially leading
to deploy more unnecessary countermeasures.
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(b) Entropy evolution in E2
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(c) Entropy evolution in E3
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
En
tro
py
Observation
 
 
(d) Entropy evolution in E4
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
En
tro
py
Observation
 
 
(e) Entropy evolution in E5
Figure 7.5: Entropy measurements per scenario.
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Figure 7.6: Results in ROC space.
Table 7.4: Summary of results in ROC space.
Scenario AUC (Trapezoidal) TPR FPR K
E1 0.8858 0.7480 0.17 0.160
E2 0.9637 0.9630 0.09 0.163
E3 0.9766 0.9680 0.08 0.160
E4 0.9794 0.9644 0.06 0.160
E5 0.9830 0.9431 0.03 0.167
7.5 Final Remarks
Throughout this chapter, a novel proposal for detecting EDoS attacks has been
introduced. To this end, the state of the art has been reviewed in detail, which has brought
several considerations towards the definition of a detection method suited for virtualized
environments. A distinctive aspect of the performed research on this subject, compared to
other proposals, is the study of behavioral entropy-based patterns analyzed on the deployed
virtual instances. The experimental testbed implemented a client-server architecture
executed on different network scenarios. On the web server, the monitored per-client
CPU times have been evaluated by analyzing the entropy levels, which have exposed
a decrement when malicious requests originated by the compromised nodes have been
processed at server-side. In such scenarios, entropy has behaved indirectly proportional
to the consumed CPU. In addition, the detection method has also demonstrated its
effectiveness when predicting the entropy thresholds to be compared against the real
measured entropy. Thereby, this approach has proven high accuracy by quantifying the
area under the ROC curve, hence demonstrating its applicability on network environments
where virtualization plays a major role.

Chapter 8
Detection of EDoS Threats in
Self-Organizing Networks
In this chapter, the problem of the economic denial of sustainability in Self-Organizing
Networks is discussed. To this end, the characteristics of these threats are identified
and formalized. Thorough the performed research two novel threats were defined:
workload-based EDoS (W-EDoS) and Instantiation-based EDoS (I-EDoS). W-EDoS is
characterized by executing expensive requests in terms of computational resources at
the victim system, hence exhausting its workload and forcing operators to contract
additional resources. On the other hand, I-EDoS occurs when the cloud management
software deploys more instances of virtual network functions than needed as a response to
requests that resemble legitimate, but are malicious, thus increasing the cost of the hired
resources. To contribute towards their mitigation, a security architecture is proposed.
It implements strategies that rely on predicting the behavior of the protected system,
constructing adaptive thresholds, and clustering instances based on productivity. An
extensive experimentation has been successfully conducted, which includes case studies
and the assessment of the accuracy under different scenarios.
For cooperating with the research community towards the detection and mitigation of
EDoS, the following main contributions are presented:
A comprehensive formalization of the distinction between EDoS threats and similar
network incidents, among them normal activities, flash crowds and denial of service.
The definition of a pair of emerging new generation threats: Workload-based EDoS
and Instantiation-based EDoS.
A multi-layered architecture for EDoS attack detection, which describes the
management of the acquired information from its monitoring to the notification
of possible threats.
A novel entropy-based EDoS detection approach that allows to discover unexpected
behaviors on local-level metrics related with the auto-scaling capabilities of the target
system.
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An evaluation methodology adapted to the singularities of the EDoS threats and the
assumptions driven by their original definition.
Comprehensive experimental studies that validate the proposed detection method.
To facilitate the reader’s comprehension, this chapter has been divided into nine parts.
Section 8.1 introduces the CRoWN indicators that lay the basis for the formalization of
this proposal. Section 8.2 describes the impact of EDoS attacks. Section 8.3 introduces
the design principles and considerations of the proposed detection method. In Section 8.4
the self-organizing architecture is presented in detail. Sections 8.5 and 8.6 delve into the
details of the detection approaches for dealing with W-EDoS and I-EDoS, respectively.
Section 8.7 describes the experiments and evaluation methodology to assess the proposed
method. Section 8.8 discusses the obtained results. Finally, Section 8.9 provides the
conclusions of this chapter.
8.1 EDoS and CRoWN indicators
The principal disparities between EDoS attacks and the rest of similar network
circumstances are easily understood by considering four essential elements involved at the
information communication processes, under the prior assumption that the relationships
between the sources of the requests and the provision that must to solve them act as a
client-server model. These traits are the clients (C), requests (R), workload that entails
their resolution (W ) and the network functions necessary for their processing (NF ), which
are grouped in the set of characteristics CRoWN : {C,R,W,NF}. From the analytical
point of view, and as deduced from the discussions reviewed in the bibliography, the
quantitative study of their behavior has attracted the interest at most of the researchers.
Therefore, the following CRoWN indicators are considered in the event definitions (see
Table 8.1): with regard to C, the total number of monitored clients that made requests
nC and its distribtuion over time nC(t); with respect to R, the average number of
requests per client nR and its distribution over time nR(t); for W is considered the
average effort towards process the requests nW (bandwidth, computational cost, memory,
etc. depending the use case) and its distribution over time nW (t); and finally, regarding
NF the total number of network functions instantiated nNF , its distribution over time
nNF (t) and the productivity of each of them P (X)nNFi=0 , 0 ≤ i ≤ nNF . Note that the
method for calculating the last indicator depends directly on the functionality of the
instantiated network functions. For example, if they act as Network-based Intrusion
Detection Systems (NIDS), a possible productivity indicator is the number of alerts
that each of them report. On the other hand, if they deploy bandwidth optimization
capabilities, productivity may be the improvement they achieve. It is also important to
highlight that the aforementioned indicators can be further extended in order to define
variations of the threats described throughout this research, introduce alternative network
situations, or enhance the proposed method. But to address these issues in-depth is out of
the scope of this paper, hence focusing on the features that most comprehensively recap
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the problems to be faced. With this purpose, the CRoWN indicators associated to a
monitoring task m are summarized in the following abstract data organization:
CRoWN(m) = [nC, nC(t), nR, nR(t), nW, nW (t), nNF, nNF (t), P (X)nNFi=0 ] (8.1)
Table 8.1: Summary of CRoWN indicators
Trait Indicator Description
C
nC Total number of clients.
nC(t) Distribution of clients over time.
R
nR Average number of requests per client.
nR(t)
Distribution of average number of requests per
client over time.
W
nW Total workload of processing requests.
nW (t)
Distribution of workload of processing requests
over time.
NF
nNF Total number of instantiated network functions.
nNF (t)
Distribution of number of instantiated network
functions over time.
P (X)nNFi=0 Productivity of network function i.
From them five categories of network situations related with EDoS at Self-Oganizing
Networks are described: normal traffic [Cha09], flash crowds [BSMT14], flooding-based
Denial of Service [ZWHL16], flooding-based Distributed Denial of Service [SGSC16],
Workload-based EDoS and Instantiation-based EDoS (see Table 8.2). Two of them are
legitimate (normal traffic and flash crowds) and the rest are malicious. Unlike Denial of
Service, and Distributed Denial of Service, the EDoS threats satisfy the Network-based
similarity condition. Because of this, the paper focuses on indicators related with
the workload and productivity traits. Note that they are variants of the classical
complexity-based DoS attacks [Afe16] that target the implementation of algorithms at
software-level, but adapted to exploit Self-Organizing Network features. On this basis, let
the network monitorizations A and B expressed bellow and the following situations:
CRoWN(A) = [nCA, nC(t)A, nRA, nR(t)A, nWA, nW (t)A, nNFA, nNF (t)A, P (X)
nNF
i=0 A] (8.2)
CRoWN(B) = [nCB , nC(t)B , nRB , nR(t)B , nWB , nW (t)B , nNFB , nNF (t)B , P (X)
nNF
i=0 B ] (8.3)
Definition 8.1.1 Flash Crowd characterization.
Assuming that A is the monitorization of the habitual and legitimate network behavior,
B is defined as flash crowd when nCA  nCB and the rest of indicators display similar
values. Hence let the U infinite set of possible network monitorizations according with
CRoWN, and the Fc subset of flash crowd events, they are formalized as:
FcB ↔ {A,B ∈ U : nCA  nCB ,∼ when other indicators} (8.4)
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Table 8.2: Network situations similar to EDoS attacks in SON
Nature Family Category Description
Legitimate
Normal Habitual traffic.
Flash Crowd Multitudinous agglomeration of legitimate requests.
Malicious
Flooding-based
DoS Basic DoS attack from a simple source.
DDoS DoS attack from multiple sources.
EDoS
Workload-based Enforcing auto-scaling by costly requests.
Instantiation-based Enforcing the instantiation of network functions.
Definition 8.1.2 Flooding-based DoS characterization.
Assuming that A is the monitorization of the habitual and legitimate network behavior,
B is defined as flooding-based Denial of Service (simple) or DoS when nCA ∼ nCB,
nCA(t) ∼ nCB(t), nRA  nRB and nRA(t)  nRB(t), i.e. when the number of clients
is similar to the normal behavior, but a significant increase in the average number of
requests is observed. Let the U infinite set of possible network monitorizations according
with CRoWN, and the DoS subset of Denial of Service events, they are formalized as
follows:
DoSB ↔ {A,B ∈ U : nCA ∼ nCB , nCA(t) ∼ nCB(t), nRA  nRB , nRA(t)  nRB(t)} (8.5)
Definition 8.1.3 Flooding-based DDoS characterization.
Assuming that A is the monitorization of the habitual and legitimate network behavior, B
is defined as flooding-based Distributed Denial of Service or DDoS when nCA  nCB
, nCA(t)  nCB(t), nRA  nRB and nRA(t)  nRB(t), i.e. when the number of
clients and requests significantly increase. Let the U infinite set of possible network
monitorizations according with CRoWN, and the DDoS subset of Distributed Denial of
Service events, they are formalized as follows:
DDoSB ↔ {A,B ∈ U : nCA  nCB , nCA(t)  nCB(t), nRA  nRB , nRA(t)  nRB(t)} (8.6)
Definition 8.1.4 Network-based Similarity.
As stated by Hoff [Hof08, Hof09], EDoS attacks pose great resemblance to the legitimate
traffic. Henceforth, it is reasonable to assume that in this context, the number and
distribution of clients and requests remain similar. So, let the A monitorization of
the habitual and legitimate network behavior, B can only been categorized as Economic
Denial of Sustainability attack if nCA ∼ nCB, nCA(t) ∼ nCB(t) , nRA  nRB and
nRA(t) ∼ nRB(t). Hereinafter this relationship is referred as network-based similarity
(abbreviated as NB), so if it is satisfied, it is possible to state that A and B are
network-based similar. It is expressed as follows:
NB(A,B)↔ {A,B ∈ U : nCA ∼ nCB , nCA(t) ∼ nCB(t), nRA ∼ nRB and nRA(t) ∼ nRB(t)} (8.7)
Note that the variations on W and NF traits reveal if B pose a threat, hence distinguishing
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it from the legitimate observations. From them, EDoS attacks on Self-Organizing Networks
are classified in Workload-based EDoS attempts and Instantiation-based EDoS attempts.
They are defined below.
Definition 8.1.5 Workload-based EDoS characterization.
Assuming that A is the monitorization of the habitual and legitimate network behavior,
B is defined as Workload-based EDoS attack (abbreviated as W-EDoS) when A and B are
network-based similar, nWA  nWB and nWA(t)  nWB(t); i.e. when they pose strong
resemblance at network-level, but the average workload per request significantly increased
in B. In this way, the attacker exploits the auto-scaling capabilities of the protected system.
Hence let the U infinite set of possible network monitorizations according with CRoWN,
and the W-EDoS subset of Workload-based EDoS threats, the second is formalized as
follows:
W -EDoS ↔ {A,B ∈ U : NB(A,B), nWA  nWB , nWA(t)  nWB(t)} (8.8)
Definition 8.1.6 Instantiation-based EDoS characterization.
Assuming that A is the monitorization of the habitual and legitimate network behavior,
B is defined as Instantiation-based EDoS attack (abbreviated as I-EDoS) when A and B
are network-based similar, nNFA  nNFB, nNFA(t)  nNFB(t) and PA(t)  PB(t);
i.e. when they pose strong resemblance at network-level, there is a significant increase
of network function instances in B, but their overall productivity decrease. Hence, the
attacker takes advantage of the actuation capabilities of the Self-Organizing Networks by
deploying useless functionalities. Let the U infinite set of possible network monitorizations
according with CRoWN, and the I-EDoS subset of Instantiation-based EDoS threats, they
are formalized as follows:
I-EDoS ↔ {A,B ∈ U : NB(A,B), nNFA  nNFB , nNFA(t)  nNFB(t), PA(t) PB(t)} (8.9)
8.2 EDoS Impact
The following subsections describe the distinctive aspects of EDoS attacks from the
perspective of a cloud platform.
8.2.1 Impact of Workload-based EDoS
Following the formalization stated in Definition 8.1.5, a W-EDoS attack is characterized
by the execution of costly operations on servers hosted in a cloud provider. Server-side
operations are produced by client requests that resemble legitimate traffic in terms of
network indicators considering not only the number of clients, requests, workload or
deployed network functions, but also their distribution over time. The effect of W-EDoS
attacks is the need to scale-up or scale-out the deployed cloud instances (typically VNFs),
by adding additional computational resources when the existing ones prove insufficient to
ensure the desired quality of service, in conformance with the configured scaling policies.
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Figure 8.1: Auto-scaling triggered by a W-EDoS.
The major drawback of these auto-scaling enforcements is the associated monetary cost
derived from the allocation of the new resources. Figure 8.1 illustrates the scaling process
of a running an additional VNF enforced by a W-EDoS attack. In the depicted scenario,
the VNF has insufficient resources to process the workload (W), leading to a scale-up
or scale-out strategy which accommodates a proper task processing, balanced in several
instances of the same VNF.
8.2.2 Impact of Instantiation-based EDoS
Assuming the ability of the attacker to exploit a vulnerability that triggers the automatic
deployment of VNF instances in distributed locations of the infrastructure, an I-EDoS
attack occurs when the cloud management software deploys more VNF instances than
needed as a response to one or more requests ostensibly legitimate, thus increasing the cost
of the hired cloud resources due to the rise on the number of instances, with a decrement
on the average service productivity. This scenario fits with the principles described in
Definition 8.1.6. Figure 8.2 illustrates an I-EDoS attack where the cloud platform itself,
or a specific network function, is assumed to have an auto-scaling policy vulnerability
exposed to the attackers, and serves in consequence as an entry point of malicious requests.
They generate the automatic allocation of several virtual instances in different network
locations, but rather than being efficient they show scarce productivity levels. Those
lazy VNF instances are thereby unnecessary by the network operator since they generate
useless expenses without adding real value to the provided service.
8.3 Design Principles
The method described in this section addresses the problem of distinguishing legitimate
monitored situations from those related to attempts of Economic Denial of Sustainability
in Self-Organizing Networks. In order to limit the tasks involved on both design and
development stages, the following capabilities and restrictions have been assumed as design
principles.
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Figure 8.2: Auto-scaling triggered by a I-EDoS.
The description of the network situations summarized in Table 8.2 and their
descriptions assuming CRoWN indicators are considered. On this basis, the
proposed method must be capable of successfully identifying W-EDoS and I-EDoS
attacks, as well as distinguishing them from legitimate activities (normal traffic and
flash crowds).
The detection of conventional flooding-based DoS and DDoS attacks is out of the
scope of this publication. Currently there is a large bibliography that facilitates its
recognition [ZJT13, BBK15], hence principally aiming on contributing at the EDoS
threat mitigation.
The introduced approach considers a non-stationary monitoring environment
[DRAP15]. This is feasible as justified in publications like [BTI+03], which are widely
supported by an important part of the research community. Note that during its
development, the importance of the adaptation to changes in the monitored data has
been taken into account, which plays an essential role towards avoiding situations
related with the concept drift [EP11]. However, these capabilities make this proposal
difficult to understand, in this way diverting the attention from the security problem
to be solved (i.e. its main goal).
For reasons like those discussed above, adversarial methods based on imitation or
identity theft [O¨B15, ADAH14] with the purpose of evade the proposed detection
strategy are not considered.
Self-Organizing Networks are complex monitoring scenarios where a large number
of sensors collect information about the state of the network in real time. This
information must be aggregated into observations that can be handled by high-level
analytic tools. Although in the experimentation the impact of the granularity with
which data is extracted is briefly reviewed, the introduction of methods for its
calibration is postponed to future investigations.
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The correlation and management of the alerts discovered [SMFDV13, MAJ13] is out
of the scope of this publication. However, the acquired knowledge must be notified
with all the metadata required for their post-processing.
The proposal aims to illustrate the detection method by focusing on the analytical
approach. The impact of security measures implemented on the developed software
are thus not considered when assessing the EDoS detection accuracy. Hence,it is
postponed for future work.
8.4 Architecture
This section describes the EDoS detection architecture, which is illustrated in Figure 8.3.
It has been designed in conformance with the ETSI-NFV [ETS13] and 5G architectures
[5G-16b], where the decoupling of data and management planes makes it possible to
distinguish the division between functional layers. The Physical sublayer is typically
composed by Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware on which the Virtualization
Sublayer acts as a core component for the creation of virtual resources such as hosts,
network links, storage elements and so on. On top of that, a Cloud Layer manages the
automatic instantiation of Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) by interfacing with the
Virtualization Sublayer, thus allowing the dynamic provision of resources needed to fulfill
the agreed service levels. The deployed cloud environment interconnects VNFs through the
underlying virtual network, composing in turn a forwarding graph where VNFs can also be
chained with Physical Network Functions (PNFs), thereby creating one or more Network
Services (NS) offered to the users. Cloud deployments are also isolated between customers
to allow the coexistence of different network operators sharing the same physical resources,
which is known as multi-tenancy support. The Cloud Layer gathers also an important
number of metrics (e.g. usage or performance) measured on the instantiated resources
allocated into the existing tenants. Besides that, sensors represent key components in
the process of monitoring SON networks since they target to monitor customized network
metrics, mainly at application-level. In this way, primary information collected by sensors
and the cloud platform itself lies the basis to perform complex analysis at VNF level in the
SON Autonomic Layer, whose subcomponents are described in the forthcoming sections.
8.4.1 Data Collection
In this module, the monitorization of the protected environment is carried out to extract
raw metrics regarding the operational conditions of the virtual cloud. Notwithstanding
the vast number of counters provided by most cloud platforms (i.e. Openstack [Ope], AWS
[AmW], Azure [WMs]), they might be insufficient when more complex analysis tasks are
required. Therefore, a SON-driven approach can facilitate the extraction of more specific
information gathered by sensors, hardly feasible at cloud-management-level, to enhance
the analysis not only for EDoS attacks, but also for several other scenarios. The Data
Collection module comprises the following submodules.
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Figure 8.3: Self-organized EDoS Detection Architecture
Application-level monitoring. VNFs are monitored by sensors at operating system
or application-level to extract specific metrics targeted to enable further analytical
processes in the SON Autonomic layer. For instance; service response time, memory
consumption per process, number of active connections, among other counters.
Virtual Infrastructure Monitoring. Built-in cloud-monitoring services, such as
Openstack Telemetry (Ceilometer) [WOS], produce several metrics related to the
virtual infrastructure (i.e. CPU, memory or network usage). Some of them are
obtained periodically while others are generated when certain events are triggered
(i.e. creation of a new virtual network).
8.4.2 Data Aggregation
The monitorization of cloud deployments generate huge volumes of data, including
counters, events, alerts, among others. To facilitate their analysis, data aggregation
operations are applied to produce a single metric that summarizes a collection of sampled
observations, thus reducing the existing data volume. Different data granularity levels
should be also possible to configure, in accordance with the intended analysis. The Data
Aggregation module comprises the following submodules:
Feature extraction. A batch of raw observations generated by the sensors is grouped
on regular time intervals, when the configured aggregation operation is applied on
those values. This leads to the generation of a time-series of aggregated metrics; for
example, the entropy degree in the W-EDoS analysis.
Virtual Resource Aggregation. The virtual infrastructure metrics collected are also
summarized with aggregation operations. Most of the polled metrics might be easily
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expressed as time series since they can be queried by the associated timestamp
registered on the monitoring database. For instance, average CPU consumption in
Ceilometer.
8.4.3 EDoS detection
This module performs the essential analysis tasks for the detection of EDoS attacks, and
it is composed by the following submodules:
Modeling. With the time series of aggregated metrics, a forecasting model is created
to estimate the next m values of the time series by the application of well-known
prediction algorithms.
Adaptive Thresholding. When compared with real observations, a prediction interval
(PI) is generated based on the forecasting error measured at each observation.
Unexpected behaviors are inferred when the value of an analyzed metric runs outside
the boundaries of the upper or lower prediction thresholds.
Clustering. Clustering methods are intended to separate groups of virtual instances
by analyzing similarities on their productivity indicators. It leads to the distinction
of a suspicious group of instances whose creation does not resemble a legitimate
pattern.
Anomaly detection. Discordant behaviors exposed by the forecasting and clustering
processes are analyzed by a rule-based system to infer conclusions about possible
anomalies. When rule matches are found, they are labeled either as W-EDoS or
I-EDoS attacks depending on the analyzed scenario.
Notification. The inference of anomalies is reported to the cloud-auto-scaling engine.
It aims to prevent the creation of VNF instances that are targeted to overspend the
use of virtual resources, and the operational cost in consequence.
8.5 Workload-based EDoS recognition
The following describes in detail the metrics required for W-EDoS detection, and how they
are analyzed for identifying unexpected behaviors and deciding if they should be tagged
as potential threats.
8.5.1 W-EDOS Metrics
As stated in Section 8.3, the W-EDoS threat satisfies the network-based similarity, but
unleash a significant variation in terms of workload (at both W and W (t)); in particular,
concerning those metrics directly related with the auto-scaling capabilities of the hosts that
support the task involved in solving requests [BBBS17]. Because of this, the proposed
approach considers as W-EDoS detection metrics, the CPU consumption (Xcpu) and
response-time at application-level (Xapp). The first one measures the CPU usage at
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the operating system-level, and the second focuses specifically on each service request
consumption. Although a direct relationship between Xcpu and Xapp is expected, this is
not always the case. The nature of the requests can lead to a different workload in each of
these levels, in this way being able to force self-scaling [SGSC16]. Because the proposed
method lies on the detection of unexpected behaviors by observing the aforementioned
metrics, the first step is to discover the response-time variations. This is carried out by
studying the disorder degree on the application-level metrics reported once the different
tasks are fulfilled. As is commonly approached in the bibliography, this is addressed on
the basis of [JSTD16, O¨B15], where the gathered information is correlated in terms of
entropy. As indicated by Bhuyan et al. [BBK15], among the various proposals, that
defined by Re`nyi provides a general-purpose solution, so it was implemented for W-EDoS
detection. Hence Hα(Xcpu) defines the Re`nyi entropy and α is the Re`nyi entropy order,
α ≥ 0, α 6= 1 . The result is expressed as follows:
Hα(Xapp) =
1
1− α log
n∑
i=1
Pαi (8.10)
Note that given that Re`nyi entropies are in range [0, log n], they are normalized as
Hα(Xapp)/ log n. The implemented method considers the normalized version.
The study of the impact of Xcpu and Xapp can be approached as a classical Statistical
Process Control (SPC), where the metrics monitored over time are modeled as time series.
In this context they are univariate, since it was previously assumed that it is not possible
to state that Xcpu upmodels Xapp. Hence, the Re`nyi entropies calculated through the performed
application-level observations relate with each other as Hα(Xapp)
n
t=0 sequences, where:
Hα(xapp)t=0, Hα(xapp)t=1, · · · , Hα(xapp)t=n (8.11)
And the CPU consumption is represented as the following time series:
(xcpu)t=0, (xcpu)t=1, · · · , (xcpu)t=n (8.12)
Note that for simplicity and taking into account that the rest of the analytics for W-EDoS
are similar for both time series, Xcpu and Xapp are refereed as the random variable X,
hence not assuming distinctions.
8.5.2 Workload-based unexpected behaviors
The W-EDoS detection method lies on deciding if the estimation Xˆt=m at m horizon,
H > n, significantly differs from Xt=m. Hence it is required to forecast the time series
of the current Xnt=0 observations until a predefined horizon is reached, then being able to
complete the comparison (see Figure 8.4). Among the several approaches to this problem
[Mak00], the W-EDoS detection implements the Double Exponential Smoothing (DES)
[GJD80]. This decision has taken into account three conditions: firstly, non-seasonality is
assumed as design principle, hence leaving aside more complex models like Holt-Winters
[Gro73], which are capable of adapting to these variations. On the other hand, the system
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Figure 8.4: Workload-based EDoS detection process.
must be efficient and requires short time series for warmup and modeling, which leaves
aside autoregressive approaches such as ARIMA [HT82].
By definition, the Simple Exponential Smoothing (SES) algorithm may not operate
effectively when there is a trend in the analyzed time series [Bro57, Hol04]. In addition
to the smoothing constant α inherited from the SES model (in order to disambiguate this
value with respect to the Re`nyi entropy degree, henceforth refereed as A, DES considers
the constant γ related with the trend smoothing factor, so 0 < A), γ < 1. It is calculated
by the following recursive equations:
St = Axt + (1−A)(St−1 + bt−1) (8.13)
bt = γ(St − St−1) + (1− γ)bt−1 (8.14)
where St is the level of the time series at t, and bt is the trend. Note that when A = 0,
DES becomes a na¨ıve forecasting approach, and if A, γ = 1 it acts as SES. As is frequent
in the bibliography, the base cases are the initializations S1 = γ1 and b1, so:
b1 =
xt=n − xt=1
n− 1 (8.15)
and the forecasts are calculated as follows:
Xˆt=n+1 = St − bt (8.16)
Xˆt=n+m = St −mbt (8.17)
The prediction intervals define the adaptive thresholds considering [MWH97], and as
suggested in [HKOS05]. They are expressed based on the t prediction error based on the
Mahalanobis distance at t, in particular when t = m.
8.6. Instantiation-based EDoS recognition 121
t =
√
(xm − xˆm)2 (8.18)
In this way the following adaptive threshold is built:
PI = xt=n ± η
√
σ2(t) (8.19)
where the parameter η, η ≥ 0 calibrates the restrictiveness of the prediction interval and
m is the forecast horizon. In the context of the W-EDoS detector, the significance of the
forecasting errors can be assessed according to the Definition 8.5.1.
Definition 8.5.1 Workload-based unexpected behaviors.
Let Xnt=0 and its forecast Xˆt=n+m at horizon m, an observation Xt=n+m is workload-based
unexpected when t /∈ PI is satisfied, i.e. when xˆt=n+m and xt=n+m differ significantly.
The sequences of unexpected observations are referred as workload-based unexpected
behaviors.
The persistence of observations tagged as workload-based unexpected behaviors
establishes the duration of the possible threats. An example of this situation is illustrated
in Figure 8.5, where Xnt=0 is analyzed and the prediction intervals are built. At the range of
observations (xt=41, xt=44) they are overtaken, in this way displaying four workload-based
unexpected observations (xt=41, xt=42, xt=43 and xt=44) and the workload-based unexpected
behavior X44t=41.
Alerts related with W-EDoS are reported when at the same observation t, both
detection metrics (Xcpu and Xapp) are workload-based unexpected. Note that given the not
Xcpu upmodels Xapp relationship, each of them may deduce a suspicious outlier, being Symp(Xcpu)
related with abusive CPU workloads, and Sympt(Xapp) being related with anomalous
time-responses at application-level. The decision of pooling both symptoms lies on filtering
the rebound effect of the adaptive thresholding method, where when a representative
change occurs in the time series, the threshold takes a while to re-calibrate, which may
lead to the emission of false positives as replicas. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 8.6,
where after discovering an outlier (t = 47), the prediction interval is erroneously calculated
at the next monitorizations (t = 48 to t = 65). On the other hand, a Symp(Xcpu) may
be triggered by anomalous decrements on the workload of the monitoring systems, which
leads to an effect contrary to that caused by the W-EDoS. This is illustrated in Figure
8.7(a) where Hα(Xapp) displays a discordant behavior because of changes at the disorder
degree on the application-level; in particular the entropy decreased because most of the
host supporting certain service are removed driven by a decrease of the demanded workload
Figure 8.7(b).
8.6 Instantiation-based EDoS recognition
The subsections below detail the metrics studied by the I-EDoS detection components,
how they are analyzed and the decision-making task.
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Figure 8.7: Example of discordant entropy not related with W-EDoS
8.6.1 I-EDOS Metrics
As indicated in Definition 8.1.4, I-EDoS situations are network-based similar with the
normal and legitimate traffic, but entail outliers in terms of nNF , nNF (t) and P (X)nNFi=0 .
It was also stated that the classical instantiation-based attacks are characterized by the
emergence of a significant number of network functions behaving in low-productivity.
Therefore, before labeling a situation as possible threat, there must be observed a direct
8.6. Instantiation-based EDoS recognition 123
relationship between the new network functions and their low productivity. This leads to
consider a pair of I-EDoS detection metrics: the number of network functions instantiated
per observation Y , and their productivity Z; where Z is the set Z = {z1 · · · zY , Y ≥ 0}
that defines the productivity of the different network functions {z1 · · · zY } at certain t
observation. In analogy to the W-EDoS, they are monitored over time and collected in
the following times series:
Yt=0, Yt=1, · · · , Yt=n; (Y nt=0) (8.20)
Zt=0, Zt=1, · · · , Zt=n; (Znt=0) (8.21)
On this basis, an observation at t, 0 ≤ t ≤ n, is potentially malicious when Yt has
grown discordantly and Zt = {z1, · · · , zY (t)} displays a group of instances that clearly
behave at low productivity; in particular, the low-productive functions must be those that
triggered the increase of Yt, in this way satisfying Y upmodels Z. These situations are defined
below.
8.6.2 Novelty detection
The anomalous growth of the number of instances are studied similarly to the
workload-based unexpected behaviors, i.e. by observing if their projection at m differ
significantly from the observations at m. With this purpose, and in the grounds stablished
at Section 8.5.2, the Double Exponential Smoothing (DES) [GJD80] is implemented, and
adaptive thresholds are built according with [HKOS05]. Consequently, a novelty in terms
of number of instances Y at t is considered as potential trait of I-EDoS when a significant
growth is observed in Yt, which is formalized according to Definition 8.6.1.
Definition 8.6.1 Significant growth.
Let Y nt=0 and its forecast Yˆt=n+m at horizon m, an observation Yt=n+m implies a
significant growth when t /∈ PI is satisfied, i.e. when Yt=n+m and Yˆt=n+m differ
significantly, and Yt=n < Yt=m.
8.6.3 Identification of suspicious network function instances
Once a self-organizing action at t has resulted in the instantiation of Zt = {z1, · · · , zYt}
new network capabilities, it is possible to detect if they are involved in an I-EDoS attack.
According to the threat definitions discussed in Section 8.1, the typical behavior of the
malicious instances is low-productivity. But low-productivity may be the pattern observed
in most of the network functions deployed; therefore, it is assumed that the malicious
instances should register significantly low-productivity with respect to the rest of the
instances that operate on the monitoring environment at t. How to detect this situation
is not a simple question. But despite detecting this situation is not trivial in many of
the network scenarios, it can be addressed from different perspectives. Among them, the
performed research has focused on those based on clustering, thus leaving other possible
approaches for future investigation. At the experimentation, a density-based approach
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was implemented; in particular, the Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with
Noise (DBSCAN) [EKS+96].
DBSCAN considers groups of observations based on the density of the K-nearest
neighbors. This process distinguishes three kinds of o objects in the space: core objects,
density-reachable and outliers. Let the object p, it is a core object if the -neighborhood
of the object contains at least minPts objects; where the -neighborhood of p is the space
within a radius epsilon centered at p. Because of this they are considered the pillars of
dense regions. The objects within  are considered directly density-reachable by p. On
the other hand, a q object is reachable by p if there is a chain of objects p1, · · · , pn, where
p1 = q, pn = q; and each pi+1 is directly density-reachable with respect to  and minPts,
0 ≤ i ≤ n, pi ∈ D. Each cluster has at least a core point, being the rest of the points
their periphery. Consequently, the objects within a cluster are interconnected, and if p is
density-reachable by other object q, the second also is part of the same group. Observations
non-reachable by objects in clusters are considered outliers [Cha09]. DBSCAN has several
advantages, which played an essential role in its selection as support for deploying an
effective defense against I-EDoS, among them high efficiency, not requirement of previous
estimations of the number of clusters to be defined, and noise tolerance. However, among
other drawbacks it is worth mentioning its efficiency, which highly depends on the distances
and similarity measures adopted. With the purpose of discover I-EDoS threats, DBSCAN
is performed on each Zt = {z1, · · · , zYt} set, where each productivity zi is an object pi, so
Yt = n. The following  distance based on the Mahalanobis divergence was implemented:
 =
√
(zi − zj)2 (8.22)
where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n and i 6= j. The resultant set of K clusters is Ct = {c1, · · · , ck}, K ≥ 0
were ci = {zr, · · · , zs}, 0 ≤ r, j ≤ n, i.e. zr, · · · , zs are network functions with similar
productivities. The members of Ct can be increasingly ordered according to the average
productivity of their members, being each c¯i the mean of zr, · · · , zs. The arranged list is
expressed as s(Ct) = [c1, · · · , cK ], ∀ci : cj 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ K is satisfied c¯i ≤ c¯j . The clusters
relevant for the I-EDoS detection are tagged as lazy groups and their members are termed
lazy instances, which are defined in Definition 8.6.2. An example of them is illustrated
in Figure 8.8, where it is possible to observe a subset of instances which productivity is
significantly low.
Definition 8.6.2 Lazy instances and groups.
Let Znt=0, for each Zt = {z1, · · · , zYt} clustered into Ct = {c1, · · · , ck}, K ≥ 0, and
sorted resulting s(Ct) = [c1, · · · , cK ]; c1 is defined as the lazy group of network function
instances, hence ∀cj : cj ∈ s(Ct), 1 < j ≤ K and the inequation c¯1 ≤ c¯j is satisfied. Each
member of c1 is considered a lazy instance, and will play a relevant role when deciding if
the protected environment is suffering an I-EDoS attack.
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Figure 8.8: Example of lazy group of instances.
8.6.4 Instantiation-based unexpected behaviors
Ideally, it is expected that when a I-EDoS attack occurs a discordant increase in the
number of instantiated network functions is observed. Consequently, and assuming that
the attack is launch at the observation registered at t, a significant growth (see Definition
8.6.1) in the number of instances must be detected on Yt. On the other hand, the network
functions triggered by the attacker must behave with low productivity. Thus, most of them
must be part of the lazy group of Zt = {z1, · · · , zYt}, in this way being lazy instances.
When both conditions are satisfied, a potential I-EDoS threat was recognized at t.
But it is important to bear in mind that in real circumstances, these observations may
occur asynchronously. This is because each type of network function taken into account
in Zt may require a different adaptation period, which is usually referred as warm-up
time. Therefore, they are not expected to be productive until the warm-up time expires.
A clear example of this situation can be comprehensively illustrated with the following
example: let a SON configured to deploy intelligent agents for load balancing purposes
similar to those introduced in [CSJN05]. These actuators are triggered once the number
of clients connected to certain service overtake a previously defined static threshold. The
productivity metric considered for I-EDoS detection is the Key Performance Indicator
(KPI) that aggregates the server throughput in terms of GB/s, i.e. the amount of data
transferred to and from the load balancer. These intelligent actuators require a warm-up
time to collect reference data and build prediction models. Now suppose that the intruder
knows the threshold that triggers the generation of new agents, and that by registering
malicious clients, it is able to cause an I-EDoS attack. In the observations that this occurs
a significant growth of the number of instances is registered, but they are not able to report
productivity, since they are initializing their internal network usage models. Because of
this, the definition of the instantiation-based unexpected behaviors related with I-EDoS
threats must take into account the creation date of the instances and from when they are
expected to begin to be productive. This leads to Definition 8.6.3, which stablishes the
condition that must be satisfied prior to report possible I-EDoS incidents (see Figure 8.9).
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Definition 8.6.3 Instantiation-based unexpected behaviors.
Let the set of instances Zt = {z1, · · · , zYt} observed at t, clustered into Ct = {c1, · · · , ck},
K ≥ 0, and sorted resulting s(Ct) = [c1, · · · , cK ]. They are instantiation-based unexpected
when there was registered a significant growth at the creation date of most of the members
of their lazy group c1. The set of instantiation-based unexpected observations over a
monitorization process is referred as instantiation-based unexpected behavior.
Therefore, when some observation in terms of the detection metrics (Y,Z) is tagged as
instantiation-based unexpected, the proposed systems reports a possible I-EDoS situation
Symp(Y,Z). The persistence of events tagged as instantiation-based unexpected behaviors
establishes the duration of the possible threat.
8.7 Experiments
This section describes the SON environment where the Cloud layer is complemented
with the SON Autonomic components, thus extending the analytical capabilities of
Cloud-platforms with more advanced features targeted to mitigate EDoS attacks. In
addition, the performed tests carried out to detect W-EDoS and I-EDoS attacks are
described in detail.
8.7.1 TestBed
The experimentation testbed was deployed to match the architectural layers defined in
Section 8.4. This SON-oriented scheme is illustrated in Figure 8.10. The Cloud Layer
has been implemented with Openstack [Ope], a widely used opensource platform to
manage the lifecycle of small and large-scale cloud environments. Openstack has been
deployed on two nodes: controller and compute (Nova). Each of them runs core Openstack
functionalities in conformance with the NFV infrastructure layer. Moreover, additional
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Figure 8.10: Testbed
features oriented to include auto-scaling mechanisms have been included to showcase
EDoS attacks. The controller node hosts also the networking service (Neutron), Nova
essential features, and RabbitMQ [RbM], the message broker software that allows the
inter-process communication between the Openstack services. The compute node hosts
also the Clustering (Senlin) [OSL] and Orchestration (Heat) services required to configure
scaling policies. In addition, the compute node hosts the Telemetry service, intended
to measure cloud-platform statistics with monitoring, scaling and billing purposes. All
the Openstack services are interconnected through a private management network, in
this way making possible to manage the on-demand instantiation of virtual resources to
conduct the experimental EDoS scenarios. The SON Autonomic Layer is implemented by
a combination of custom and well-known opensource tools matching the modular design.
Data Collection is carried out at application-level by a Python client-server application
composed by the Raw Data Pollster Agent (RDPA) running on each instance (client-side),
and the Central Collector Node (CCN) on the server-side. They are communicated
by means of HTTP REST messages pushed by the RDPA on regular time-intervals.
Apart from that, the virtual infrastructure monitoring is natively supported by Openstack
Ceilometer which gathers an extensive set of meters [Cl1] related to the cloud deployment.
Depending on the type of measurement, notification or polling methods are implemented.
Data Aggregation is performed by two Python modules. On the one hand, the Feature
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Extraction (FE) module fetches from the CCN a batch of client-request processing times
observed on one-second intervals. Then, the FE computes the Re`nyi entropy of the
sampled observations, thus creating a time series of measurements. On the other hand, the
Virtual Resource Aggregator (VRA) queries the Ceilometer REST API and extracts CPU
usage counters for each analyzed virtual instance on one-second intervals, thus leading
also to the creation of a time series.
EDoS detection is implemented on two major functional blocks: Analytics and
Decision-Making (DM). The EDoS Analysis (EA) is a Java module implementing the
Double Exponential Smoothing algorithm which results are stored in data structures, and
the forecasted metrics are taken into account to elaborate the adaptive thresholds. In
addition, EA implements the Clustering capabilities of the Weka libraries [Wkl], and the
Decision Maker (DM) is implemented in Drools [SDB] as a rule-based expert system whose
conclusions (alerts) are written in JSON files to match the Notification stage.
Finally, the client-side of the experimentation is performed by Python multi-threading
modules capable to emulate a configurable number of clients. It also allows the possibility
to control the number of requests and their connection rate to generate network traffic
adapted to the experimental W-EDoS and I-EDoS scenarios.
8.7.2 Evaluation Methodology
The methodology used to conduct the experimentation is explained in the forthcoming
sections, which distinguishes tests for assessing the W-EDoS and I-EDoS recognition
capabilities of the proposal.
8.7.2.1 W-EDoS detection evaluation
The evaluation of W-EDoS analyzes the Re`nyi entropy degrees measured on the server-side
response times observed in one-second intervals, compared against the CPU consumption
at operating-system-level. To this end, a client-server application has been implemented
as described below.
Server-side software. A RESTful HTTP application was written in Flask [SFl]
due to the simplicity that entails this type of web service, hence exposing eight
endpoints with different computational costs each in terms of processing time. When
requested, each of them performs list-sorting operations with randomly generated
values, varying on the list size and the number of iterations. The HTTP endpoints
and their average execution times measured for 1000 executions are described in
Table 8.3. All the HTTP methods support a GET parameter (id) used to distinguish
client requests when they are generated from the same host (thus with the same IP).
This application is hosted in a server deployed as an Openstack Compute instance
running on a single-tenant private cloud.
Client-side software. A Python application instantiates each client as a standalone
thread, which in turn send HTTP requests to the web service following a random
Poisson distribution being lambda (λ) the expected number of occurrences in a given
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time interval. Such distribution is suitable to generate legitimate web requests as
often assumed by the bibliography [BTI+03]. Thereby, normal traffic conditions and
EDoS attacks can be conducted with multiple clients running in parallel. Taking
advantage of the HTTP GET id parameter of each endpoint, a single node can
impersonate multiple clients. For example, two HTTP requests launched from the IP
192.168.5.48 with URIs /3?id=145 and /3?id=213 would be interpreted as originated
from different clients with ids 145 and 213 respectively. So that, response times
measurements on the server are associated to those client ids.
Cloud Auto-scaling. It has been configured an auto-scaling policy for launching a
new virtual instance of the web service when the average CPU consumption runs
above 60% in a one-minute interval.
W-EDoS attack scenarios. The detection of a W-EDoS attack is carried out by
examining the variation of the threat features in terms of the number of clients,
request rates and percentage of malicious connections triggered from compromised
nodes. Normal traffic conditions were considered when clients launched requests
to endpoints 1 to 8, randomly chosen for each connection; whereas W-EDoS
attack traffic is targeted to execute only endpoint 8 since it produces the costliest
operations at server-side and the maximum CPU overhead in consequence. Table 8.4
summarizes the parameters considered to define the W-EDoS scenarios for normal
network traffic, and Table 8.5 shows the malicious traffic volume determined by the
attack intensity on each scenario (S1 to S4).
SON W-EDoS detection and notification. The SON layer follows the principles of
Definition 8.5.1. If a significative variation between the observed and forecasted
entropy degree of the request processing times (Hα(Xapp)) matches with an
increment of the CPU consumption at operating system-level (Xapp), the autonomic
layer infers a W-EDoS attack in the analyzed web server and triggers an alert
intended to prevent the auto-scaling of a new virtual instance since it does not
resemble a legitimate origin.
Table 8.3: HTTP endpoints and average CPU processing time
URI Avg. CPU time (ms)
/1 18.56
/2 21.58
/3 24.64
/4 27.81
/5 31.06
/6 33.72
/7 36.73
/8 226.04
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Table 8.4: Normal traffic attributes
Feature S1 S2 S3 S4
Number of clients (C) 1000 1000 1000 1000
λ requests per second (px) 50 60 70 80
Number of requests (R) 9000 10800 12600 14400
Table 8.5: Malicious requests per scenario
Intensity S1 S2 S3 S4
1% 90 108 126 144
5% 450 540 630 720
10% 900 1080 1260 1440
8.7.2.2 I-EDoS detection evaluation
The evaluation of I-EDoS aims to evaluate inconsistencies between the number of deployed
VNF instances compared against the productivity measured on them. This is implemented
as follows:
VNF and productivity. A simple Flask REST web server with a single endpoint
of average response-time of 27.89 ms has been implemented and deployed as an
Ubuntu-based Openstack Glance image, used as a template for launching additional
instances in the cluster when scaling-out is performed. The performance of this
VNF has individually evaluated with Httperf [THt], a well-known benchmarking
open-source tool to measure web performance under different workload conditions
whose results are shown in Table 8.6. Therefore, the ideal performance is reached
by Medium and Optimal productivity levels at any time of operation, which are
analyzed individually on each virtual instance.
Cloud environment configuration. To showcase the evaluation scenarios, an
Openstack cluster has been deployed and auto-scaling rules have also been configured
to dynamically scale-out and scale-in the cluster size. It has been considered a
minimum size of 2 instances and a maximum size of 12. A Neutron load balancer
has also been deployed, which implements a round-robin policy to handle the traffic
request to be distributed across the active cluster nodes.
Cloud auto-scaling in and out policy. To scale-out the cluster, a new VNF instance
is launched when the cluster average CPU consumption runs above 80% in a
one-minute interval. Likewise, when the average CPU usage runs below 40% a
virtual machine instance is removed, following the “youngest first” deletion policy.
In addition, a “best effort scaling” is enabled to prevent breaking the size limitations
(minimum and maximum) of the cluster.
Normal traffic conditions. A normal scenario has been defined by modeling a traffic
profile based on a variable number of expected HTTP connection rate (λ), measured
in requests per second (px), in different time slots, elapsing a total time-window
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of three hours. The cloud platform will then determine the right number of VNF
instances based on the auto-scaling rules, ranging from 2 to 12 according to the
cluster configuration. A graphical representation of the traffic workload is illustrated
in Figure 8.11.
I-EDoS attack scenarios. Auto-scaling is configured in Openstack Senlin, which
is also integrated with Heat and Ceilometer to define cluster-related configuration
templates with auto-scaling policies. Ceilometer alarms are thereby configured to
trigger notification when some virtual-infrastructure-related counters run outside
pre-defined thresholds, such as with CPU or memory usage. Based on the
dependance on Ceilometer measurements, the I-EDoS attack is conducted by
poisoning the counters gathered by Ceilometer related with CPU consumption since
scaling policies rely on their values. To this end, it is assumed the ability of the
attacker to gain access to the RabbitMQ message broker, either with legitimate
authentication credentials, such as a valid username and password, or by exploiting a
common Telemetry-related vulnerability, such as the one reported in CVE-2016-9877
[Cv9] where access to the messaging service can be granted only with a legitimate
user regardless of the provided password. Once connected to the message bus, the
attacker fetches legitimate CPU usage counters obtained by Ceilometer (represented
as JSON objects) and injects a manipulated version of the original message with
random CPU usage counters above 90 percent. As a result, and maintaining the
same normal traffic conditions described in the previous section, the Heat engine
performs scaling-out decisions based on unrealistic data, creating in the meantime
more instances (cluster nodes) than needed to process the traffic workload.
SON I-EDoS detection and notification. The SON autonomic layer forecasts the
number of virtual instances in the Openstack cluster with the Double Exponential
Smoothing (DES) algorithm. Meanwhile, the adaptive thresholds are built to look
for situations where the number of existing instances is higher than the predicted
values. The EDoS detection module targets these situations of unexpected growth
to carry out DBSCAN density-based clustering based on the productivity measured
on each virtual instance. It leads to the distinction between productive and lazy
instances, which corresponds with Definition 8.6.3, triggering in consequence an
instantiation-based unexpected behavior alert.
8.8 Results
The effectiveness of the proposal when analyzing EDoS threats and legitimate situations
are described and discussed below.
8.8.1 W-EDoS detection
As indicated in Section 8.7, the evaluation of the W-EDoS detector is based on studying
their behavior when varying the features of the threats and the legitimate environment,
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Table 8.6: VNF performance and metrics
Connection rate
(cons/sec)
Reply time
(ms)
Reply rate
(replies/sec)
Connection
errors (%)
Avg. server
CPU (%)
Productivity
Label
5 31.9 5 0 22.9
Lazy
10 30.7 10 0 39.1
15 29.5 15 0 49.3
Medium
20 27.2 20 0 57.5
25 25.9 25 0 66.1
Optimal30 25.3 30 0 74.3
35 28.2 35 0 81.6
40 133.1 38.2 4 92.1
Overload
45 736.2 8.1 89 99.6
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Figure 8.11: Traffic workload for I-EDoS experimentation.
the impact of the Re`nyi entropy degree and the improvement obtained by refining the
analysis of the XApp evolution with the study of XCPU . They are described throughout
the rest of this subsection.
8.8.1.1 Attack distribution and requests
The results obtained when varying the request rate and the intensity of the W-EDoS
threats are summarized in Figure 8.12(a). With the purpose of facilitate their
understanding, the intensity of attacks has been measured at the interval 1%, 5%, 10%,
where the percentage indicates the distribution of malicious requests per observation.
In addition, four different scenarios have been studied based on the number of average
requests per second (px) made by each client: {50, 60, 70, 80}. In Figs. 8.12(a)-8.12(c)
the ROC curve obtained at each experiment is illustrated, where it is assumed the K
value of the prediction interval as the main parameter that adjusts the W-EDoS detection
sensitivity. The obtained effectiveness is summarized in Table 8.7 and Figure 8.12(e). The
worst results are observed when clients perform an average of 60 requests per second, as
well as when the attack is present in at least 1% of the request, being the trapezoidal
approximation to the Area Under the Curve (AUC) 0.901, and in the best case under this
setting, the True Positive Rate (TPR) 0.816 and the False Positive Rate (FPR) 0.15. On
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the opposite, the W-EDoS detector best performs when the sensors submit an average of
at least 80 requests per sensor and the attack poses 10% intensity. In this case the AUC is
0.995, and the best TPR is 1 and FPR is 0.01. From the plots and the summarized data,
it is possible to conclude that, as the number of requests per node grows, the accuracy of
the system improves. This denotes that under such circumstance, the prediction strategy
has a greater capacity to model the characteristics of the monitored traffic, and therefore
to act more accurately. On the other hand, it is possible to affirm that the greater attack
intensity, the higher its visibility, resulting in much more obvious entropy variations and
CPU overload. In general terms, the obtained accuracy demonstrates the ability of the
W-EDoS detection method of operating on scenarios similar to those proposed in the
testbed.
Table 8.7: Summary of results of the W-EDoS detector
Average Requests per Second (px)
50px 60px 70px 80px
Attack AUC TP FP AUC TP FP AUC TP FP AUC TP FP
1% 0.9069 0.8183 0.08 0.9013 0.8161 0.15 0.9175 0.83654474 0.07 0.9345 0.8492 0.05
5% 0.9557 0.9113 0.04 0.9432 0.8195 0.15 0.9631 0.9347 0.05 0.9603 0.9434 0.11
10% 0.991 0.9889 0.01 0.9631 0.9843 0.02 0.9908 0.989 0.01 0.995 1 0.01
8.8.1.2 Entropy degree
In the performed experimentation, the Re`nyi entropy degree that configures the W-EDoS
detectors has proven to play an essential role in the quality of the decisions made. With
evaluation purposes, and in view of the results observed in subsection 8.8.1.1, a testing
scenario with average rate of 60 requests per client/second, and attacks originated from
5% of the clients to be served, has been considered. It is worth mentioning that this
configuration represents an intermediate point between the circumstances that provide
greater visibility of the threats, and those that hinder their identification. The results
obtained are illustrated in Figure 8.13, where it is possible to distinguish the impact of
α in the ROC space (Figure 8.13(a)), the summary of the precision obtained in terms of
TPR and FPR (Figure 8.13(b)), and an example of its smoothing effect in the time series
to be analyzed (Figure 8.13(c)). Note that at this study the range 1 ≤ alpha ≤ 5 has
been studied. The minimum value supported by the Re`nyi entropy is α = 0, which has not
been taken into account since it coincides with the expression of Hartley (i.e. max-entropy)
Hα(X) = log2 n, which due that normalized values are adopted, always returns 1. From
α = 5, the observed AUC is less than 0.5, so it is inferred that the obtained values
correspond to a random behavior. From Figure 8.13(a) and Table 8.8 it is possible deduce
that the best fit is α = 1, where AUC = 0.955, TPR = 0.911 and FPR = 0.04. Hence, as
the degree increases, the smoothing of the resulting time series decreases, which entails a
greater tendency to report false positives, (see Figure 8.13(c)). Because of this, the worst
measured value has been observed when α = 5, resulting in AUC=0.513, TPR=0.556 and
FPR=0.64, which obviously are far from achieving a desired accuracy. Consequently, it
is possible to conclude that the degree of Re`nyi entropy has a direct relationship with
the successfulness of the performed deployment; and that in order to mitigate the false
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Figure 8.12: Results when varying the attack rate and requests
positives problem, it is advisable to select low values, thus reducing the impact of the
temporary outliers inherent to the monitoring tasks on network environments.
8.8.1.3 Simple XApp and refinement by XCPU
In order to evaluate the refinement of the analysis stage based solely on XApp, achieved
by studiying XCPU , a new test has been performed. Firstly, it only attempted to detect
W-EDoS based on XApp, then assuming the combination of both random variables. The
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Table 8.8: Summary of results when varying α
Re`nyi entropy degree
Measure α=1 α=2 α=3 α=4 α=5
AUC 0.9557 0.8692 0.7574 0.6072 0.5138
TPR 0.9113 0.8388 0.7147 0.7041 0.5568
FPR 0.0400 0.1600 0.3200 0.6500 0.6400
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Figure 8.13: Analysis of entropy degree variation
obtained effectiveness has been assessed based on the number of average requests per
second (px) made per client: {50, 60, 70, 80}, and by configuring 5% of the clients to
be served as attackers. The results are illustrated in Figure 8.14, where Figure 8.14(a)
indicates the precision obtained to consider only XApp; Figure 8.14(b) displays the results
when combining both random variables; and Figure 8.14(c) plots its comparison, which
contents are summarized in Table 8.9. The best results in the simple XApp tests were
AUC=0.7766, TPR=0.5152 and FPR=0.1, when 80px. On the opposite, the combined
setting provided AUC=0.9633, TPR=0.9346 and FPR=0.05 when 70px. Note that as
discussed in Section 8.8.1.1, the greater numbers of average requests per second tend to
facilitate the detection task. In the light of these results, it is possible to deduce that
the W-EDoS detection when only considering XApp was not feasible, since the AUC fall
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Table 8.9: Summary of results considering XApp and XCPU
Effectiveness measurements
Setting Px AUC TPR FPR
XApp
50 0.6942 0.5152 0.10
60 0.8189 0.7028 0.12
70 0.7319 0.7021 0.32
80 0.7766 0.7541 0.29
XApp and XCPU
50 0.9557 0.8195 0.15
60 0.9432 0.9113 0.04
70 0.9633 0.9346 0.05
80 0.9603 0.9434 0.11
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Figure 8.14: Analysis when considering XApp and XCPU
behind those provided by the combined approach, as well as an alarming false positive
rate was displayed. This is because of the situations previously described in Section 8.5.2,
where it was explained the rebound effect of the forecasting modes, and other legitimate
situations that may lead to false positives.
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8.8.2 I-EDoS detection
This section describes the results observed when evaluating the I-EDoS detection
capabilities of the proposed defensive scheme. In order to facilitate the understanding
of the performed research, an illustrative case of study is detailed, where the differences
between normal activities and I-EDoS are displayed, and the detection process is
demonstrated. In addition, the effectiveness of the approach when dealing with attacks of
different intensity is discussed.
8.8.2.1 Case of study
The testing scenario evaluates the effectiveness of the I-EDoS detection in the experimental
testbed described in Section 8.7. The comparison between the number of VNF instances
deployed as a result of auto-scaling decisions on both normal and attack traffic are
presented in Figure 8.15, where it is noticeable that the deployment of a higher number
of VNF instances has been caused by an I-EDoS attack. Under normal conditions, the
cluster scaled up to a maximum of 10 instances when the highest traffic workload has
been reached; whereas the I-EDoS attack has forced the scaling of the cluster up to the
maximum size of 12 instances. Then, the number of virtual instances have been compared
with the adaptive thresholds estimated for normal (Figure 8.16(a)) and attack conditions
(Figure 8.16(b)) in which deviations between the forecasting and the real measurements
have been found. For instance; at observations 12 or 36 when analyzing normal traffic,
and at observations 14 or 34 when the attack was performed. Besides the identification
of a suspicious growth of the VNF instances, the I-EDoS detection strategy relies on
the productivity measurements, whose dispersion graphs are compared. Under normal
coniditions (Figure 8.17(a)), the lower number of instances leads to a more uniform
distribution of the productivity exposed by the VNFs which in general reach higher
values and less dispersed measurements than its counterpart when the I-EDoS attack
was launched (Figure 8.17(b)). In such attack conditions, the red dots clearly denote
the presence of a subset of instances whose productivity is significantly lower, thus being
referred as lazy nodes. In consequence, the overall productivity is decremented since
this scenario forces the workload distribution into a higher number of VNF instances.
To quantitively validate the distinction of productive and lazy instances, the results of
the DBSCAN density-based clustering are presented for sampled measurements obtained
at t=86 under normal traffic conditions (Figure 8.18(a)). Three gropus of instances are
created (Group A, Group B and lazy), with 80% of instances allocated to Groups A and B
and remaining of 20% allocated to the group of possible lazy instances. Likewise; taking
the productivity measurements observed at t=19 when the attack is performed (Figure
8.18(b)), DBSCAN generates two groups. The lazy group gathers 73% of the allocated
instances, while the latter poses the remaining 27% as productive instances.
8.8.2.2 Attack Intensity
As would seem logical, the intensity of the I-EDoS attacks has directly influenced
the detection capability of the approach. Figure 8.19(a) and Table 8.10 display the
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Figure 8.16: Forecasting of the number of VNF instances
effectiveness registered when analyzing threats that lead to increase 10%, 20%, 30% 40%
and 50% the number of instances of the NFV considered at the previous example. In
general terms, the success rate has varied little (see Figure 8.19(c)); at the first four
groups of attacks (10%, 20%, 30%, 40%) a distance of 0.022 (0.025%) was observed
between the minimum hit rate (TPR=0.89, in 10%) and the best hit rate (TPR=0.91
in 40%). When the attacks posed higher intensity (50%) the hit rate slightly improved
(TPR=0.94 in 50%). However, by taking into account the issuing of false positives the
results were more significant (see Figure 8.19(d)); in particular, if the attacks posed lower
intensity, the detection method reached FPR=0.12; but by increasing their capacity to
cause economic losses, the best observation decreased to FPR = 0.07, which represents
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Figure 8.17: Productivity distribution per VNF instance
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Figure 8.18: DBSCAN classification by VNF productivity
an improvement of 58.3% over the worst registration. These situations are reflected in
Figure 8.19(a) and Figure 8.19(b), where the AUC varies according to the attack intensity,
being AUC=0.9483 in the worst case, and AUC=0.9811 in the best case. The effectiveness
variations are mainly due to the clustering stage, where the instantiated NFVs are grouped
based on productivity. The greater is the attack intensity, the greater is the number of
instances created by the intruded that belong to the lazy group. This places a larger
140 Chapter 8. Detection of EDoS Threats in Self-Organizing Networks
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
TP
R
 (S
en
sit
ivi
ty)
FPR (1−Specificity)
 
 
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
(a) ROC
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
A
U
C
Attack Intensity
(b) AUC
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
TP
R
Attack Intensity
(c) TPR
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
FP
R
Attack Intensity
(d) FPR
Figure 8.19: Analysis of the effectiveness at different attack intensities
amount of normal instances in other groups, hence reducing the false positive rate in the
best calibrations despite generally, it remains similar. In view of the results, it is possible
to conclude that the proposed strategy is capable of detecting I-EDoS threats successfully.
However, to maintain a setting that facilitates recognition of low intensity threats may
result in the emission of a greater number of false positives, which should be considered
by the security management strategy. It entails deciding the trade-off between protection
and economic losses that fits better into the monitoring scenario and the security policies.
Table 8.10: Summary of results considering different attack intensities
Effectiveness measurements
Intensity (%) AUC TPR FPR
10 0.9483 0.8936 0.12
20 0.9498 0.9099 0.10
30 0.9654 0.9167 0.08
40 0.9708 0.9155 0.07
50 0.9811 0.9404 0.07
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Bearing the performed experimentation in mind, the following items are highlighted:
1. When analyzing W-EDoS, as the number of requests per node and the intensity of
the attack increase, the accuracy of the system improves. The best results were
observed when the sensors submit an average of at least 80 requests per sensor and
the attack poses 10% intensity (AUC=0.995, TPR=1, FPR=0.01).
2. The W-EDoS detection approach is more effective when the Re`nyi entropy degree
is low. The best observation was α = 1 (AUC=0.9557, TPR=0.9113, FPR=0.0400)
with a test setting that assumed an average rate of 60 requests per client/second,
and attacks originated from 5% of the clients to be served
3. The W-EDoS detection when only considering XApp was not recommended because
of the rebound effect of the forecasting and adaptive thresholding methods described
in Section 8.5.1. It leads to a significant increase in the false positive rate.
4. The proposal for I-EDoS detection behaves better when analyzing attacks of greater
intensity. The best results were observed when the attack intensity was 50%
(AUC=0.9811, TPR=0.9404, FPR=0.07).
5. At I-EDoS detection, the greater is the attack intensity, the greater is the number
of instances created by the intruded that belong to the lazy group. This has a
direct impact on the false positive rate resultant of the optimal calibration. Hence
if the attacks posed lower intensity, the detection method reached FPR=0.12; but
by increasing their intensity, the best observation decreased to FPR = 0.07, which
represents an improvement of 58.3% over the worst register
From these facts it is deduced that the main objective of this proposal has been
achieved, i.e. it was able to successfully recognize the different EDoS attacks against the
self-organized network considered during the experimentation. However, the effectiveness
has varied depending on different characteristics of the monitoring scenario, highlighting
among them the heterogeneity of the information to be studied (1) and the intensity of
the attack (1), (2), (4), (5). The first one allows more accurate modeling of the legitimate
behavior by reducing the false positive rate, and the second facilitates the recognition of the
intrusive activities. Finally, it is worth highlighting the impact of the Re`nyi entropy degree
at the W-EDoS detection approach (3), where this parameter significantly influenced the
smoothing and noise reduction of the time series to be analyzed. This has resulted in
the fact that α = 1 (Shannon entropy), i.e. the most noise-tolerant setting, entailed
greater accuracy, in a similar way to previous publications related with conventional DDoS
recognition [O¨B15].
From an analytical point of view, a light solution has been proposed, where the most
complex tasks are executed in a dedicated server, thus minimizing operational costs.
Given that the definitions of W-EDoS and I-EDoS attacks lie on CRoWN indicators,
the object of study has been clearly delimited. But certainly, the future will bring new
ways of achieving EDoS, so it is not possible to guarantee the effectiveness of the proposal
in uncharted circumstances. It is also important to bear in mind that the proposed
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solution implements analytic tools well-known by the research community, for example
the DES [GJD80] forecast algorithm or the DBSCAN [EKS+96] clustering method. Their
selection has been conveniently justified throughout the paper, but they pose advantages
and disadvantages that should be considered prior to instantiation in alternative use
cases. Note that if necessary, they can be replaced by similar algorithms. Finally, it
should be highlighted that the proposal inherits the countermeasures related with the
limitations assumed at the design principles (see Section 8.3). Therefore, it does not
incorporate adaptation techniques to non-stationary scenarios [DRAP15] nor robustness
against adversarial attacks [O¨B15, ADAH14]. Neither an advanced information correlation
strategy has been proposed, where data from different sensors could be pooled. These
facilitate the inference of more precise diagnoses [SMFDV13, MAJ13], which serve to risk
assessment and to resolve the trade-off between the cost of countermeasures deployment
and the estimated losses caused by the intrusion. Consequently, many interesting lines of
future work have been raised.
8.9 Final Remarks
This chapter has delved into the analysis of EDoS threats in emergent self-organized
networks. In order to lay a formal definition of EDoS threats, a set of indicators have been
identified that lead to the distinction of two categories of EDoS threats: Workload-based
EDoS and Instantiation-based EDoS. They constitute one of the central contributions of
this work on which the defensive detections strategies have been conducted. The W-EDoS
attack detection considers significant prediction errors terms of CPU consumption and
response-time at application-level of the instantiated VNFs. On the other hand, I-EDoS
attack detection analyzes the relationship between the initialization of unproductive
instances and the suspicious growth of the number of deployed NFVs instances. To validate
the proposal an extensive experimentation has been conducted in a self-organized testbed,
and the obtained results have proven good accuracy on the detection of such threats.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the proposal fulfills its main objective at the
deployed scenario.
Chapter 9
Detecting the Participation of a
Device in a DDoS Attack
This chapter introduces a novel approach for detecting the participation of a protected
network device in Distributed Denial of Service attacks. With this purpose, the traffic flows
are inspected at source-side looking for discordant behaviors. To this end, the strategy
has led to delegate the analytic tasks to a dedicated autonomic layer, hence minimizing
the impact on operational efficiency and quality of experience. In particular, the approach
takes advantage of the knowledge acquisition framework implemented in the SELFNET
project, which facilitates its implementation as a self-organizing solution. The proposal
adopts feature extraction, pattern recognition, prediction and adaptive thresholding
capabilities, and facilitates its adaptation to more sophisticated self-protection approaches.
Hence, the main contributions of the performed research are:
An in-depth review of the flooding-based DDoS landscape and the different proposals
for its mitigation from the academic point of view.
The introduction of a novel method for its identification by analyzing source-side
activities, adapted to non-stationary of the emerging networks.
An adaptation of the solution to an advanced architecture for self-protective
purposes.
The collection of a dataset.
The description of an evaluation methodology for proving the effectiveness of the
proposal.
A comprehensively discussion of the obtained results.
This chapter is structured into seven sections. In Section 9.1, the initial considerations
for the proposal are described categorized as design principles, assumptions and
limitations. Section 9.2 defines a multi-layered architecture on which the detection strategy
is implemented. Section 9.3 provides a description of the DDoS indicators considered in the
detection stage. Section 9.4 describes in detail the detection strategy composed by three
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major data processing stages. In Section 9.5 the evaluation methodology is presented. In
Section 9.6 the results derived from the experimentation are discussed. Finally, Section
9.7 remarks the conclusions of this chapter.
9.1 Initial Considerations
This section delves into the design principles reviewing its objectives, assumptions and
limitations. It also describes the current architecture and the strategy for acquiring initial
factual knowledge, in this way detailing the procedures for monitoring metric generation
and knowledge inference.
9.1.1 Design principles
The defense against flooding-based DDoS attacks may be approached from different
perspectives, ranging from prevention to identification of sources [VZF17]. In addition,
and given the complexity of the emerging network scenarios, they pose a large number
of challenges, as is the case of deciding the most effective countermeasures and range
of action [ZJT13], to adapt to the nature of the data to be modeled [BBK15] or how
implement previously agreed security management policies [Den14b]. In order to facilitate
the understanding of the performed research, it should be clear that main objective
of this contribution has been the development of a novel flooding-based DDoS attacks
detection strategy at source-side, that must to adapt to non-stationary processes in the
data to be analyzed. Unlike similar proposals, only a single source of information is
monitored, which is the protected device [MKK11]. The most relevant secondary goals
are the evaluation of the approach under different traffic profiles; and its integration as a
self-organizing solution for next generation networks, thus allowing both taking advantage
of its dedicated analytical capabilities and fostering the definition of sophisticated use
cases able to reactively/proactively manage the protected network security. To this end,
the SELFNET project [P5S] has been selected, which aligns with the European 5G PPP
Security Work Group.
9.1.2 Assumptions
In order to restrict and lay the foundations of the performed research the following premises
have been assumed:
The detection of the participation of an end-user or IoT device as source-side of
DDoS attacks based on the study of metrics aggregated from its incoming/outgoing
traffic is possible.
Flooding-based DoS differ from normal activities in traits related with number of
requests observed and traffic volume generated by the suspicious end-points. In the
case of DDoS attacks the number of clients involved also varies [SMMVGV17a].
The analysis of discordant behaviors in aggregated metrics at flow-level enables
recognizing DDoS situations on conventional monitoring scenarios [O¨B15].
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By extracting and analyzing advanced metrics in a remote dedicated server it is
possible to provide a passive-monitoring detection approach.
As the information provided by incoming/outgoing traffic flows monitored from
network devices largely depends on the traffic profile, its non-stationarity is assumed
(since for not all users this feature can be guaranteed). The non-stationarity is also
inherent to the emergent communication networks landscape.
9.1.3 Limitations
For diverse reasons, the performed research has not taken into account the following
circumstances, most of them being postponed for future work:
The protection of communication channels between monitoring agents and SON
analytical components has not been addressed [LII+15]. Security practices on
software development are not explicitely considered either. Consequently, at the
performed experimentation it was assumed they have not being compromised.
Nowadays there are different adversarial threats able to evade detection methods
similar to those studied during the course of the performed research [O¨B15]. But
given the complexity that their development often entails and aiming on facilitating
the understanding of the main contribution of our research, their adoption is out of
the scope of this publication.
The issues related with data protection inherent in the audition of user behaviors at
communication networks have not been considered. Neither the implementation of
the recent European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Consequently,
it is assumed that the proposed solution have permission to monitor the
incoming/outgoing traffic of their network devices for purely analytic purposes.
The knowledge representation and data models implemented for management and
storage of the factual knowledge acquired by this proposal are not detailly specified
throughout this work.
9.2 Architecture
The proposed SON architecture (Figure 9.1) is grounded in the functional layers defined
for the SELFNET framework [P5S]. At a glance, this 5G oriented architecture takes
advantage of the decoupling of the control and data plane layers, promoted by SDN to
allow a fully software-driven management model, being this a remarkable characteristic of
the next-generation networks [ARS16].
The major benefit of this model is the inclusion of complex data processing tasks
in the SON Autonomic Layer, which encompass advanced data extraction features,
machine learning approaches, anomaly detection strategies, among others, towards
the accomplishment of self-protection capabilities for detecting and mitigating network
threats in complex network contexts [MGC+18]. In the lowest level of this 5G-oriented
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Figure 9.1: Architecture for Source-side DDoS Detection.
architecture, the network physical infrastructure holds heterogeneous network nodes
embracing end-user devices (D2D), such as mobile phones and personal computers, or IoT
devices intended for machine to machine (M2M) communications [PDG+16]. All of them
act as traffic generators, thus increasing the complexity of the monitored environment
as the network grows. On the other hand, the inclusion of virtualization capabilities
driven by the Network Function Virtualization (NFV) architecture leads to overcome
scalability issues of physical infrastructures [HH15] due to its on-demand provisioning
model orchestrated by the Virtual Infrastructure Manager (implemented on Openstack
[Ope]), which allows the instantiation of virtualized network elements easily configurable
by software. This is a distinguishable aspect of 5G network architectures, which is
achieved, for instance, by provisioning a VNF node with the desired protocol stack
[TKJ16]. Thereby, virtualization leads to the creation of configurable forwarding nodes
in the SON Data Plane layer, which are in the meantime compatible with the SDN
paradigm. For this reason, the Open vSwitch (OVS) [POv] instances implement the
OpenFlow [MAB+08] protocol in the southbound interface for handling the configuration
messages with the SDN controller.
In addition, OVS switches provide support for NetFlow, a well-known protocol used
for monitoring flow traffic statistics [HCT+14] built upon the matching of source IP,
destination IP, and protocol; which are analyzed in the autonomic layer. NetFlow
implements flow-sampling methods which have faced some scalability issues [LMKY16]
in large network deployments as other flow monitoring methods, hence remaining as a
traffic engineering open challenge in research literature [ALW+14] [SWXH15] [YHSH17].
Despite its drawbacks, this proposal has opted for NetFlow to prioritize the flow metrics
extraction to validate the detection model, which is grounded on accurate flow statistics
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rather than addressing efficiency and scalability aspects. Notwithstanding, those issues
have been mitigated by provisioning the OVS instances with larger allocation of memory
and computing capacity aimed to enhance its performance. Both OpenFlow and Netflow
interact with the OpenDaylight (ODL) [MVTG14] controller located in the Control Layer.
The OpenFlow interface manages the configuration of the flow-tables for packet forwarding
in the data plane, whereas the Netflow collector gathers flow counters from the virtual
switches. The proposed detection strategy relies on the representation of flow metrics as
time series, being this the reason why the ODL Time Series Data Repository (TSDR)
[ODT] is deployed to transform flow statistics into a time series representation. On
the highest level of the architecture, the SON Autonomic layer is composed by data
processing modules targeted on the core detection strategy implementation, which spans
from the data collection to the notification of network threats. Flow statistics are
gathered by querying the time series database (through the TSDR API) under different
granularity levels, and the resultant sample of metrics are aggregated by means of feature
extraction methods (entropy measurement). Likewise, to conduct a machine learning
approach a Training stage is considered, of which main outcome is the construction of a
classification model fitted for selecting the proper prediction algorithm based on the time
series features included in the reference dataset. This classification model is used in the
Adaptive Prediction stage when the most accurate prediction algorithm is inferred from
the time series characteristics extracted from the monitored observations. Once selected,
it is calibrated for minimizing the forecasting error to enhance its accuracy. Then, the
DDoS detection is carried out by constructing the adaptive thresholds estimated from the
predicted values to detect anomalies when the observations are outside the prediction
boundaries, thus generating DDoS alerts to be notified as the outcome of the SON
self-protection approach.
9.3 DDoS indicators
Throughout the performed research different levels of information processing have been
studied, which entailed the need for extracting very heterogeneous features that facilitate
the analysis of the knowledge acquired from the monitored devices, that being analyzed
as univariant time series. They are summarized in Table 9.1 and described throughout
this section.
9.3.1 Time Series Features
The first analytic stage has focused on the extraction of traits that allow defining usage
models adaptable to changes in the monitoring environment. For the automation of
deciding the best suited modeling and prediction strategies, more than 100 metrics per time
series sample were constructed by the tool TSFRESH, which has been developed under
the iPRODICT [TF1] project. This collection takes into account from basic statistical
attributes (peaks, maximum/minimum observations, mode, etc.) to correlation measures
related with the evolution of the time series (white noise, trend, seasonality, autocorrelation
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Table 9.1: Source-side DDoS detection indicators.
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coefficients, etc.). They were directly applied on the collection M3-Competition [Mak00]
at the training stage of the system.
9.3.2 Basic Metrics
The incoming/outgoing traffic flows from the protected IoT device are monitored and
structured in IPFIX format [HCT+14], according to which each traffic flow being a bunch
of packets captured in certain time interval t that share the following properties: same
source IP address, IP destination and protocol. The timeslots that delimit the traffic
flows establish the granularity of the analytic tasks to be performed, in this way serving as
adjustment parameters that configure the sensitivity level of the detection methods. For
example, when the granularity is high, the information to be processed is hardly filtered
or softened, since it is often acquired from less instances (packets). As a result, these
observations are more likely to pose outliers or noise. However, when the granularity is
too low, it is possible that the analytic tasks overlook relevant situations. The first of
these scenarios results in a more restrictive adjustment, where the detection of threats is
prioritized in opposition to the generation of false positives. In the second case, the quality
of the user experience is prioritized at the expense of decreasing the level of protection
offered. The following pair of measurements is taken per traffic flow: number of transferred
packets nP and total amount of information transferred nB (bytes). From them the
aggregated metrics described in the next subsection are inferred.
9.3.3 Aggregated Metrics
As suggested in the bibliography, the basic flow-level metrics are aggregated based on the
relationship between outgoing and incoming traffic and their dispersion [GP01]. In the
first case, the normalized Mean Squared Error (MSE) is considered, which is expressed as
follows:
nMSE(X) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 (x(a)i − xˆ(b)i)2
σ2
(9.1)
where X is the trait to be analyzed, n is the total number of traffic flows with paired
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IP source and IP destination (i.e. the traffic incoming/outgoing traffic between a and
b), x(a)i is the metric registered at the incoming traffic grouped at the flow a, and x(b)i
is the metric registered at the outgoing traffic at b. A clear example is illustrated in
the relationship Eτ (nP in, nP out) that describes the difference between incoming packets
Xin(a) = nP out(b) and outgoing packets Xout (a) = nP in(b) captured at the time interval
τ .
On the other hand, the disorder degree of the observations is measured based on the
normalized entropy described by Shannon. This decision is supported by previous research
works related with conventional DDoS recognition, which successfully approached similar
problems in the same way [BBK15]. It has been hypothesized about this metric being
also valid for detection at single source-side device monitorization. As is usual in the case
the bibliography, the entropy implemented by this proposal is inferred from the following
expression:
H (X) =
−∑ni=1 pi loga pi
loga n
(9.2)
where n is the total number of monitored flows captured at the time interval τ , and
p1, p2, . . . , pn are the probabilities of the instances x1, x2, . . . , xn of the random variable
X, the latest constructed from basic flow-level metrics. Table 9.1 summarizes the DDoS
indicators studied at the performed experimentation.
9.4 Source-side flooding-based DDoS detection
The proposed architecture bases its detection strategy on studying univariate time series
built from aggregated metrics, which are deduced from both traffic monitored at the
protected devices and collections of reference time series with training and validation
purposes (at the performed experimentation, the M3-Competition [Mak00] dataset).
To this end, three major data processing stages are distinguished: Training, Adaptive
Prediction and Classification (see Figure 9.2). At Training stage, the criteria that
facilitates deciding the predictive models that best adapt to the data to be analyzed
are defined from the reference samples. At the Adaptive Prediction stage, the modeling
strategies are calibrated aiming on improving the forecasts to be made from the next
observations. Therefore, the TSFRESH features extracted from the time series to
be analyzed lie the grounds of the forecast models that drive the inference of next
observations. Finally, at Classification stage it is decided the significance of the registered
prediction errors, hence leading to discover unexpected behaviors (discordant) that provide
suspicious activity indicators. The following describes in detail each data processing stage.
9.4.1 Training and forecast method detection
The analytic dedicated server provides a battery of forecasting procedures implemented
in the Section 6.3.2, which gathers among others, models based on moving averages,
autoregression or smoothing. In order to adapt the detection strategy to the
non-stationarity of the monitoring environment, prior to infer the traffic behavior the
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Figure 9.2: SON data processing stages.
best suited prediction method is selected and properly calibrated. Therefore, a collection
of reference samples is required from which it is possible to extract the most relevant
characteristics and build the classifier that stablish the best forecast function from them
[TF1].
At the training stage (Figure 9.3), the classifier that decides the best prediction method
is constructed. The is proposal adopts as classification procedure the Random Forest
approach described by Breiman [Bre01]. According with Breiman, a random forest is a
classifier consisting of a collection of tree-structured predictors such that each tree depends
on the values of a random vector sampled independently and with the same distribution
for all trees in the forest. In particular, the original approach implemented the variation of
Classification And Regression Trees (CART) [RJPD14b] that choose which variable to split
on using a greedy algorithm that minimizes error. This task typically requires specifying
several adjustment parameters, for example, the maximum number of iterations to be
performed as stop condition, the number of trees to construct or their maximum depth.
But, as highlighted by Breiman, the number m of randomly selected attributes is the
only adjustable parameter to which random forests are somewhat sensitive. This value
determines the correlation between each pair of trees and the strength of each individual
tree. By increasing the aforementioned parameter, both correlation and strength increase.
When the correlation grows, the forest error rate increases; in the opposite, when strength
grows the forest error rate decreases, so the level of both features must be balanced. This
problem is addressed by applying the solution proposed by Breiman (i.e. m = logM + 1,
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where M is the number of features of samples within the dataset), hence postponing for
future versions the implementation of alternative calibration strategies.
Each training sample considered for Random Forest definition is represented by the
100 TSFRESH attributes extracted from the reference time series (M3-Competition). The
instance belongs to the class that represents the prediction algorithm that registered less
significant forecasting errors when building its prediction model. The class of each sample
is obtained by analyzing the time series with the complete prediction algorithm battery
provided in Section 6.3.2. The solution that resulted in the lower Symmetric Mean
Absolute Percentage Error (sMAPE) becames the label of the instance. Note that the
sMAPE criterion was previoulsy adopted among others by the M3-Competition [Mak00],
in this way enabling the evaluation of the effectiveness of different forecasting procedures.
Finally, it should be remarked that one of the main disadvantages of the Random Forest
classifiers is their trend towards overfitting. In this proposal, this problem is reduced by
including a pre-selection step conducted by the greedy algorithm for feature discrimination
described in [HLSR18] and its evaluation based on the significance of the prediction errors
[Hal99].
9.4.2 Adaptive Prediction
Holte denoted in [Hol93] that pattern recognition conventionally considered that the
reference datasets applied for training purposes are representative of the expected
observations at the monitored environment. The presence of gradual changes over time in
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the statistical characteristics of the class to which an observation belongs are the result of
non-stationary fluctuations, which leads among others to the concept drift problem (i.e.
the models built at training do no longer represent the situations that they originally
intended depict). From the standpoint of the research community, the stationarity in
communication networks is questionable [Mas09], which only should be assumed in very
specific circumstances [MDB17]. Because of this, and in order to provide an effective
defense against DDoS in any emerging scenario, non-stationarity operation is assumed. It
is important to highlight that O’Reilly et al. [OGIR14] distinguished two major approaches
to this problem: passive and active. The active solutions require the previous recognition
of inflection points that foresee relevant changes on the monitored environment, from
them updating the previously built models. Because of their modus operandi, the active
solutions are usually refereed as detection and response methods. On the other hand,
the passive approach assumes that the monitored feature distribution steadily varies over
time, hence demanding the continuous recalibration of the analytic capabilities. Therefore,
while active solutions focus on punctual drift distinction, the passive approaches proved
greater effectiveness when forecasting gradual drift and recurring concepts [WIY03]. The
existence of stealthy flooding-based DDoS threats based on hiding abrupt variations in the
data volume injected [FR15] leads to hypothesize that with the proper data granularity,
the second paradigm best suites the main objectives of the performed research, so it was
implemented in this work (the development of active/hybrid solutions is postponed for
future work). The detection method introduced in this section adapts to non-stationarity
environments in two steps: forecasting algorithm selection and calibration (see Figure 9.4).
They are described below.
9.4.2.1 Forecasting Algorithm selection
The most suitable forecast algorithm is decided based on studying the TSFRESH features
extracted from the monitored time series, which serve as input of the Random Forest
previously built at Training stage. The resultant class refers to the best forecast method,
on which the expected behavior of the network is estimated. This procedure is repeated on
each observation, so the prediction method will vary as the traffic distribution changes. For
example, let the time series that represent the number of outgoing bytes (nBout) of certain
endpoint. The Random Forest classifier initially decided that the best suited prediction
algorithm is the Simple Exponential Smoothing (SES). But at the next observations, the
time series significantly gains in trend and seasonality, so the likelihood of budging from
SES to Triple Exponential Smoothing (TES) increases, since TES typically behaves more
accurately than SES under the new conditions [Win60].
9.4.2.2 Calibration
Most of the prediction methods in the implemented battery of algorithms required a
previous configuration, where the proper calibration of its adjustment parameters plays
an essential role in the achieved performance. Because of this, once the prediction
method is selected, it is calibrated driven by a basic Genetic Algorithm (GA) [KRG01].
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This solution is inspired by the biological evolutive theories and their genetic-molecular
basis. Consequently, and in contrast to other proposals with similar purposes, the genetic
algorithms are probabilistic algorithms that conduct the evolution of an initial population
of individuals (observations) generated from initial factual knowledge, through actions
with arbitrary results (i.e. genetic mutations and gen recombination) that try to get
closer to the optimal solution in each iteration, hence resembling those of the biological
evolution processes. Its main drawbacks are related with high resource consumption and
not guarantee of finding and optimal solution, both of them extensively discussed in the
bibliography [ESE14]. But their discussion and mitigation are out of the scope of the
principal contributions of this research.
The proposed detection approach implements a GA as solution to the forecasting
algorithm calibration problem after taking into consideration different reasons,
highlighting among them: the fact that GAs already posed solutions to optimization
problems previously proved with calibration purposes [Rui16], they are capable of operate
on vectors of adjustment parameters of different nature, and their operation adapts to the
detail level in which calibrations must be calculated. Note that the latter is especially
valuable when operating in real time scenarios, hence allowing to balance accuracy and
performance to satisfy the implemented security management policies.
In the implemented GA, it is considered as evolving population the set of candidate
adjustments, where each individual raises a possible solution. Their genotype represents
a vector of gens in which each position contains one of the adjustment parameters of the
prediction method. For example, in the case of TES a collection of four characteristics
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Table 9.2: Summary of the GA calibration
Feature Highlights
Individual An individual represents a possible calibration. The genotype is a vector where each
gen is an adjustment parameter of the prediction algorithm.
Initial Population At the first launch, the initial population is generated by assigning randomly values
to gens. The initial population of the next observation is the final population of the
previous execution.
Fitness The sMAPE [Mak00] obtained by a specific calibration.
Selection Fitness Proportionate Selection (FPS) [GD91]
Crossover Swapping gens from an arbitrary pivot.
Mutation Uniform mutation of an arbitrary gen.
Stop Condition Reached a previously defined maximum number of iterations or discovery of an
optimal solution.
would be constituted: data smoothing factor (α), trend smoothing factor (β), seasonal
change smoothing factor (γ) and forecast horizon (τ) [Win60]. The initial population is
randomly calculated and only the most adapted individuals hold possibilities of persisting
at future generations. Note that as in nature, the fitness of an individual ponders its ability
to adapt to the environment, and therefore the probability of procreation. Therefore, the
fitness function of the implemented GA returns the sMAPE calculated when the prediction
algorithm is calibrated according to the genotype of an individual.
In addition, the GA performs simple crossover and uniform mutation per iteration. The
first of them selects a couple of parents per crossover by Fitness Proportionate Selection
(FPS) [GD91], then randomly deciding a swapping point and exchanging their genetical
contents pivoting on such point. Consequently, the descendant individual replaces the
parent with lower fitness. At the mutation stage, an arbitrary gen of the descendant
is replaced by a random value. Because of the gens may present different nature, this
action is constrained by the boundaries stablished by the data range of the adjustment
parameter. For example, the α parameter of the TES prediction function ranges in 0 . . . 1,
so the random uniform mutations on alpha must be restricted to 0 . . . 1. The algorithm
has two stop conditions: a predefined maximum number of iterations (worst case), and
some individual reaching its optimal fitness, i.e. sMAPE=0.
From the prediction algorithm selected by the Random Forest classifier, as well as
from its calibration according to the adjustment indicated by the best individual of the
final population, the next h observations of the time series to be analyzed are estimated.
The final population is temporally stored for serving as initial population for the next
execution of the GA, in this way usually gaining accuracy. Note that this decision is based
on the fact that most of the time series will be similar, so large changes in the adjustment
values are not expected. Table 9.2 summarizes the main steps of the implemented GA.
9.4.3 Classification
At the classification stage, the natures of the time series of aggregated metrics constructed
from the monitored traffic flows are decided. In this context, it is assumed that an
observation is an outlier if it matches with an unexpected behavior, i.e. when the variation
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between a prognosis at certain time horizon and the observed value differ significantly.
Because the projection of continuous values on time tends to yield errors, the main
challenge of this process is to define their relevance, which is addressed by defining adaptive
thresholds. In the aftermath, outliers are tagged as potential malicious behaviors, and
normal situations are classified as legitimate, so the current implementation acts as a binary
classifier. The reference reasoning framework [SMMVGV17d] provides advanced analytical
capabilities related with building prediction intervals, most of them widely accepted by
the research community for network traffic study. Of them, it is integrated the adaptive
thresholding methodology described in [MWH97], which defines the following adaptive
thresholds:
Ath = xˆn+1 ±K
√
σ2(Et) (9.3)
where xˆn+1 is the forecast of certain aggregated metric x at n + 1 horizon, Et is the
Euclidean distance between xˆn+1 and xn+1, and K is the adjustment parameter that
configures the restrictiveness of the sensor. The equations distinguish an upper threshold
Athup and a lower threshold Athlow, both adapted to t. It is expected that the greater
values of K, the higher noise tolerance, since this situation expands the margin of error
between xˆn+1 and xn+1. Figure 9.5 illustrates an example of outlier induced by a DDoS
flooding-based attack, where at T=41 a compromised endpoint injects a large number of
HTTP requests. During the attack the threshold was exceeded, which leads to label the
traffic as malicious.
9.5 Evaluation Methodology
The collection of samples gathered for evaluation includes outgoing traffic captures from
62 different devices. Each sample was created from traffic monitorizations separated
in time periods of 1, 3 and 5 days, comprising a total amount of 50 instances with 3
hours per device, so the dataset contains 3,100 samples of normal traffic (Table 9.3).
At the end of each normal traffic capture, the tools described in [SLo][WcD] launched
DDoS attacks; in particular, traffic injections based on UDP, HTTP or TCP flood with
low, medium and high intensity. Accordingly, the dataset provides 27,900 samples with
malicious contents, 9,300 per intensity (see Table 9.4). Usage profiles comprised daily user
habits (i.e. general-purpose usage), synthetic web navigation with various automatization
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Table 9.3: Monitored activities and endpoint devices at the performed experimentation.
No. No. Samples p-ADF
Daily user habits 20 1,000 0.103
Browser bot A 4 200 0.065
Browser bot B 16 800 0.130
Browser bot C 4 200 0.008
Audio streaming 4 200 0.040
Video streaming 14 700 0.065
Table 9.4: Normal and attack traffic samples per monitored device.
Endpoint No. Normal Attack
Desktop computer 29 1,450 13,050
Notebook 16 800 7,200
Smartphone 8 400 3,600
Tablet computer 6 300 2,700
Smartwatch 2 100 900
Smart TV 1 50 450
tools and multimedia streaming (audio and video). The synthetic web browsing profiles
were separated according to the tool that the endpoint executed; being referred as A for
Internet Noise [SIN], B for Noiszy [NZ1] and C for TrackMeNot [TnS]. Six families of
devices were considered: desktop computers, notebooks, smartphones, tablet computers,
smartwatches and smart TVs. Note that given that in terms of traffic modeling, the type of
the endpoint had less impact than its usage mode, the conducted study primarily focused
on their behavior. Table 9.3 displays the average p-value of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test (ADF) that assess the no-stationarity of each traffic profile [CL95]. The p-values
lower than 0.05 resemble stationary processes, which leads us to assume that most of the
endpoints behave as non-stationary data sources.
The effectiveness of the proposed method has been tested by adopting an experimental
evaluation methodology, in which the impact on effectiveness was measured when varying
the following adjustment parameters: granularity, traffic profile and attack. In analogy
with previous publications, this task was addressed by considering a classical binary
classificator based on observing its sensitivity and specificity. The first of them determines
the ability to properly point out anomalies as malicious. On the other hand, the
specificity measures the ability of recognizing normal activities as legitimate. From their
representation in the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) space, several effectiveness
indicators have been extracted, standing out for relevance the Area Under the Curve
(AUC), and the True Positive Rates (TPR) and False Positive Rates (FPR) achieved from
the best sensor adjustment in terms of K. The optimal setting coincides with the position
of the ROC curve that displays the better Youden index [BNR14] (Y ), which ranged from
-1 (worst) to 1 (optimal).
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Table 9.5: AUC registered per observation granularity when varying K.
Indicator
Observation granularity
7.5 Sec. 15 Sec. 30 Sec. 1 Min. 2 Min. 3 Min.
nPin 0.75 0.79 0.72 0.75 0.69 0.69
nPout 0.84 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.83 0.80
nBin 0.61 0.65 0.63 0.67 0.65 0.62
nBout 0.75 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.76 0.72
H(nPin) 0.63 0.71 0.75 0.67 0.69 0.67
H(nPout) 0.65 0.74 0.72 0.69 0.68 0.66
H(nBin) 0.64 0.71 0.75 0.65 0.69 0.65
H(nBout) 0.63 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.66
nMSE(nP) 0.88 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.85 0.89
nMSE(nB) 0.60 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.68 0.61
9.6 Results
The obtained results are summarized in the following subsections.
9.6.1 Impact of granularity
At this experiment, the accuracy of the sensor was measured when studying traffic flows
captured in time intervals of 7.5 sec., 15 sec., 30 sec., 1 min., 2 min. and 3 min; hence only
focusing on the monitorization interval and the adjustment of theK parameter for adaptive
thresholding calibration. The accuracy achieved per metric and configuration is illustrated
in Table 9.5, where the effectiveness of this proposal is expressed in terms of AUC, and
the corresponding TPR and FPR for the best granularity is shown in Table 9.6. This
performance indicator was calculated via trapezoidal approximation with 0.005 estimated
error. The best studied granularity was 15 seconds per observation, which provides the
most accurate results (AUC=0.96, TPR=0.93 and FPR=0.01). When the granularity is
lower (i.e. the duration of the observation is smaller), the accuracy worsens. For example,
when 7.5 seconds the best registered AUC was 0.88. Similarly, as the level of detail falls,
the effectiveness of the proposal decreases, hence reaching AUC=89.2 when 3 minutes per
observations. This is due to the fact that with small observations the information they
compile tends to be less significant, hence being more likely to infer noise. On the contrary,
when the observation is too large, the first observations of the attack may go unnoticed
among legitimate traffic. In this case, the adaptation to non-stationarity readjusted the
analytic algorithms, so if the attack is not initially detected, it may be considered part of
the normal activity of the network. Finally, it is worth to highlight the accuracy achieved
by metrics directly related to the total incoming (nPin) and outcoming (nPout) packet,
which divergence (nMSE(nP )) behaved as the most accurate DDoS indicator at the
performed experimentation. In contrast with the classical entropy-based DDoS detection
solutions focused on intermediate/victim edge audition, these metrics proved not to be as
effective at single source-side monitorization.
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Table 9.6: Best parameters
Best(15 sec.)
TPR FPR Y
0.56 0.01 0.55
0.92 0.01 0.91
0.74 0.51 0.23
0.83 0.01 0.82
0.81 0.48 0.33
0.87 0.49 0.38
0.80 0.47 0.33
0.85 0.49 0.36
0.93 0.01 0.92
0.76 0.50 0.26
Table 9.7: AUC registered per traffic profile at 15 sec. granularity.
Indicator
Traffic usage profile
P0 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
nPin 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.94 0.70 0.84
nPout 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.96
nBin 0.79 0.71 0.51 0.93 0.81 0.67
nBout 0.92 0.88 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.93
H(nPin) 0.73 0.54 0.80 0.84 0.57 0.67
H(nPout) 0.73 0.76 0.79 0.72 0.63 0.67
H(nBin) 0.70 0.58 0.79 0.83 0.56 0.67
H(nBout) 0.71 0.78 0.80 0.64 0.64 0.66
nMSE(nP) 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96
nMSE(nB) 0.84 0.76 0.36 0.91 0.86 0.72
9.6.2 Impact of traffic profile
With the purpose of facilitating the understanding of the achieved results, the impact
of the device usage mode on the effectiveness has been studied when assuming the best
granularity of the previous experimentation, as it is illustrated in Table 9.7. The six
traffic activity profiles described in Table 9.3 were analyzed, hence leading to the following
best results: user daily habits P0 (AUC=0.96), A synthetic traffic P1 (AUC=0.97), B
synthetic traffic P2 (AUC= 0.97), C synthetic traffic P3 (AUC=0.97), audio streaming P4
(AUC=0.96) and video streaming P5 (AUC=0.96). Note that similarly to the previous
tests, the best metric is often the difference between incoming and outgoing packets
(nMSE(nP )), which is closely followed by the total number of incoming packets (nPin)
and the total number of outgoing packages (nPout). Again entropy-based metrics have
not been effective enough. Since no significant variations have been recorded between
traffic profiles, it is possible to conclude that the proposed detection method was capable
of self-calibrating according to the traffic distribution inherent to each type of endpoint,
in this way posing an effective solution regardless the nature of the device.
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Table 9.8: AUC registered per attack type at 15 sec. granularity.
Indicator
Attack type
Hl Hm Hh Tl Tm Th Ul Um Uh
nPin 0.90 0.87 0.83 0.80 0.94 0.89 0.95 0.76 0.75
nPout 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99
nBin 0.87 0.76 0.73 0.62 0.72 0.61 0.69 0.61 0.61
nBout 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.81 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.97
H(nPin) 0.65 0.68 0.78 0.75 0.80 0.79 0.61 0.67 0.74
H(nPout) 0.42 0.69 0.92 0.71 0.64 0.79 0.55 0.70 0.84
H(nBin) 0.66 0.65 0.77 0.73 0.83 0.78 0.58 0.65 0.73
H(nBout) 0.44 0.69 0.92 0.73 0.64 0.71 0.57 0.72 0.86
nMSE(nP) 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
nMSE(nB) 0.79 0.78 0.68 0.66 0.56 0.70 0.80 0.71 0.72
9.6.3 Impact of attack type
Table 9.8 summarizes the accuracy obtained by threat group, which include flooding-based
low-rate attacks on HTTP (H), TCP (T ), UDP (U) protocols. They have been clustered
based on intensity, hence distinguishing three subsets: high intensity (h), medium (m)
and low (l). For example, the symbol Tl refers to the group of TCP attacks of low
intensity. In general terms, the effectiveness was better than at previous tests, where the
metrics nMSE(nP ), (nPin) and (nPout) outstand. The best AUC ranged from 0.99 to 1.0
regardless the intrusion subset. This obvious improvement is empowered by a fundamental
characteristic of the test: the K adjustment factor that was applied for configuring its
restriction level now is set to detect a specific menace; this did not happen at the second
experiment, where the same threshold distance was configured for all the DDoS methods.
In view of these results, it is possible to deduce that the proposed method has been
able to adapt to each attack group. However, as the threat specificity decreases it is
tended to lose precision. This must be taken into account when proposing general-purpose
self-organizing defenses, where it might be advisable to deal with the different intrusion
categories separately.
9.7 Final Remarks
This chapter introduced an autonomic architecture with operability on the emerging
communication networks and a novel intrusion detection approach adaptable to
non-stationary processes. It has posed the most innovative aspects on the analysis of DDoS
attacks on the source side, hence inferring whether a network endpoint is participating in a
DDoS attack. The proposal effectiveness has been proven by an extensive experimentation,
where traffic from 62 devices of different nature has been monitored and analyzed looking
for DDoS traits. The obtained results have demonstrated that it is possible to lay detection
strategies based on predictive analysis on the basis of different flow-level metrics measured
in the network. Nevertheless, not all the metrics have shown equal effectiveness. For
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example, those based on studying the proportionality between incoming and outgoing
traffic yielded promising results, from which it follows that solutions like could be
successfully accommodated for operating on heterogeneous and non-stationary network
environments. In contrast, the classical entropy-based approaches for DDoS detection not
resulted as effective. This fact brings uncertainty about their accuracy when acting at
source-side observations, more particularly at non-stationary contexts. The performed
research on this subject has thereby introduced an innovative approach compared to other
proposals, while proving promising results in the meantime.
Chapter 10
Conclusions and Future Work
The fifth generation of mobile networks has emerged pushed by emerging communication
contexts, where ambitious performance indicators should be addressed to ensure
ubiquitous access to network services. 5G networks are in consequence foreseen as the
technological platform to sustain the economic and societal challenges raised by the modern
communication landscape. Bearing this context in mind, the presented research has been
framed into the study of knowledge acquisition processes aimed to provide analytical
capabilities for conducting a self-organizing management approach in 5G networks.
5G supportive technologies such as SDN, NFV, SON, cloud computing and machine
learning have provided the architectural principles for designing and implementing the
analytical methods introduced throughout this thesis. To accomplish the use cases goals,
the 5G reference architecture provided by the SELFNET project has been considered.
There, particular interest has been set on the Analysis component, where the situational
awareness reasoning has led to conduct strategies for detecting discordant behaviors in the
monitored networks, thus laying the proposal of a reasoning and knowledge acquisition
framework for 5G analytics. On the other hand, the detection of network threats driven by
autonomic incident management approaches have been analyzed in the proposals oriented
to deal with Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) and Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS). All of them have been widely discussed and effectively assessed throughout this
research.
To deal with the challenge of performing advanced network analysis, a reasoning and
knowledge acquisition framework has been introduced. It has been adapted to support
analytic methods on 5G monitoring environments toward the provision of self-organizing
autonomic capabilities. Because of this, the framework assumes the design principles of
the new generation networks and the technologies they implement. This fact motivated
its instantiation tightly coupled to the SELFNET architecture, which involved the
implementation of different components based on pattern recognition methods, prediction
algorithms, adaptive thresholding approximations and knowledge inference techniques.
Such components were orchestrated as a modular architecture, easily expandable and
scalable, adapted to the large volume of information flowing through the network. A
detailed evaluation of those capabilities has been carried out to validate the effectiveness
of the proposal; both at component level, being assessed against reference datasets, and
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at use case level, by analyzing behavioral aspects of the network traffic.
Furthermore, an entropy-based model for the detection of EDoS attacks in cloud
environments has been introduced in this thesis. For this purpose, a comprehensive
revision of the EDoS related research has been covered to elaborate a multi-layered
architecture tackling the detection of EDoS attacks. The proposed work suggested
good detection accuracy, thus preventing the unnecessary consuption of additional cloud
instances if they were issued by auto-scaling policies based on unreal demands. The
experiments conducted to validate the proposed architecture have encompassed all the
stages defined in the architecture, starting from the monitoring and aggregation of
metrics that directly affect the customer’s cost model, implementing the novelty detection
procedures to recognize an EDoS attack, and enabling decision-making and notification
actions to be applied in the system. It is also worth mentioning the distinctive approach
of the proposed model compared to other resource-consuming methods presented in the
literature such as those based on analyzing requests of large files, triggering costly database
queries, exploiting web vulnerabilities, etc. Such detection enhancement is achieved
since this architecture relies on server-side consumption analysis rather than anomalous
network-level metric patterns.
Moving a step further in the analysis of EDoS threats, they have been studied in the
self-organizing network context by highlighting its adaptation to 5G network scenarios.
This study has led to identify two main categories of EDoS threats. The first of them
is W-EDoS, which aims on exploiting vulnerabilities by workload injection in NFV
auto-scaling policies. On the other hand, the I-EDoS threats take advantage of the NFV
auto-instantiation capabilities by thwarting the orchestration processes. Consequently, a
pair of strategies for their mitigation have been proposed. They were based on modeling
the normal behavior of the protected system and discovering discordant activities. Their
effectiveness have been proven at the performed preliminary experimentation, which
considered different adjustment parameters; among them, the attack intensity, the normal
traffic features, and a confidence interval for adaptive thresholding and entropy degree.
Finally, the DDoS use case has been studied by the proposal of a detection approach for
inferring the participation of network endpoint in DDoS attacks. It raised a flooding-based
detection approach of DDoS attacks by analyzing source-side traffic flows from protected
devices, in this way supporting the development of defensive self-organized solutions
grounded on endpoint monitorization. To this end, the detection scheme implemented
predictive analysis considering the non-stationarity of the analyzed traffic, where adaptive
prediction has been implemented by examining time series features that allowed the
selection of the most suited prediction algorithm, and its calibration conducted by a
genetic algorithm. Several flow-level metrics have been analyzed and studied to infer
the participation of a protected device in an orchestrated DDoS attack. The obtained
results demonstrated high accuracy, hence demonstrating that it is possible to raise similar
solutions to the challenges inherent to this type of network threats. Another interesting
finding is that the proposal behaved almost indistinctly on different network usage profiles,
whether they pose legitimate or malicious activities.
In the light of the results obtained by the performed research, it is possible to conclude
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that advanced analytical capabilities in emerging network contexts firmly contribute to
achieve the challenging requirements of network autonomic management introduced at the
begining of this thesis.
Last, but not least, it is also important to bear in mind that 5G is still in research
stage. Thus, various architectural elements of the 5G architecture are foreseen to be
integrated at industry-level by the year 2020 to accomplish the goals of this emerging
platform. Such integration is nowadays being prototyped by the researchers in compliance
with the requirements of 5G networks, as it was explained throughout this thesis. The final
goal is the exploration of innovative approaches for extending the current capabilities of
4G/LTE architectures towards the disruptive technological that 5G supposes. Even though
a primary objective is to perform concept-proof validations, larger industry-level scenarios
have been studied with the use of well-known datasets such as CAIDA, NSL-KDD or M3
competition. Those are widely accepted by the research community, and provide real data
on which the experimental results are validated with more confidence. On the other hand,
the ability to generate large data samples with adjustment to real experimental scenarios
allow a better validation of the proposals. That is the case of the EDoS detection proposals
where data heterogeneity and statistical distribution of the sampled observations have been
addressed, thus dismissing the need of external datasets. Because of the experimental
rigor, the proposals prevent the reader their generalization or biased interpretation by
delimiting their scope. In the same way, the assumptions, limitations and design principles
have been explicitly introduced on each for providing the operational landscape where the
contributions of this thesis have proven their validity.
10.1 Future Work
Bearing in mind the novelty of the introduced proposals and the level of maturity of their
supportive technologies, promising research subjects have been raised as a result of the
conducted research. The knowledge acquisition approach aimed on the development of
5G network analytics have exposed new research lines. The clearest of them is to delve
into how the knowledge acquisition framework can be instantiated in order to face the
challenges posed by the different use cases. These may have very different requirements;
for example, a use case focused on bandwidth optimization may require information that
facilitates deciding proactive actions, and therefore must be primarily based on prediction;
but the reactive responses have greater impact on mitigating threats such as botnets or
DoS attacks. Other interesting topics, such as inclusion of data protection policies or the
communication ways between the proposed framework and the rest of network components
(protocols, interfaces, etc.), have not been detailed throughout the article, in this way
postponing their development for future work.
Regarding the detection of EDoS threats, the presented approach, evaluation
methodology and the conducted experimentation posed also new potential research lines.
On the one hand, experimental scenarios should be extended to couple diverse network
conditions to either enhance the validation or to disclose some evasion techniques.
Moreover, the defined model of measuring the resource consumption and diagnosing its
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entropy can be accommodated to include additional metrics, thus extending its scope
to wider analysis scenarios. Furthermore, the proposed method might be fitted to
enhance adaptive auto-scaling policies on cloud platforms by incorporating more complex
evaluation criteria. Complementary, the existing decision-making and countermeasures
to EDoS attacks remain far from being evolved, and might effectively complement the
conducted research.
It was also identified when analyzing the impact of EDoS threats in self-organized
networks that in certain circumstances the proposal reported significant false positive
rates, which raised interesting lines of future work. For example, integration of alternative
analytic techniques, granularity optimization or adaptation to non-stationary processes.
In addition, for the better understanding of our contributions several issues have not been
addressed, which were outlined throughout the document. They included among others
robustness against adversarial threats or the assumption of data protection policies, hence
being relegated to forthcoming research.
In addition, one of the main drawbacks noticed when assessing the DDoS detection
proposal was its proven tendency to loss in precision as its specificity grows, i.e. when
it is trained to act against a larger variety of attacks. This feature raises an interesting
line of future research that leads to encourage outlining ensemble learning methods for
providing a general-purpose defensive solution. Throughout the research alternative ways
of improvement have been highlighted, being of special interest those based on expanding
the diversity of metrics, prediction algorithms and adjustment parameters. It is expected
that as a result of these enhancements, a greater effectiveness may be registered. This
also contributes to the clearer understanding of the studied traffic profiles, as well as to
assess their impact on intrusion detection at forthcoming communication networks.
Finally, there are common design and implementation aspects that might enhance
the overall performance and accuracy throughout the proposals presented so far. Such
is the case of secure software development which should guarantee data integrity when
performing analytical tasks. For instance, handling efficient data structures suited for
supporting heterogenous data types should raise the resulting performance of the proposed
solutions. Likewise, the use of authenticated software interfaces will raise the restrictiviness
level that prevent third parties for accessing or manipultaing the acquired data. Thereby,
it should allow a more trusted execution environment on which knowledge generation takes
place. Those aspects represent interesting lines of work that might be addressed on future
implementations.
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